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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
DO INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHELTICS SUBSIDIES CORRELATE WITH 
EDUCATIONAL SPENDING? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
DIVISION-I COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
Intercollegiate athletics are a prominent feature of American higher education. 
They have been characterized as the “front door” to the university due to their unique 
ability to draw alumni and other supporters to campus. It is often supposed that the 
exposure from high-profile athletics produces a number of indirect benefits including 
greater institutional prestige. Such exposure comes at a cost, however, as most Division I 
athletics programs are not financially self-sufficient and receive institutional subsidies to 
balance their budgets. At present, it is unclear how institutions budget for athletics 
subsidies or whether the recent increases in subsidies have impacted the overall financial 
picture of colleges and universities. Prior research has shown that athletics subsidies and 
student tuition and fees are not significantly correlated for public Division I institutions, 
which suggests the possibility that institutions have reallocated funds from other core 
areas to athletics. In this dissertation, the relationship between athletics subsidies and one 
of the most important core areas of the university – education and related activities – was 
examined. This relationship was investigated using fixed-effects structural equation 
models to analyze a panel dataset of public Division I institutions.  
It was found that total athletics subsidies (school funds and student fees) per 
student and education and related spending per student were positively correlated. This 
suggests that rather than decrease educational spending, institutions that increase total 
athletics subsidies have simultaneously increased their educational expenditures. 
However, in the analyses involving the more restrictive definition of athletics subsidies, it 
was shown that athletics subsidies from school funds was not correlated with educational 
spending. The results also provided some evidence that differences in the relationship 
between athletics subsidies and educational spending exist according to Carnegie 
classification and level of athletics competition. The findings from this study have a 
number of implications for higher education policy and future research. The absence of a 
negative relationship between athletics subsidies and educational spending suggests that 
athletics subsidies are not associated with decreases in educational spending that could 
ultimately harm the quality of education provided by colleges and universities. 
Furthermore, the existence of a positive correlation between athletics subsidies and 
educational spending and the fact that core revenues were controlled for in the models 
suggest the possibility that institutions have redirected funds from other areas to support 
education and athletics.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Resource allocation in higher education has received increasing public attention in 
recent years in part due to the continued rise of published student tuition and fee rates 
(Ehrenberg, 2000). Even after accounting for inflation, tuition and fees were 3.25 times 
higher in 2014-15 than they were 30 years prior at public four-year institutions (Baum & 
Ma, 2014), where the majority of students pursuing a four-year degree are enrolled 
(Snyder & Dillow, 2013). In real 2014 dollars, this represents an increase from $2,810 to 
$9,139 for in-state students. Climbing tuition rates have led to considerable public 
scrutiny along with demands for greater accountability for institutions to hold down costs 
and limit future tuition increases (Wollan & Lewin, 2009; Nelson, 2013; Woodhouse, 
2015; and Kapsidelis, 2016). In response, a number of states are working toward new 
legislation that will limit annual tuition increases to a fixed amount between 2 and 6 
percent (e.g. Maryland and Florida) or the rate of inflation (Wisconsin, Texas, and 
Georgia) (Dance, 2005; Dunkelberger, 2014; Stein & Herzon, 2015; Watkins & 
McCrimmon, 2015; Sheinen, 2016).  
A number of explanations have been proposed for the rising costs of higher 
education, and those explanations can generally be classified into two categories: 
mismanagement of resources and cost disease. The former view has received much 
attention through the media, and typically follows that an “academic arms race” is taking 
place, leading institutions to construct lavish facilities and services, such as suite-style 
dormitories, gourmet meals, and fitness centers in the competition to attract top students 
(see Zemsky, Wegner, & Massy, 2005; Winston, 2000; Ehrenberg, 2000; and Smart, 
2007). The cost disease argument is based in economic theory and supposes that in times 
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of economic prosperity, private industry is able to increase its profits through increased 
productivity, which leads to wage increases for its workforce. Colleges and universities 
are unable to increase productivity in a similar manner without compromising the quality 
of their education and services, but must also pay higher wages in order to successfully 
compete with industry for an educated workforce (see Massy, 1996; Becker & Lewis, 
1993; Archibald & Feldman, 2001). The net result is cost increases for colleges and 
universities, which are forwarded on to the consumer in the absence of increased funding 
to subsidize the services provided.  
There is also a third explanation for the rise in college tuition and is one that has 
been oft-cited within the higher education community itself. This explanation suggests 
that tuition increases are primarily, if not entirely, the result of declining state 
appropriations (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2016). Between 2008 and 2013, 
states have collectively decreased their funding of public institutions by 21 percent or 
$14.1 billion (“Federal and state funding,” 2015). As an example, the University of 
Illinois-Champaign has seen its state funding decrease from $526.6 million in 1987 to 
$335.3 million in 2012 (in real 2012 dollars) (“Twenty-five years of declining state 
support,” 2014). While some institutions have fared better than the University of Illinois 
in terms of state support, it is certainly not alone in its experience. The continued decline 
in state funding has forced public institutions to become increasingly reliant on other 
sources of revenue, most notably student tuition and fees (Fowles, 2014). Institutions 
have used tuition to balance their budgets because it is the revenue stream over which 
they have had the greatest control and student demand has been largely inelastic with 
respect to price up to this point (Funk, 1972; Ghali, Miklius, & Wada, 1977).  
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Faced with declining state support and mounting pressure to limit tuition 
increases, public institutions have been forced to make a variety of difficult financial 
decisions over the past decade. Such cost-saving measures as hiring freezes, employee 
furloughs and layoffs, administrative re-structuring, and early retirements have become 
commonplace (Pelletier, 2011; Blackford, 2016; Box, 2016). A number of institutions 
have eliminated certain degree programs as well, leading to the closing of academic 
departments and with it the laying off of tenured faculty (Douglas-Gabriel, 2016; Brown, 
2016). As a university contemplates such actions, it must consider not only the economic 
costs and benefits of each program but also the intrinsic value it provides to the 
institution and its constituents. This raises the question of how does a university make the 
determination that one program is more valuable than another? 
Bowen (1980) was among the first to suggest that the primary goal of colleges 
and universities is to increase their influence and prestige. Moreover, he argues the only 
limitation on how much schools will spend in pursuit of greater prestige is the amount of 
revenue they are able to obtain. Garvin (1980) has further expounded upon Bowen’s 
theory, commonly known as the Revenue Theory of Costs, by suggesting that a 
university’s overall prestige is a weighted sum of the prestige of its academic 
departments. He argues that each department’s prestige is based chiefly upon the prestige 
of its discipline and secondly upon its standing within that discipline. In other words, a 
lower tier physics program is believed to provide greater prestige than a top-ranked 
Spanish program. Alpert (1985) has observed that when resources for higher education 
were relatively abundant during the 1950s and 1960s, colleges and universities expanded 
almost unilaterally, adding or enhancing programs in a large number of disciplines. In 
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more recent decades, however, competition for campus resources has intensified, leading 
the university to allocate resources in a less egalitarian manner by favoring those 
programs that bring the greatest prestige and external revenues (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  
Beyond academic programs, another activity that can generate a high level of 
visibility and recognition for the university is a successful Division-I athletics program. 
Athletics has been famously characterized as the “front door to the university,” meaning 
that it is the first and perhaps only contact many outside of campus will ever have with 
the institution (Toma & Cross, 1998). There appears to be considerable truth in this 
statement as athletic events have shown a unique ability to draw crowds of current and 
prospective students, parents, and alumni to campus in a manner that is unmatched by 
other activities (Toma, 1999). Furthermore, televised games offer significant national 
exposure, particularly for schools in the Power 5 conferences (Big Ten, Big 12, SEC, 
ACC, and PAC-12). Such exposure is believed to generate a “halo effect,” leading 
prospective students and other outside observers to conclude that an institution whose 
athletics programs are successful is a successful institution in general (Fisher, 2009; 
Quattrone, 2008).  
In addition to greater visibility and prestige, it has often been argued that 
Division-I athletics provide a number of indirect benefits to the university. One such 
benefit is the purported windfall of student applications resulting from a successful 
football or basketball season (Clotfelter, 2011). The case of Boston College, whose 
student applications rose 33 percent following the football team’s upset victory over 
Miami University in 1984, is frequently cited to support such claims (Marklein, 2001). 
More recently, Butler University saw a 40 percent increase in applications following its 
4
back-to-back appearances in the championship game of the NCAA basketball tournament 
in 2010 and 2011 (Johnson, 2013). Such increases in applications are attractive to 
universities because they provide considerable flexibility in admissions, assuming the 
overall quality of the pool remains constant (or improves). For example, the institution 
can increase its enrollment and generate additional revenue, all while maintaining its 
current student quality (Pope & Pope, 2009). Alternatively, enrollment can be held 
constant, which allows the institution to become increasingly selective.  
Others have suggested that athletics are an important means of increasing 
philanthropic donations, in part because they provide a reason for alumni and other 
prospective donors to participate in on-campus events (Fizel, 2004). Once on campus, 
development officers have convenient access to prospective donors to solicit gifts for a 
variety of purposes, athletics as well as academic. The recent example of Texas A&M 
University appears to support such a connection between athletics and fundraising. 
Following its first season in the SEC in 2012, one in which its football team posted an 11-
2 record and defeated Oklahoma in the Cotton Bowl, A&M raised $740 million in 
donations, $300 million more than any other year in school history (Khan Jr., 2013).  
Athletics programs have also been credited with helping to build a sense of 
campus community, developing important character and leadership skills in student-
athletes, and even improving access for low-income and minority students to higher 
education (Clopton, 2009; French, 2004; Bok, 2003). However, research examining the 
many indirect benefits of intercollegiate athletics to the university has provided mixed 
results (see for example Pope & Pope, 2009; Stinson & Howard, 2007; Brooker & 
Klastorin, 1981). Furthermore, studies that have found positive and significant 
5
relationships between athletics and student applications or alumni donations have 
generally shown such effects to be small (Frank, 2004). For example, Pope and Pope 
(2009) estimated that an NCAA basketball tournament appearance would lead to a 1 
percent increase in applications and a top-20 football ranking a 2.5 percent increase, 
controlling for other factors. In surveying the body of empirical evidence, Frank (2004) 
has concluded that “institutions overspend on athletics in order to reap few benefits.”  
Despite the lack of evidence to support the argument that universities reap 
substantial indirect benefits from Division-I athletics programs, there is little question 
that many institutions assign a high priority to building (and maintaining) a successful 
program. Between 2004 and 2014, FBS athletics departments increased their median 
spending from $29.0 million to $64.0 million (120 percent) and FCS departments from 
$7.8 million to $15.1 million (94 percent) (Fulks, 2015). As a baseline for comparison, 
the total rate of inflation during this time period was only 23 percent (US Department of 
Labor, 2015). Increased athletic spending in and of itself may not be an issue if it 
coincides with increases in revenue from ticket sales, television contracts, or donations. 
This has not been the case for most Division-I institutions, however, as their reliance on 
institutional subsidies to balance athletics department budgets has only increased. Data 
indicate the median FBS subsidy climbed from $7.2 million to $12.9 million (79.2 
percent) between 2006 and 2014 (Fulks, 2008; Fulks, 2015).  
Counter to what one might expect, it is not the high-profile programs who 
generally have the largest subsidies. For example, Ohio State, Alabama, and Texas all 
reported $0 in total subsidies in 2015 (USA Today, 2016). Rather, FBS institutions in 
non-power conferences, such as the Mid-American, Atlantic-10, and American Athletic 
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Conferences, have been among the worst offenders as far as subsidies are concerned. 
Houston, Connecticut, and Delaware all reported total subsidies in excess of $25 million 
in 2015 (USA Today, 2016). Unable to generate the same level of revenue through ticket 
sales, television contracts, and donations as Power 5 programs, these institutions are 
forced to heavily subsidize athletics in order to remain competitive. In short, the desire to 
compete in Division-I athletics has given rise to an arms race in which no one institution 
is likely to de-emphasize athletics and curtail spending voluntarily (Frank, 2004). 
Despite the unprecedented growth in intercollegiate athletics spending there has 
been relatively little empirical research on the impact of subsidies on university 
budgetary decisions. A portion of student fees are earmarked for athletics at most 
institutions, but it remains unclear how universities budget for subsidies coming from 
institutional funds. For example, do subsidies represent a fixed line-item within the 
student services, facilities, or another unit-level budget, or are reserve and other funds re-
allocated from other departments at the end of the year to cover athletics budget 
shortfalls? Furthermore, it is not readily apparent what role, if any, athletics subsidies 
have played in the recent rise in student tuition.  
To date, a few researchers have studied the relationship between athletics on-field 
success and student charges. Alexander and Kern (2009) sought to determine the 
correlation between various measures of athletics success and in-state and out-of-state 
tuition. Their analysis showed a positive correlation between football and men’s 
basketball win percentages with both in-state and out-of-state tuition, although effects 
were most pronounced for schools in the Power 5 conferences. In another study, Smith 
(2012) found a positive relationship between football success and a combined measure of 
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student costs (tuition, fees, and room and board), controlling for other factors. However, 
the relationship between basketball success and student charges was non-significant.  
A recent study by Jones and Rudolph (2016) provides the most direct look at the 
effect of subsidies on student charges. Their study utilized data for 223 public, Division-I 
institutions from the USA Today NCAA Athletic Department Revenue Database (2016). 
They estimated a series of fixed-effects models to test the relationship between athletics 
subsidies and both in-state and out-of-state student charges (tuition list price and net 
price). Controlling for a variety of factors related to the state’s economy, student demand, 
regional competition, and student financial aid, it was shown that the correlation between 
athletics subsidies and student charges was non-significant in all of the model 
specifications.  
The finding by Jones and Rudolph (2016) that athletics subsidies are not 
correlated with student charges at public institutions is not entirely surprising. Although 
Bowen (1980) has suggested that universities seek to raise additional revenue rather than 
decrease costs, the ability of public institutions to increase their tuition rates is generally 
restricted because they are subject to approval from a state governing board. As a result, 
it is possible that universities are having to decrease costs in other areas, such as 
instruction or student services, in order to provide increasing institutional support to 
athletics. 
In this vein, the goal of this dissertation was to examine the extent to which public 
universities are “robbing Peter to pay Paul” by re-directing funds from instructional 
activities to support athletics programs. To date, empirical research on this subject has 
not been published, and related studies have focused upon the impact of athletics on 
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student costs rather than institutional resource allocation. The current study complements 
this existing research because it focuses upon the expense, rather than revenue side of the 
university budget. Moreover, this study is timely because of the present financial climate 
in higher education, and important because it speaks to the impact of athletics on the core 
mission of public higher education. The research questions addressed in this study 
include: 
1. How do the rates of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school 
funds per FTE compare to the rate of growth in education and related (E&R) 
expenditures per FTE for public Division I institutions between 2005 and 
2014? 
2. What is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R 
expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors? 
3. Is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R 
expenditures per FTE dependent upon institution type (research university, 
flagship university) or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting 
structure, level of play), controlling for other factors? 
4. What is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures 
per FTE, controlling for other factors? 
5. Is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per 
FTE dependent upon institution type (research university, flagship university) 
or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level of play), 
controlling for other factors? 
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In chapter two of this dissertation, a review of the literature pertaining to 
university resource allocation is presented. This discussion begins with an overview of 
the resource allocation process and various university budget models that are used to 
distribute funds to units and departments across campus. Subsequently, the types of 
revenues and expenditures and their relative importance to public and private four-year 
institutions is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical research on 
indirect benefits to the university from intercollegiate athletics. Lastly, the theoretical 
framework and research questions that were used to guide the study are presented. The 
theories presented include: property rights theory of the firm; principle-agent theory; 
resource-dependence theory; and Bowen’s revenue theory of costs. 
Chapter three begins with a discussion of the research hypotheses for the study, 
which have been developed according to existing economic and higher education theory. 
Next, the research methodology is described with respect to the data collection and 
preparation, the empirical models that were tested, and the statistical procedures used to 
analyze the dataset.  Chapter four presents the results from the analyses used to 
investigate each of the five research questions. The final chapter of this dissertation 
summarizes key findings and discusses the implications of the results for higher 
education theory and future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature in three principal areas that 
provide the necessary background information to contextualize the proposed study. The 
first section focuses upon university resource allocation, including a review of higher 
education budget models. It follows with a presentation of university revenue and 
expense categories and differences in revenue and expenditure patterns between public 
and private four-year institutions. The second section of this chapter reviews the most 
frequent justifications for intercollegiate athletics on the basis of proposed indirect 
benefits. These benefits include: increased marketing and prestige; number and quality of 
student applications; philanthropic donations; and student-athlete character development. 
The arguments for each of these areas is presented followed by a review of existing 
empirical research that has tested these assumptions. The third section presents the 
theoretical framework for this study drawing upon key economic and higher education 
theories to shed light on university financial decision-making processes and priorities. 
Finally, the research questions that will be examined in the proposed study are presented 
at the end of the chapter.  
Resource Allocation in Higher Education 
Budget Models 
Each college and university develops an annual budget in order to specify how 
resources are to be allocated across departments and for what purpose. A useful definition 
of a budget is provided by Wildavsky (1988, p.2) who characterizes it as a “link between 
financial resources and human behavior in order to accomplish policy objectives.” Four 
types of higher education budgets have been identified by Barr and McClellan (2011): 
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operating, capital, auxiliary, and special funds. Most expenses incurred during the day-to-
day operations of core units such as academic departments and administrative units are 
contained within the operating budget. Capital budgets consist of revenues and expenses 
for large capital projects such as new building construction or renovation (McClellan & 
Barr, 2011). It is common for capital projects to be assigned their own budgets because 
revenues are restricted and projects may span multiple fiscal years. Many auxiliary units 
possess distinct budgets because, as non-core units, they are expected to accrue sufficient 
revenues to cover all of their expenditures. Common auxiliary units include student 
housing, dining services, teaching hospitals, and Division-I athletic departments (Clark & 
d’Ambrosio, 2006). Lastly, special funds budgets may be designated for specific 
programs or services, such as an endowed scholarship (Goldstein, 2005).  
The annual budget is unique to each college or university, but a number of 
commonalities exist across American higher education. First, each budget has a finite life 
cycle that in most cases is 12 months and follows the institution’s defined fiscal year. 
Generally, a fiscal year is the period between July 1st and June 31st but may vary 
depending on the institution (Barr & McClellan, 2011). The fiscal year determines when 
new funds are allocated and charges cease to be made against funds for the current year. 
Second, the budgets of all institutions are governed by a number of constraints. For all 
colleges and universities – for-profit and non-profit alike - expenditures are not to exceed 
revenues in a given fiscal year (Granof, Khumawala, 2013). An annual deficit may not 
result in the immediate failure of an institution, but persistent losses are not sustainable. 
And third, a number of revenues are restricted – such as those associated with special 
funds or capital projects – and cannot be used to support activities beyond those for 
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which they were specified (Massy, 1996). Moreover, some expenses cannot readily be 
eliminated or even decreased from one budget to the next. One example is the salaries 
and outlays of tenured faculty who cannot be let go except in cases of dire financial need 
or gross incompetence.  
Resource allocation may follow a centralized process, with decisions made 
largely by the central administration, or a decentralized process where budgeting 
authority is delegated to the individual units. In a highly centralized environment, a small 
group of administrators is responsible for compiling financial information, developing 
budget projections, and overseeing budget operations. Institutions that operate from a 
centralized position seek to closely regulate the spending of each unit in an effort to align 
its behavior with institutional priorities (Rodas, 1998). In practice, centralized budget 
processes tend to limit unit accountability, which frequently leads to wasteful spending 
(Hoenack, 1994). Centralized models also tend to foster distrust between units and the 
central administration because limited financial information is transmitted from the 
administration to the units.  
 Historically, most institutions operated under a centralized budgeting process; 
however, many have moved to decentralized models in recent years due to the 
shortcomings of centralized control as well as the growing complexity and size of the 
university (Massy, 1996; Rodas, 1998). Decentralization seeks to place much of the 
responsibility for budgeting and resource management in the hands of deans and other 
unit leaders under the premise that those individuals are most informed regarding what 
resources are needed and how they can best be utilized. Furthermore, decentralization 
increases each unit’s knowledge and understanding of the budgeting process, and leads to 
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greater communication between the administration and individual units (Goldstein, 
2005). However, decentralized budgeting, depending on the model that is in place, can 
lead to principal-agent problems if control mechanisms or incentives are not developed to 
ensure units pursue institutional goals and not simply their own agenda (Rodas, 1998). 
Another common issue is that the central administration may itself be resource-poor, 
making it difficult to fund new programs and initiatives (Lasher & Greene, 1993). 
A number of budget models – centralized and decentralized - that have been 
developed within higher education over the past 50 years will be presented in the 
subsequent paragraphs. Specifically, incremental budgeting, formula and performance-
based budgeting, zero-based budgeting, planning, programming and budgeting systems, 
and responsibility-centered management will be presented in some detail. Additionally, 
some notable advantages and disadvantages of each approach will be discussed. 
Incremental Budgeting 
One of the oldest yet still the most widely used budget model in higher education 
is line-item or incremental budgeting (IB) (Schuh, 2003). Development of a new annual 
budget using this method begins with the budget from the most recent fiscal year, with 
increases or decreases being applied to the individual line-items or more broadly to the 
college, school, or unit-level budgets (Lasher & Greene, 1993). For example, a unit may 
be given a flat three-percent increase to its budget from the previous year. Responsibility 
for developing the budget resides with the central administration, which generally 
communicates with units in a top-down manner. Units may have the opportunity to 
request additional funding for new faculty lines or technology upgrades for example, but 
the decision of which needs will be addressed is made by the administration. Once the 
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new budget is developed, it is communicated to the units who are then responsible for 
executing their share of the overall budget. Expenditures are monitored closely by the 
administration in order to identify and address potential overages within unit-level 
budgets or line items (Massy, 1996).  
 IB has a number of inherent strengths. First, it is the budget model that arguably 
provides the central administration with the greatest control over resource allocation 
because the administration allocates all resources and specifies how they are to be used. 
Because all funds flow through the central administration, it should also be capable of 
locating funds for new initiatives, such as the launching of a new graduate program. 
Second, IB is a simple, straight-forward approach because adjustments are made to the 
preceding budget and line items are not examined in detail (Barr & McClellan, 2011). 
Moreover, the time to develop and implement the annual budget should be less than in 
other forms of budgeting because of the relatively few steps and persons involved. 
Finally, since the central administration develops and tracks the budgets of individual 
units, possible issues may be identified and addressed prior to the end of the fiscal year.  
 On the other hand, a number of key disadvantages can be attributed to IB, and 
those disadvantages loom large enough that many institutions have transitioned to other 
budget models (Rodas, 1998). For one, IB is based on a flawed assumption, namely that 
resources were properly allocated in previous fiscal years and only minor adjustments are 
necessary moving forward (Lasher & Greene). Such reasoning is flawed because the 
priorities of institutions change over time, and the costs of all activities and services do 
not necessarily increase at the same rate. Second, programs are automatically continued 
from one year to the next, in most cases, without consideration of their continued 
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viability or contribution to the institution’s current priorities. Still another issue with IB is 
that it fails to promote fiscal conservativeness by unit budget managers. In fact, units 
have a disincentive to save money because unused funds are usually collected by the 
administration at the close of the fiscal year, and a large leftover balance may cause a unit 
to receive less funding in subsequent years (Massy, 1996). Thus, departments are 
encouraged to spend any remaining funds before the end of the fiscal year. 
Zero-based Budgeting 
Whereas incremental budgeting does not entail a detailed review of line items, 
zero-based budgeting (ZBB) requires that each line item be justified on an annual basis 
(Schloss & Cragg, 2013). ZBB is designed to allow the administration opportunity to 
shift resources and better align them with institutional priorities, locating resources where 
they are most needed. The budget process for ZBB is typically managed by the central 
administration but tends to be more collaborative than IB due to the direct involvement of 
the units in the development of their annual budgets. This leads to less information 
asymmetry between the administration and the unit by comparison with IB.  
ZBB has several advantages, most notably its ability to minimize wasteful 
spending. Because each line item is reviewed on an annual basis, poor management of 
funds in previous years can be corrected in the future. Furthermore, the central 
administration can shift funds from one area to another if less funds are required to 
sustain an existing activity and new costs have been identified elsewhere. Another 
advantage is that the budget process involves sharing of information between the unit and 
the administration, and the ability of the unit to request funding may improve buy-in and 
ownership.  
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The clearest disadvantage for ZBB is the time required of all groups involved in 
the budget process. The steps of requesting and preparing detailed budgets and line-item 
justification for each unit, reviewing all line items, and allocating the necessary funds for 
each line item are time and resource intensive (Barr & McClellan, 2011). As a result, 
very few institutions currently adhere to a pure ZBB approach. Institutions have been 
much more inclined to implement a hybrid model that involves certain aspects of ZBB, 
such as the allocation of funding for discretionary line items according to ZBB principles, 
with more static items such as tenured faculty salaries being funded according to IB 
(McClellan, & Stringer, 2009). Another potential drawback to ZBB is that it may suffer 
from a lack of rapport between the central administration and the units if the review and 
decision-making process by the administration is not sufficiently transparent. As with IB, 
departments may become frustrated and view the process as arbitrary if their requests for 
additional funding are repeatedly denied and no explanation is provided.  
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems 
A quantitative approach to organizational budgeting called planning 
programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS) was developed during the 1960s and 
implemented within a few colleges and universities, including the University of 
California, Ohio State, Princeton, and the University of Utah during the 1970s (Meisinger 
& Dubeck, 1985). However, the approach has disappeared from higher education 
altogether in the decades since (Lasher & Greene, 1993). The focus of PPBS was to 
closely tie institutional objectives with resource allocation, and it relies upon careful 
planning to identify program-specific outcomes and the resources needed to achieve 
those outcomes (Vandement, 1989). Additionally, a list of alternative approaches and 
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their costs must be developed for each outcome in order to select the most cost-effective 
means of accomplishing that outcome. The unit of analysis in PPBS is the program, 
which may range from degree programs to student services initiatives and even 
maintenance of the physical plant (Bers, Head, & Palmer, 2014). To be successful, PPBS 
requires clear and measurable objectives, detailed cost estimates, outcomes data, and 
careful analysis of all information. 
PPBS has a number of strengths, including its ability to integrate resource 
management and planning (Caruthers & Orwig, 1979). The institution, once it has created 
long-range plans and cost estimates, is able to justify all expenses according to their 
relationship to the stated objectives. Another strength is that PPBS provides a clear sense 
of direction to the activities of the university, which theoretically improves alignment of 
the goals of the agents (units) with those of the administration (principal) (Caruthers & 
Orwig, 1979). Moreover, without PPBS the institution may not ordinarily engage in long-
term planning or may fail to develop quantifiable outcome measures. Finally, if 
conducted successfully at the program level, the institution is able to better understand 
the costs associated with each program as well as the costs of alternatives.  
PPBS is a logical approach to organizational budgeting, but is one that institutions 
have found difficult to implement and sustain. As with ZBB, the amount of time and 
resources the university is able or willing to devote to the budget process is often limited. 
PPBS requires a substantial volume of quantitative information to be compiled and 
analyzed on an annual basis, including program costs and performance towards stated 
objectives (Lasher & Greene, 1993). Moreover, PPBS assumes that an institution has 
access to cost information for all programs as well as for possible alternatives, which is 
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rarely if ever the case. Institutions have also found it difficult to define outcomes and 
determine quantitative means of measuring those outcomes (Barr, 2004). Another 
problem for PPBS is that the unit of analysis is the program, which is inconsistent with 
the manner in which most institutions estimate costs and allocate resources. Resources 
tend to be allocated at the school or department level, but rarely the program level. 
Because programs often draw upon resources from multiple units, estimating their total 
costs is an onerous task. As an example, a department of biology may offer 
undergraduate programs in biology, biology education, and zoology as well as graduate 
programs in ecology, genetics, and microbiology. More than likely, biology faculty will 
teach in most if not all of these programs.  
Formula and Performance-Based Budgeting 
 Two other approaches to higher education budgeting, formula-based budgeting 
(FBB) and performance-based budgeting (PBB), are discussed together in this section 
due to their evident similarity. With FBB, resources are allocated according to a set of 
criteria selected by the institution, and may include such measures as student enrollments, 
degrees conferred, student contact hours, or externally sponsored research (Pickens, 
1982). The purpose of a funding formula is to relate program demand with costs, and 
formula are based upon historical data, projections, and desired levels of output (Lasher 
& Greene, 1993). For a criterion to be included in the formula, it must be both 
measurable and quantifiable. At its foundation, FBB attempts to provide an equitable 
means of allocating resources as well as to implement criteria that align with the priorities 
of the institution. Similarly, PBB identifies criteria that are used to gauge success towards 
meeting desired outcomes (Daugherty & Natow, 2015). These may include similar items 
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to those noted above or other incentives that signal increases in performance. While not 
necessarily the case with FBB, PBB seeks to identify criteria that are moveable and serve 
to motivate departments to improve their performance.  
Due to their similarities, the two systems possess many of the same strengths and 
weaknesses. For either approach, the allocation of funds is arguably an equitable and 
objective means of allocated resources (Lasher & Greene, 1993). Additionally, once the 
criteria are defined, PBB and FBB are relatively simple to implement, assuming the 
required data are easily obtained. Further, the criteria used for PBB may serve to motivate 
individual units to improve in the areas measured by the institutional performance 
indicators. The possibility of additional funding or the fear of decreased funding in future 
years should encourage units to manage resources in a manner consistent with their 
intended purpose.  
Critics of formula budgeting and PBB cite the difficulty in identifying appropriate 
criteria and assigning reasonable weights to each criterion in the funding formula 
(Caruthers & Orwig, 1979). If not chosen carefully, units may complain that criteria are 
arbitrary or inappropriately emphasized. Another concern is the possibility that FBB and 
PBB may further strengthen units that are already resource-rich at the expense of 
resource-poor units. In other words, the units that have the most resources at their 
disposal are likely to be in the best position to pursue and be successful in achieving the 
performance criteria. Still another issue for these two methods is that they inherently 
emphasize certain behaviors, while devaluing others. Departments may focus exclusively 
on the criteria in the formula at the expense of other, potentially critical activities that are 
not linked to resources.  
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Responsibility Centered Management 
One of the more common methods of decentralized resource allocation is known 
as responsibility centered management (RCM) budgeting. This approach follows the 
Harvard mantra of “every tub on its own bottom” where each unit, or cost center, is 
responsible for generating its own revenues and covering all of its expenses (Hoenack & 
Collins, 1990). Cost centers are typically identified as each college or school and 
administrative, auxiliary, and service unit. In addition to holding each unit accountable 
for its costs, the responsibility of developing and monitoring the budget is largely 
transferred to the unit itself. Accordingly, deans and other unit leaders are able to focus 
resources where they are most needed or will provide the greatest utility. Units are further 
incentivized by the fact that they are able to retain all of the revenues they raise. Another 
common feature of most RCM systems is the use of overhead charges (or taxes) applied 
to each unit by the central administration to cover its operating costs (Rodas, 1998). Units 
are often charged for their consumption of campus resources including utilities, facilities, 
technology, and a variety of administrative functions. In some institutions, enough funds 
are gathered by the administration to allocate subsidies or subventions to units that are 
unable to raise sufficient revenues on their own.  
RCM has a number of advantages over the budget models that have been 
reviewed to this point. First, it leads to greater accountability for each cost center, as each 
is responsible for raising enough revenues to cover its costs. Units that fail to cover their 
costs must make up for any deficits by raising additional revenues or decreasing costs in 
subsequent years in order to repay the central administration. Second, RCM encourages 
entrepreneurial behavior by its deans and other unit leaders (Barr & McClellan, 2011). To 
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increase revenues, departments may develop, for example, new revenue-generating 
programs or increase their fundraising efforts. Third, RCM places the responsibility for 
budgeting directly in the hands of those who are most familiar with a unit’s operations 
and needs. Deans, department chairs, and even faculty are afforded much greater input 
into budget decisions than in other budget models. 
 RCM is not without its flaws, however. A frequent criticism is that it can 
accentuate principal-agent problems because units are given substantial freedom in 
deciding how to allocate their resources and may become too entrepreneurial (Schuh, 
Jones, & Harper, 2010; Barr, 2004). For example, a university may wish to decrease its 
average class size, whereas the college of engineering may prefer large classes in order to 
decrease faculty teaching loads and free up additional time for research. Hence, fostering 
participation in university-wide initiatives becomes difficult without explicit incentives. 
Another challenge with RCM is determining an equitable process for making overhead 
charges and allocating subventions (Rodas, 1998). Overhead charges perceived to be 
excessive, or large increases from one year to the next, will be viewed negatively by units 
who then may decide to look for ways around the system. Discontent may also arise over 
subventions. Units that generate positive net revenue and receive little to no subventions 
may view units that are provided sizeable subventions as not pulling their weight (Barr & 
McClellan, 2011). Finally, the central administration may have difficulty securing 
enough revenue to fund its own operations or university-wide initiatives if overhead 
charges are insufficient. 
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Having reviewed several important budget models in higher education, the paper 
proceeds with a discussion of the primary types of revenues and expenditures for colleges 
and universities.  
Revenues and Expenditures in Higher Education 
One of the strengths of higher education in the United States is the diversity of 
revenue sources from which colleges and universities are able to draw. It is in part due to 
this diversity that institutions have been able to survive and even thrive following 
sustained periods of decline to one or more sources of revenue (Michael, 2005). While 
most institutions have multiple revenue streams available to them, the specific streams 
and size of those streams vary according to institutional type, size, mission, and 
geographic location. In this section, the various types of revenues and expenditures as 
well as their importance to public and private four-year institutions will be discussed.  
Revenues 
Broadly, higher education revenues can be classified as either restricted or 
unrestricted in their use. Restricted revenues may only be allocated for expenses that 
match their intended use, while unrestricted revenues can generally be used however the 
institution deems most appropriate (Lasher & Greene, 1993). Most colleges and 
universities are funded through a combination of the following: student tuition and fees, 
federal and state government appropriations, private gifts, grants and contracts, 
endowment income, and a handful of others such as auxiliary enterprises and hospital 
services (Toutkoushian, 2001). The most comprehensive public source of college and 
university financial data is available through the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2015b). 
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All institutions that participate in any form of Title IV financial aid are required to report 
their annual revenues and expenditures to NCES using either Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (public institutions) or Financial Accounting Standards Board (private 
institutions) (National Center for Education Statistics, N.D.a). Although differences 
between the two accounting standards exist (particularly for expenditures) a careful 
review of their methodology as well as comparative statements provided by the NCES 
(Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, N.D.b) and Delta 
Cost Project (2011) allow for comparisons to be made between institutions of varying 
types.  
To demonstrate the relative importance of each revenue source within higher 
education, the percentage of total revenues attributed to each source is shown in Figure 
2.1 for all public four-year institutions during the time period of 2000-01 to 2011-12. 
Percentages for private not-for-profit four-year institutions are provided in Figure 2.2. 
Evident from Figure 2.1 is the reliance of public institutions on state, local, and private 
appropriations, gifts, and contracts. This category represents the largest source of funding 
in each year shown; however its place within the overall budget decreased from 34 
percent in 2000-01 to 26 percent in 2011-12. Declines in state funding for public higher 
education have occurred not only in terms of the share of public funding within overall 
institutional budgets, but also in terms of real dollars. At public research universities the 
average revenue per student FTE (full-time equivalent) from state and local 
appropriations declined from $10,983 in 2000-01 to $7,902 in 2010-11, a decrease of 28 
percent (Desrochers & Hulburt, 2014). Regardless of the reasons for declining state 
support of public higher education, Figure 2.1 demonstrates that public institutions have 
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become more dependent upon student tuition and fee revenue, federal support (including 
federal student aid), and other revenues. From 2000-01 to 2011-12 each of these 
categories has seen its share within the overall revenue picture increase by about 3 
percent (see Figure 2.1).  
Private institutions, as one might expect, exhibit a heavier reliance on student 
tuition and fees in place of state, local, and private appropriations (see Figure 2.2). In 
2000-01 and 2011-12, tuition and fee revenue represented nearly 40 percent of the budget 
for private colleges and universities compared to roughly 20 percent for public 
institutions. Additionally, private institutions drew upon private gifts and donations as 
part of their annual budget to a greater extent than public institutions over the time period 
shown: 11 percent compared with 4 percent in 2011-12. Federal appropriations and 
support (including federal financial aid), hospital services, auxiliary enterprises, and other 
sources of revenue each occupied a comparable share of the revenue for public and 
private four-year institutions.  
Investment income occupies a consistent share of public institution revenues (1 to 
4 percent) but fluctuates from -7 to 23 percent for private institutions. Greater insight into 
these ranges can be obtained through Table 1, which shows the percentage of total 
revenues from investment income for each year between 2000-01 and 2011-12 for public 
and private four-year institutions. It is evident from the table that in most years 
investment income occupies a greater share of private institutions’ total revenues (median 
of 13 percent) than public institutions (median of 4 percent). Much of this difference can 
be attributed to the larger endowments of private institutions. For example, in 2011-12,  
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the median endowment per student FTE for private doctoral universities was $63,700 
compared to $15,500 for public doctoral universities (Baum & Ma, 2014). 
Figure 2.1 
Percentage of Total Revenue by Category for Public 4-year Institutions in 2000-01, 
2005-06, and 2011-12 
Source: Data have been compiled from the Digest of Education Statistics provided by the 
National Center for Education Statistics.  
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Figure 2.2 
Percentage of Total Revenue by Category for Private Not-for-profit 4-year Institutions in 
2000-01, 2005-06, and 2011-12 
 
Source: Data have been compiled from the Digest of Education Statistics provided by the 
National Center for Education Statistics.  
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Table 2.1 
Percentage of Total Revenue for Public and Private Not-for-profit 4-year Institutions 
Attributable to Investment Income for 2000-01 to 2011-12. 
Public 4-year 
Private Not-for-
Profit 4-year 
2000-01 1% -4%
2001-02 NA -8%
2002-03 NA 9%
2003-04 4% 23%
2004-05 5% 22%
2005-06 4% 23%
2006-07 7% 31%
2007-08 2% 5%
2008-09 -5% -94%
2009-10 4% 17%
2010-11 5% 26%
2011-12 2% 3%
Median 4% 13% 
Source: Data have been compiled from the Digest of Education Statistics provided by the 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
Expenditures 
 College and university expenditures have been functionally classified by the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) into the following areas: instruction, 
research, public service, academic support, student services, institutional support, 
operation and maintenance of the physical plant, scholarships and fellowships, auxiliary 
enterprises, hospital services, independent operations, and other expenses and deductions 
(Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2015a). Provided in 
Figure 2.3 is the percentage of total expenditures according to functional category for all 
public four-year institutions during the time period of 2001-02 to 2011-12. Figure 2.4 
shows the same information for all private, not-for-profit, four-year colleges and 
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universities. Data for both sets of institutions have been extracted and compiled from the 
IPEDS database, with several transformations having been made to address differences in 
accounting. Specifically, the expenses for operation and maintenance of plant, 
depreciation, and interest are reported as totals for FASB institutions (private) but are 
aligned with other expense categories, such as instruction and research, for GASB 
institutions (public). The expenses for each of these three areas were subtracted from the 
corresponding expense categories and then summed to create totals for maintenance, 
depreciation, and interest. Lastly, for the sake of simplicity, the interest and depreciation 
expenses were added to the “other expense” category for both public and private 
institutions.  
In comparing the expenditures of public and private institutions in Figures 2.3 and 
2.4, the spending patterns are surprisingly similar, with most categories differing by only 
2 to 3 percent. The largest expense category for both types of institutions is instruction, 
which ranges from 26 to 29 percent for 2001-02 to 2011-12. In general, public 
institutions appear to devote more resources to hospital services, public service, and 
research, while private institutions devote more resources to institutional support, 
independent operations, and student services. Though the data appear to indicate that 
public institutions allocated roughly 3 to 4 percent more of their resources to scholarships 
and fellowships than private institutions, this is likely an artifact from the different 
accounting standards that use different definitions of financial aid.  
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Figure 2.3 
Percentage of Total Expenditures by Category for Public 4-year Institutions in 2000-01, 
2005-06, and 2011-12 
Source: Data have been compiled from the Digest of Education Statistics provided by the 
National Center for Education Statistics.  
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Figure 2.4 
Percentage of Total Expenditures by Category for Private, Non-profit 4-year Institutions 
in 2000-01, 2005-06, and 2011-12 
 
Source: Data have been compiled from the Digest of Education Statistics provided by the 
National Center for Education Statistics.  
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core and auxiliary units on p. 10-11, one might assume that athletics departments serving 
as auxiliary units would be required to generate sufficient revenues to cover their 
expenses while those departments located under student services would not. As it turns 
out, both types of departments frequently receive substantial subsidies in the form of 
student athletics fees and institutional funds. For example, the Ohio University and North 
Carolina State University athletics departments, both auxiliary units, were the 
beneficiaries of $19 million and $26 million in institutional subsidies in 2014-15, 
respectively (USA Today, 2016a). Thus, the athletics department may be one of the few 
(and perhaps only) auxiliary units on campus that receives institutional subsidies 
allocated from the general fund, which is comprised largely of student tuition and fees 
and state appropriations.  
Summary 
In this section, the ways in which colleges and universities attempt to allocate and 
control their resources through various budget models has been presented in some detail. 
From this discussion, several important conclusions can be drawn. First, a university’s 
ability to control the diversion of resources depends, to a high degree, upon its budget 
model. A centralized model allows for close monitoring by the administration, but may 
lead to wasteful spending if budgets are not revisited and adjusted annually. 
Decentralized models may be used to incentivize departments to become more 
entrepreneurial but can lead to units pursuing goals that do not align with the university. 
Second, no budget model is without drawbacks, and as a result many institutions have 
developed hybrid models that incorporate desirable features from several approaches in 
order to meet their specific needs. Third, although the percentage of revenues received by 
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public and private universities has differed historically, they are becoming increasingly 
similar with the decline in state appropriations for public institutions. Expenditure 
patterns between the two types of institutions have been surprisingly similar during the 
time period examined. Lastly, athletics departments represent a somewhat special case 
within university budgeting. For most Division-I institutions, athletics serves as either an 
auxiliary unit or a department within student services. Despite this difference in 
alignment of athletics between institutions, the data show that both models frequently 
result in substantial subsidies being provided from the general fund to support the 
athletics program.  
Indirect Benefits of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Institutional Marketing and Prestige 
 One of the most widely-held beliefs regarding the value of intercollegiate athletics 
is that it provides institutions with a cost-effective marketing tool (Bremmer & 
Kesselring, 1993). When a college’s football team competes in a high-profile bowl game 
in January, it has the opportunity to reach a broad audience of sports fans, including 
prospective students and their parents, alumni, donors, and even state legislators. In 
addition to the notoriety that the game itself brings, institutions are afforded air time 
during the TV breaks in order to advertise their institution. Institutions generally use this 
time to demonstrate their excellence in teaching and research, success of recent 
graduates, and to show that campus is generally a fun and exciting place to be (Dimaggio 
& Powell, 1983). To illustrate this idea of a fun student environment, the advertisements 
frequently show students competing in athletics as well as cheering on their peers at a 
sporting event such as the homecoming football game. 
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An opposing view suggests that athletics is separate, even at odds with the 
academic missions of colleges and universities which focus primarily upon education and 
research. However, some have argued that a successful Division-I athletics program may 
in fact contribute to the academic mission by creating a halo effect that extends to other 
areas of the university (Fisher, 2009). Such a halo effect, if present, may lead prospective 
students, donors, and other stakeholders who know little else about a university to 
conclude that because it is successful in athletics it must be a successful institution, in 
general. In this way, athletics may prove to be a more cost-effective means of raising an 
institution’s prestige than universally improving the quality of its academic offerings. 
This may help to explain why less distinctive institutions are often eager to move up from 
lower levels of competition to Division-IA.  
At present, there is little empirical research on the extent to which an institution 
can raise its brand awareness through athletics, in part due to challenges in isolating 
marketing and branding variables and their effects on various institutional outcomes 
(Anctil, 2009). There are however several studies that have examined the effects of 
athletics on institutional prestige. Trenkamp (2009) has studied the relationship between 
football and men’s basketball success and the US News & World Report (USNWR) 
rankings. His dataset consisted of a cross-sectional sample of 173 institutions that 
competed in Division-I men’s basketball, football, or both. He estimated a series of OLS 
models treating the institution’s 2004 USNWR rank as the dependent variable and 
football success, basketball success, and various institutional controls for size, quality, 
and type as independent variables. The model estimates indicated that both football and 
basketball success had positive and significant effects on institutional ranking. A one-
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point increase in either football or basketball Sagarin ratings was estimated to increase an 
institution’s USNWR ranking by 1.4 positions on average.  
Quattrone (2008) also tested the hypothesis that football and men’s basketball 
performance contributed significantly to institutional prestige, as indicated by the 
USNWR peer score within its annual rankings. For the football and basketball success 
variables, he used a comprehensive measure of success developed by Lucas and Lovaglia 
(2005) that included all-time win percentage, the number of bowl game appearances (or 
NCAA tournaments), national championships, top-25 finishes, and the number of players 
who entered the NFL or NBA over the previous five years. He tested several empirical 
models for USNWR peer score that included the athletic success measures and various 
institutional characteristics as control variables. Model estimates showed that a 10-point 
increase in men’s basketball success score was expected to increase the institution’s 
USNWR peer score by 0.75 points (on a 5-point scale). Surprisingly, football success was 
not a significant predictor in the model.  
In another study, Cox and Roden (2010) explored the relationship between 
USNWR ranking and winning a championship in either football or men’s basketball. The 
authors conducted a two-part analysis using a sample of all national universities in the 
USNWR rankings between 1992 and 2006. In the first part, they restricted their sample to 
only those institutions who won a football or basketball national championship during 
this time period and compared their rankings in the two years prior to the championship 
with the two years following. Their findings indicated that, on average, an institution’s 
overall ranking in USNWR improved by 6.9 positions following a national title in 
football and 7.5 positions following a title in basketball. However, there was no 
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statistically significant change in peer score, only in three student-related factors of the 
USNWR formula were increases observed: acceptance rates, retention rates, and 
graduation rates. In the second part, the authors examined the correlation between 
football ranking (Sagarin rankings) and USNWR ranking over a nine-year period. In this 
case they found no significant relationship between the two variables.  
Student Admissions 
A related concept to the idea that intercollegiate athletics increase prestige is the 
belief that they can enhance a university’s student applicant pool. As noted previously, 
football and men’s basketball games afford institutions the opportunity to market 
themselves indirectly through competition and directly through TV advertisements during 
halftime or timeouts. While in-state students are likely already familiar with their local 
state university, high-profile athletics may be a particularly effective means of raising 
awareness among out-of-state students. It has been suggested that prospective students 
seek to purchase a “bundle of services” that include not only academic programs, dining, 
and residence halls but also certain student activities and experiences (Mixon & Ressler, 
1995).  Among those experiences may be the opportunity to play in or attend athletics 
events.  
If in fact an institution is able to increase its applicant pool following a successful 
football or men’s basketball season, this allows the institution to improve itself in a 
variety of ways. First, if the number of student applications increase but the overall 
quality of the applicant pool is unchanged, the institution could expand enrollment and 
thereby increase tuition revenue all while maintaining its present student quality (Pope & 
Pope, 2009). Alternatively, the university could maintain the size of its current 
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enrollment but increase its selectivity. This would in turn enhance the institution’s 
reputation because many external rankings are based upon the quality of entering students 
(i.e. SAT, high school rank, acceptance rates, etc.). Either of these two scenarios may 
further increase tuition revenue for public institutions if the percentage of applicants from 
out-of-state has increased. 
 The total number of empirical studies in the area of athletics success and student 
admissions is impressive. Although a range of research questions has been explored in 
previous research, most studies can be broadly classified into one of three categories: 
athletics success and the total number of student applicants; athletics success and the 
quality of student applicants; and athletics success and out-of-state student enrollment. 
The literature for each of these lines of inquiry is discussed briefly in the following 
sections.  
Number of Student Applications 
One of the earliest studies exploring the relationship between success in 
intercollegiate athletics and undergraduate applications was conducted by Murphy and 
Trandel (1994). Their research attempted to determine whether a significant correlation 
existed between football win percentage and the number of applications the following 
year. Using a panel dataset from 1978 to 1987 containing 55 institutions with elite 
Division-I football programs, they determined that an increase of 0.250 in a team’s win-
loss record would produce an increase in applications of roughly 1.3 percent the 
following year. They note this increase in applications to be very modest in light of the 
difficulty involved for a football team to win an additional 25 percent of its games. 
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Toma and Cross (1998) studied the impact of successful football and men’s 
basketball programs on the number of student applications. They used data from all 
institutions that won a national championship in either sport from 1979 to 1992 to 
determine whether the number of applications in the three years before winning a 
championship differed from the number in the three years following. In addition, they 
compared admissions data from each championship school with a small group of 
academic peers (non-champions). Their results showed that most institutions winning a 
football or basketball championship increased their applications over each of the next 
three years. In fact, seven of the 16 football national champions experienced at least a 10 
percent increase in applications the following year. Moreover, these increases were 
generally well above and beyond those that occurred at peer institutions.  
In his 2005 study, McEvoy investigated whether changes in the performance of 
various NCAA DI-A athletics teams had a significant effect on undergraduate 
applications. He compared applications for institutions whose winning percentage had 
increased by at least 0.250, decreased by at least 0.250, or remained essentially 
unchanged for the two most popular men’s and women’s sports. Football was determined 
to be the only sport having a significant relationship with the number of applications. His 
results showed that schools whose football teams improved their record by 0.250 or more 
experienced an average increase in applications of 6.1 percent. By comparison, schools 
whose football team records were unchanged or declined by at least 0.250 saw smaller 
increases in applications of 2.5 and 0.4 percent, respectively.  
Two recent studies provide additional evidence that successful football and men’s 
basketball teams can lead to increases in student applications. The first, by Pope and Pope 
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(2009), analyzed data from 1983 to 2002 for all 332 institutions participating in NCAA 
athletics. Controlling for various school characteristics, they found that participation in an 
NCAA DI men’s basketball tournament produced a 1 percent increase in applications and 
a top-20 football team ranking a 2.5 percent increase. Private schools saw an increase in 
applications that was a factor of two to four times greater than for public institutions 
experiencing similar athletic success. Jones (2009) has expanded upon previous research 
by examining the effects of playing in any football bowl game versus a popular bowl 
game on both student applications and admissions yield. His research draws upon a panel 
dataset for all NCAA DI-A institutions from 2002-2003 to 2007-2008. Model estimations 
showed that appearance in any football bowl game increased male applications by about 
2.4 percent, on average, and that a more highly rated game led to even greater increases 
in the number of male applicants. On the other hand, female applications were unaffected 
by a football bowl appearance regardless of whether or not it was a high-profile game. 
Lastly, appearance in a bowl game did not correlate significantly with yield for either 
gender, but playing in a more highly rated game did significantly increase the yield of 
both male and female students.  
Quality of Student Applications 
A second sub-set of the literature on student admissions focuses upon whether 
intercollegiate athletics has an impact on the quality of entering students to the university. 
One of the foundational studies in this area was published in 1987 by McCormick and 
Tinsley. Their study sought to determine whether the average SAT scores of the entering 
freshmen cohort could be predicted, in part, by the presence of a “big-time” athletics 
program or the success of the football team. Findings indicated that institutions with 
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high-profile athletics had average SAT scores between 26 and 43 points higher than other 
institutions, depending on the model specifications. Football win percentage also had a 
positive and significant relationship with SAT scores. A school that increased its winning 
percentage by 100 percent over the previous 15-year period was predicted to increase its 
average SAT score by 279 to 302 points in the current year.  
A study by Bremmer and Kesselring (1993) was published as a direct response to 
McCormick and Tinsley (1987). The authors used the same set of institutions, dependent 
variable (average SAT score), and many of the same explanatory variables. In addition, 
Bremmer and Kesselring introduced variables for the number of football bowl 
appearances, the number of NCAA men’s basketball tournament appearances, and the 
average SAT score of high school students in the state as independent variables. In 
contrast to McCormick and Tinsley (1987), their results indicated that none of the sports 
variables – the presence of a high-profile sports program or football or basketball 
postseason appearances – were significant predictors of students’ SAT scores. They 
contend there is no evidence that athletics contributes significantly to the quality of the 
student body. 
Tucker and Amato (1993) also conducted a follow-up study to McCormick and 
Tinsley (1987). In their manuscript, they investigated the relationship between average 
SAT score and success in football and men’s basketball as measured by the end-of-
season AP rankings. They used the same set of explanatory variables and a dataset 
consisting of the same 63 institutions with “big-time” athletics programs as McCormick 
and Tinsley (1987). The authors estimated both a cross-sectional model using only 1989 
data and a model containing the change in values of each continuous variable from 1980 
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to 1989. While none of the athletics success measures were significant in the cross-
sectional model, football success was a significant predictor in the longitudinal model. It 
was estimated that a 31-point increase in football success score would increase the 
institution’s mean SAT score by 14 points.  
A study was published by Mixon (1995) that again estimated the relationship 
between the mean SAT score and athletics, but used an improved measure of basketball 
success over earlier studies. Rather than using the number of basketball tournament 
appearances, Mixon calculated the number of tournament games played by each 
institution from 1978 to 1992. For a sample of 217 institutions, Mixon estimated a series 
of models for SAT using this new measure of basketball success along with several 
explanatory variables for institutional type and quality. He found that basketball was a 
positive and significant contributor in the model and that an increase in one tournament 
round was associated with an increase in SAT score of 1.6 points, on average.  
Finally, Mixon, Trevinos, and Minto (2004) have examined the impact of football 
performance on median SAT score. Here, the authors have looked at the impact of 
football winning percentage from 1990 to 2000 on the median SAT score of entering 
freshmen in 2000-2001 for 68 institutions with prominent DI athletic programs (the five 
power conferences and major independents). They included various control variables 
from US News & World Report for 2000-2001 to account for institutional size, quality, 
and selectivity. Football win percentage was determined to be a significant predictor for 
median freshmen SAT score. A one-point increase in total win percentage over the 
preceding 10-year period was estimated to raise the median SAT of entering students by 
0.94 points.  
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Out-of-state Enrollment 
In addition to the research on athletics success and the number and quality of 
student applications, a few studies have attempted to answer whether athletics success 
can lead to increases in tuition revenue. In their 1995 study, Mixon and Ressler examined 
whether athletics success could serve to lower the price elasticity of demand for out-of-
state students. Even if a public institution was unable or unwilling to increase its total 
enrollment, the ability to increase its out-of-state to in-state student proportion could 
generate additional revenue. The authors tested a series of quantitative models to 
determine whether a significant relationship existed between success in men’s basketball 
and the percentage of enrolled students from out of state. Basketball success was 
measured by the number of NCAA basketball tournament rounds played from 1978 to 
1992. The authors found that a positive and significant relationship existed between 
basketball success and the percentage of out-of-state students. Estimates suggested that a 
100 percent increase in the number of NCAA tournament rounds played would lead to a 
6 percent increase in the proportion of non-resident to resident students, controlling other 
factors.  
A study by Mixon and Hsing (1994) examined the relationship between a variety 
of institutional characteristics and out-of-state student enrollment. They used a Tobit 
model to analyze data from 1990 for a sample of 220 institutions. In their specifications, 
the percent of enrollment from out-of-state was the dependent variable and their 
independent variables included measures for price (tuition), size, selectivity, quality, and 
NCAA athletics division. Most of the predictors were found to be significant in the 
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model. NCAA athletics division, although it exhibited a positive sign with the dependent 
variable, was only marginally significant (p ≤ .10).  
Institutional Advancement 
Another important thread in the argument that athletics yields indirect benefits to 
colleges and universities proposes a causal relationship between on-the-field success and 
philanthropic donations (Frank, 2004). This line of reasoning focuses upon the ability of 
athletics, particularly the high-profile sports of football and men’s basketball, to draw 
alumni and other supporters to campus in numbers that are unmatched by other arguably 
more legitimate university activities (Suggs, 2009). Athletics provides unique 
opportunities for development officers to access donors and request support for numerous 
campaigns including those pertaining to academics. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
alumni and other donors are more likely to donate to a university when it produces a 
winning sports program (Anctil, 2009). Some donors give out of a desire to be associated 
with a successful organization, and although athletics is generally not viewed as central to 
the university’s mission, it can create an impression that a successful athletic institution is 
also a successful academic one (Fisher, 2009).  
Alternatively, it has been suggested that athletics does not increase donations to 
the university or at the very least does not increase giving to other areas besides athletics. 
Those who support this view have argued that athletics merely provides a consumable 
(entertainment) for alumni and community members and their support of the institution 
arrives only in the form of ticket sales and donations for improved athletic facilities 
(Sperber, 1990; Sperber, 2000). Still others maintain that athletics creates a crowding-out 
effect on donations to support academic activities by re-directing funds to athletics that 
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would have gone to support a new classroom building, scholarship, endowed chair 
position, etc. (Stinson & Howard, 2008). Ehrenberg (2000) cites an example of a Cornell 
alumnus who, after being approached by an athletics administrator, suddenly decided to 
split his gift, originally intended for arts and sciences, with athletics.  
The prevalence of theories and commentaries on the subject of intercollegiate 
athletics and donations as well as the availability of considerable giving data has 
produced a rich set of empirical studies. Studies have been conducted using cross-
sectional and longitudinal datasets, data from a single or all NCAA institutions, and with 
a variety of athletics success and giving measures. One of the earliest studies to appear on 
the subject was completed by Sigelman and Carter (1979). They used correlation and 
regression analyses to explore the relationship between several measures of athletics 
success and three measures of alumni giving. The dataset spanned a fourteen year period 
between 1960-61 and 1975-76 and included all NCAA division-I institutions. The authors 
found no evidence that athletics performance significantly affected alumni giving the 
following year.  
Another early study by Brooker and Klastorin (1981) showed more promising 
results towards the usefulness of athletics for university fundraising. Using longitudinal 
data from 1962 to 1971 on 58 universities with “big-time” athletic programs, the authors 
tested several models to determine whether the average total and capital gift per alumnus 
was impacted by football and men’s basketball team performance. Their findings 
indicated that football win percentages and bowl appearances were generally positive and 
significant for alumni giving at private institutions. For major public universities, football 
win percentage had a positive effect on the percentage of alumni who gave but a negative 
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effect on the average gift per alumnus. In total, the authors found a positive and 
significant relationship between at least one measure of athletics success and alumni 
giving for all types of institutions.  
In their 1983 study, Sigelman and Bookheimer examined the effects of on-the-
field success in football and men’s basketball and alumni giving to both the general fund 
and athletics. They conducted a cross-sectional analysis using data from the Omaha 
World Leader for 57 of the same 58 institutions used by Brooker and Klastorin (1981). In 
contrast to earlier studies, a series of control variables for institutional size, type, quality, 
and location were included in their models. The results demonstrated that athletics 
success had a positive and significant impact on alumni giving to athletics: a 10 percent 
increase in football success generated an additional $125,160 in donations, on average. 
However, they did not find any evidence that athletics performance increased giving to 
the general fund. Yet the relationship between athletics and academic giving was non-
significant, suggesting that a “crowding-out” effect was not present. 
A number of more recent studies provide additional evidence that athletics 
success has the potential to increase giving to the university. Baade and Sundberg (1996) 
used a panel dataset of 309 colleges and universities from 1973 to 1990 to explore 
whether success in football and men’s basketball affect alumni giving. They showed that 
a football bowl appearance increased giving by 54 percent for private and 40 percent for 
public universities, on average. A basketball tournament berth increased alumni giving by 
35 percent at public institutions, but had no significant effect on giving at private 
institutions. Rhoads and Gerking (2000) drew upon a dataset from 1986-87 to 1995-96 
for 87 universities that were members of a power five athletics conference (PAC-10, Big 
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Ten, SEC, Big 12, ACC) or high-profile independents (e.g. Notre Dame). Using a two-
way fixed effects model, they showed that a football bowl appearance led to an increase 
in alumni donations of about $858,000 (7.3 percent) in that year. However, none of the 
athletics performance variables were significant in the model for total contributions, 
which included both alumni and other philanthropic donations.  
Humphreys and Mondello (2007) analyzed data on restricted and unrestricted 
giving for all NCAA institutions from 1973 to 1990. They estimated that a basketball 
tournament appearance increased restricted donations the following year by 8.5 percent 
for public and 9.8 percent for private institutions. Further, a football bowl appearance led 
to an increase in restricted donations of 12 percent at public universities. Importantly, 
none of the athletics success measures were significant in the models for unrestricted 
giving, which suggests that athletics may only increase athletic giving. An extensive 
study by Stinson and Howard (2007) probed the relationship between football success 
and seven measures of charitable giving for DI-A institutions. They found that athletics 
performance had no discernible effect on academic giving, but football win percentage 
did positively influence giving to athletics and the proportion of total giving directed to 
athletics.   
With a few notable exceptions, most of the research conducted on this topic has 
focused upon NCAA Division-I, and often football bowl subdivision (FBS) institutions. 
An important study on athletic performance and private giving for division I-AA (D-
IAA) and division I-AAA (D-IAAA) institutions was produced by Stinson and Howard in 
2008. Using data from 1998 to 2003 for a sample of 208 institutions, they developed a 
linear mixed model to examine the effects of football and men’s basketball success on the 
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number of alumni who gave and the average gift per alumnus to athletics and academics. 
In contrast to their study on D-IA institutions, Stinson and Howard found that athletic 
success positively influenced both athletic and academic giving. A basketball tournament 
appearance was estimated to increase the average alumnus donation to athletics by $18 
(50% increase) and academics by $435 (100% increase), on average, in the model for D-
IAA institutions. However, once D-IAAA institutions were included, the relationship 
between athletic success and academic giving became non-significant.  
Lastly, a few studies have utilized data from a single institution to examine more 
detailed financial records and introduce new explanatory variables that are generally not 
available through large public datasets. In their study, Grimes and Chressanthis (1994) 
modeled the effects of athletics performance on alumni giving to the Mississippi State 
University Foundation for academic purposes. Their dataset, which spanned from 1961 to 
1991, included four indicators of athletics performance for football, men’s basketball, and 
baseball. In the overall model, both win percentage and TV appearances were significant. 
They estimated that a one percent increase in overall win percentage for the three major 
sports would produce $268,702 in additional donations the following year. Meer and 
Rosen (2009) studied the relationship between football and men’s basketball performance 
and giving by alumni who were athletes and non-athletes at an elite private university. 
They also examined whether a former athlete’s team success impacted his or her 
donation. It was shown that football and men’s basketball generally had small and non-
significant effects on donations from athletes as well as non-athletes. However, if a male 
graduate’s athletic team won its conference championship the average size of his general 
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and athletic gifts each increased by 7 percent. Team success had no significant effect on 
donations from female alumni.  
Character Development 
It has often been said that “the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of 
Eton” (French, 2004, p. 14). Although the origin of this statement is unclear, its 
implication is that the victorious British general Arthur Wellington honed his leadership 
skills while playing sports at the Eton boarding school (Sage, 1998). Belief in the 
importance of athletics has perhaps reached its pinnacle in the United States where the 
collegiate ideal is not simply an intellectual pursuit but a balanced experience in which 
students develop a “sound mind in a sound body” (Shulman & Bowen, 2001). Supporters 
of athletics further cite that it has the ability to instill important character traits in youth 
such as discipline, teamwork, leadership, respect, and fairness (Childs, 1987). However, 
some scholars have pointed to the fact that these claims are largely unproven and that the 
most compelling evidence consists of anecdotes from current and former athletes, 
coaches, and athletic directors (French, 2004). Further still, many have found it difficult 
to reconcile the all-too frequent sanctions and rule violations in intercollegiate athletics 
with the NCAA’s core values of integrity and sportsmanship (“NCAA Core values,” 
2015).  
Behavioral researchers over the past 50 years have attempted to quantify the 
effect athletics has on character development in adolescent and college athletes. This line 
of inquiry is not without its problems, however, due to the difficulty in measuring 
character as a construct. In addition to the fact “character” is broad and somewhat poorly 
defined, much subjectivity abounds with respect to what constitutes “good character” 
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(Sage, 1998; Bowen & Levin, 2005). Yet, a number of scholars have attempted to address 
these issues by focusing upon specific types of character that a student might be expected 
to acquire through athletics, such as sportsmanship.  
In his 1983 study, Silva sought to determine how student perceptions of the 
legitimacy of various athletic rule violations varied according to gender, the type of sport, 
and level of experience. He showed a series of slides to 167 undergraduate and graduate 
students and asked them to rate the extent to which they agreed the demonstrated 
behaviors, all athletics-related, were acceptable. His findings showed female students 
were more likely than male students to rate the rule infractions as unacceptable. For both 
genders, the number of years of experience playing an organized sport, having competed 
at a high level (i.e. varsity athletics in college or high school), and the amount of physical 
contact in the sport were all positively correlated with willingness to accept the rule 
violations.  
Another study by Bredemeier and Shields (1986) compared the moral reasoning 
ability of high school and college athletes and non-athletes. The authors developed an 
intensive interview protocol based upon the Haan interactional model of moral 
development (1978, 1983) that presented the interviewees with a number of social and 
sports-specific dilemmas. The sample consisted of 120 students, both male and female, 
who were non-athletes or had competed in varsity basketball or swimming. No 
significant difference was found between athlete and non-athlete high school students. At 
the college level, moral reasoning scores of swimmers and non-athletes were similar but 
the scores of both groups were significantly higher than basketball players. Consistent 
49
with Silva’s findings, it was shown that females generally had higher moral reasoning 
scores than males. 
Beller and Stoll (1995) conducted their landmark study on the moral reasoning of 
athletes and non-athletes at the secondary level. Their research sought to determine 
whether there was a difference in moral reasoning for team- versus individual-sport 
athletes and between under- and upper-classmen. They administered the Hahm-Beller 
Values Choice Inventory (HBVCI), which asks students about sports-related scenarios 
such as retaliation, personal fouls, and drug use, to a sample of 1,330 high school 
students in the U.S. Overall, it was shown that at all ages non-athletes scored higher than 
athletes and female students higher than male students in moral reasoning. There were no 
significant differences between team- and individual-sport participants or between upper- 
and lower-classmen. The authors interpret the fact that athletes generally scored lower 
than non-athletes as an indication that the “win at all costs” mantra has taken precedence 
over sportsmanship and rule-following among athletes.  
Two additional studies utilized the HBVCI to study social and moral character 
among college athletes. Priest, Krause, and Beach (1999) studied whether college 
athletes’ moral reasoning improved over the course of their four years in college by 
administering the assessment to 631 students at the United States Military Academy. 
They found that all groups – men and women, team- and individual-sport athletes – 
declined in their moral reasoning scores during their four years at the academy. 
Furthermore, team-sport athletes’ scores were lower than individual-sport athletes, and 
varsity athletes lower than intramural athletes. Rudd and Stoll (2004) sought to measure 
both the social and moral character of college athletes at a variety of intercollegiate levels 
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of competition. They administered an instrument containing 10 items from the HBVCI 
for moral character and 10 newly developed items addressing social character to a 
random sample of 595 college students at NCAA DI, II, III, and NAIA institutions. The 
moral character items focused upon sportsmanship whereas the social character items 
centered on teamwork, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. Results showed that non-athletes 
scored significantly higher on the moral character scale than athletes, but athletes 
generally scored higher on the social character scale. Team-sport athletes scored 
significantly higher than individual-sport athletes in social character. The authors 
conclude that the lower moral reasoning scores among athletes may be evidence of an 
overemphasis on winning, while team athletes’ high social reasoning scores likely reflect 
the emphasis placed on teamwork and self-sacrifice by parents and coaches.  
Finally, Doty and Lumpkin (2010) explored whether college athletes who 
competed at the varsity, club, and intramural levels differed in their character in sports. 
They developed a new instrument to measure athletes’ character in athletic scenarios, and 
administered the assessment to a sample of 4,184 students at the U.S. Military Academy. 
The authors found that the level of character exhibited depended most heavily upon the 
sport the athlete played, but as a general rule female and club sport athletes had the 
highest overall scores. Varsity male athletes in high contact sports: ice hockey, football, 
and lacrosse had the lowest average scores. There was no evidence of significant growth 
over time in character for students competing at any of the three levels of competition.  
Summary 
In this section, several of the persistent claims regarding the indirect benefits of 
intercollegiate athletics have been reviewed. Findings were somewhat mixed, although 
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most studies have shown that colleges and universities appear to receive some benefits to 
their prestige, student applications, and fundraising as a result of athletics success at the 
NCAA Division-I level. Moreover, these effects appear to be most pronounced when an 
institution wins a national championship in either football or men’s basketball. On the 
other hand, there is no clear evidence that participation in intercollegiate athletics 
increases student character. In fact, studies suggest the longer an individual participates in 
athletics and the higher the level of competition (i.e. varsity vs. club), the less moral 
character s/he exhibits. Furthermore, non-athletes were found to have higher character, on 
average, than athletes. These findings suggest that an emphasis of “winning at all costs” 
may have superseded the importance of sportsmanship and rule-following among 
athletes.  
The conclusion that intercollegiate athletics can improve an institution’s prestige, 
student applications, and fundraising, although supported by empirical evidence, should 
be interpreted with caution. First, the size of the effect that athletics success has on these 
areas is often small. For example, Murphy and Trandel (1994) showed an increase in 
football win percentage of 0.250 led to a 1.3 percent growth in applications and Pope and 
Pope (2009) found a top-20 football ranking led to a 2.5 percent increase. These are 
relatively modest results when one considers the difficulty of a football team finishing in 
the top 20 or winning an additional 25 percent of its games. Second, studies have 
typically focused upon institutions in one of the power five conferences or major 
independents. Consequently, it is difficult to interpret how these effects translate to FCS 
institutions or those looking to transition from Division-II to Division-I. Lastly, the 
present research does not indicate whether athletics is a cost-effective means of 
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improving the university. Future research should look to examine the opportunity cost of 
investing in athletics over other marketing or improvement strategies.  
There are several additional areas that require further empirical research. For one, 
it remains unclear how long an institution continues to reap the benefits of winning a 
national championship in football or men’s basketball. Researchers should seek to 
determine whether a championship permanently raises the number or quality of student 
applications, or if they return to their pre-championship levels after a given period. 
Relatedly, future research should look to better understand the benefits, if any, an 
institution receives from having a low-performing Division-I program as opposed to a 
successful Division-II program. Finally, there is a paucity of research on the impact of 
athletics on university expenditures. Most of the existing research has examined the 
relationship between athletics success and various revenues – donations, student tuition, 
and state appropriations.  
Theoretical Framework 
The framework for this study draws heavily upon classical economic models of 
organizational behavior. A number of these models can be applied successfully to the 
decisions of colleges and universities, most notably property rights theory of the firm, 
principal-agent theory, and resource dependence theory. Each of these theories is 
discussed briefly in the following section. Additionally, Bowen’s revenue theory of costs 
– an economic theory specific to higher education – is reviewed. The section concludes
with a summary of these theories with a view toward their significance to the proposed 
study.  
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Property Rights Theory of the Firm 
Property rights theory supposes that the owner of a firm has control over certain 
resources – human, physical, or capital, and that she or he has the ability to decide who 
has membership within the firm and is given access to its resources (Buckley & Michie, 
1996). The owner has a right to decide how the resources are to be utilized, to retain 
profits, and to capitalize on gains made by the firm through the selling of his or her 
ownership rights (Frech III, 1976). In most organizations, the owner must delegate 
responsibility for management and use of the firm’s resources to one or more actors who 
are then empowered to take action on behalf of the firm. Although assigned by the owner, 
property rights are generally derived through a political process that involves negotiation 
among group members and are frequently rooted in historical precedence (Libecap, 
1989).  
The property rights of an owner or the firm’s actors may become attenuated if the 
rights to control one or more resources are not clearly established (Van Wezel, Jorna, & 
Meystel, 2006). Moreover, property rights tend to be highly attenuated in non-profit 
organizations because the owner’s property rights are inherently limited. Namely she or 
he cannot retain profits for personal use or capitalize on the gains of the firm by selling 
his or her ownership rights (Frech III, 1976). As a result, there is often little incentive for 
non-profit organizations to minimize costs, leading them to operate less efficiently in 
most cases than profit-seeking firms (Frech III, 1976). This is a particular cause for 
concern within colleges and universities that utilize incremental budgeting, where 
departments tend to view the financial resources allocated to them annually through their 
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budget as property rights, making it difficult for the institution to decrease unit-level 
budgets from one year to the next.  
Principal-Agent Theory 
A useful model for understanding the behavior of an organization from a resource 
management perspective is that of principal-agent theory. In this view, a principal 
contracts with one or more agents to perform services that fulfill the organization’s 
mission, but that s/he is unable to provide for him/herself. In higher education, the 
principal is often identified as a state government, taxpayers, donors, or others external to 
the university, with administrators, faculty, and staff who deliver the education and other 
services as the actors (Martin, 2011). However, the model is also useful for understanding 
relationships between internal constituents. For example, an administrator such as the 
president or provost can be viewed as a principal who contracts with faculty, staff, or 
third-party contractors to perform specific services.  
From principal-agent theory, it is understood that the objectives of the agent may 
not always align with those of the principal, which gives rise to principal-agent conflicts. 
Differences in priorities between principal and agent can occur for a number of reasons, 
but often they stem from an agent’s desire to pursue self-interests. Principal-agent 
conflicts produce wasteful spending and increase operating costs as the agent diverts 
resources away from their intended purpose (Sappington, 1991). The severity of 
principal-agent problems depend upon the disparity between the objectives of the 
principal and agent, the likelihood that the principal will be able to determine the agent is 
diverting resources, and the extent to which market forces can control principal-agent 
problems (Martin, 2005).  
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According to Hoenack (1983) there are three approaches to minimize principal-
agent problems: regulatory, formulaic, and persuasive measures. In the first, an 
organization may develop policy that tightly regulates the actions of its agents. 
Regulation can provide a high level of control, but may not be cost-effective due to the 
time required to monitor the activities of agents. Formulaic measures, on the other hand, 
are designed to align agent priorities with those of the principal through incentives. As an 
example, a provost may allocate additional funding to academic departments that reach a 
targeted benchmark for sponsored research funding (matching funds) in order to 
encourage more grant applications and research activity. While often successful in 
promoting desired behaviors, a weakness of formula-based methods is that they have a 
tendency to de-emphasize and even marginalize activities that are not explicitly rewarded 
(Massy, 1996).  
Persuasive measures seek to align agent objectives with those of the principal 
through arguments of rationality. In short, the principal will attempt to demonstrate to the 
agent that although diversion of resources may appear beneficial in the present, it will 
over time harm the institution’s financial stability and reduce the amount of funding 
available in the future. Persuasion may have positive short-term effects and be the least 
costly of the three approaches, but is unlikely to be successful when the gap between 
principal and agent interests is significant (Martin, 2011).  
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) describes how an organization interacts 
with its environment to obtain resources that are critical to its survival (Smart, 1999). The 
theory suggests that no organization is entirely autonomous but must rely upon other 
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organizations for resources that it cannot provide for itself. Resources can range from 
fiscal capital or raw materials to human resources and services (Austin & Jones, 2016). 
The fact that an organization, A, relies upon another organization, B, for a given resource 
suggests that B possesses a certain level of power over the actions and decisions of A. 
The level of dependence of A on B, and inversely the power of B over A, is shaped by 
the scarcity of the resource, the importance of the resource to the continued survival of A, 
and the extent to which the resource is concentrated within one or a few organizations in 
the environment (Emerson, 1962). In other words B has limited influence over A if the 
resource is not particularly scarce or vital to A and can be provided by any number of 
other organizations. 
The dependence of an organization on its environment for certain resources 
creates uncertainty in the future of that organization. It is unclear, for example, whether 
an organization will continue to have access to sufficient quantities of critical resources 
and at a price that allows its operations to continue successfully. Managers within the 
organization will respond to this uncertainty by taking steps to reduce environmental 
dependencies (Hillman et al., 2009). One type of action the organization can take is to 
merge, acquire, or enter joint ventures with other organizations that have access to the 
resources it requires. Another approach is to diversify its products and services, thereby 
reducing its dependence on any single activity and the resources that are associated with 
it (Smart, 1999). In other cases, the organization might seek to change its environment by 
shaping governmental policy or regulation. In higher education, a college or university 
might push for legislation that leads to greater state or federal financial assistance for 
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students, which would likely increase enrollments and ensure a more consistent flow of 
tuition revenue to the institution.  
Two other types of actions an organization might take to reduce uncertainty deal 
with its internal structure. Organizations will often establish a governing board or board 
of directors, which may provide any of the following benefits: new information and 
expertise, external legitimacy, political influence, and greater access to resources (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). The size and structure of a governing board varies across 
organizations based upon the types of dependencies the organization experiences and 
what role(s) its board is to assume. Hodge and Piccolo (2005) have shown that boards 
within privately-funded non-profit organizations are more involved in their operations 
and decisions than those for commercial or federally-funded organizations. Lastly, an 
organization tends to structure its administrative offices in a way that emphasizes 
management of important external dependencies (Hillman et al., 2009). Administrators 
who oversee those offices often acquire considerable power and are granted the authority 
to shape many of the organization’s decisions.  
RDT is an important theory for understanding administrative structure and 
organizational behavior in American higher education (Fowles, 2014). Like any 
organization, the university depends upon its environment for resources, most notably 
funding. The types and sources of funding vary considerably across institutions, but as 
discussed in Chapter 2 generally include: tuition and fees, state appropriations, state and 
federal grants and appropriations, donations, and private grants and contracts. Each 
stakeholder group that provides funding to the university (students, federal and state 
governments, alumni and donors, etc.) holds a certain degree of power to influence its 
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decision-making processes. Historically, public institutions have relied to a much greater 
extent on state appropriations and less on student tuition revenue than private institutions. 
Consistent with RDT, Tolbert (1985) has shown that in general private institutions invest 
more heavily in administrative offices that support private sources of funding 
(admissions, alumni, and development) than public institutions. Conversely, public 
institutions invest to a greater extent in offices that support public sources of funding – 
institutional research and strategic planning.  
 As noted previously, state appropriations to public institutions have declined 
considerably in recent decades. One of the important consequences of this decline has 
been the rise in student tuition and fee charges. Fowles (2014) has noted that this shift 
from a public to a private model of financing for higher education has important 
implications for institutional control. In his research, he has shown that a significant 
relationship exists between the source of revenue in higher education and instructional 
expenditures. His estimates indicate that a one-percentage point increase in the share of 
revenue from net tuition produces a 0.78 percentage point increase in the share of total 
expenditures to education-related activities. These findings support the usefulness of 
RDT for interpreting resource management in colleges and universities.  
 In addition to the power that external groups have on university decisions, actors 
within the organization possess power based on their ability to acquire critical resources 
for the institution (Johnson, 1995). Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found that academic 
departments that were most successful in securing external funding had the greatest level 
of internal power. These units received a greater share of scarce internal resources, such 
as graduate fellowships, which only served to reinforce the existing power structure. In 
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another study, Pfeffer and Moore (1980) found that enrollment and external funding both 
play significant roles in determining subunit power. Subunit power, in turn, was a 
significant determinant of departmental budgets and faculty lines. It was also found that 
departments were more likely to exercise their power to attain scarce resources during 
times of financial stress than periods of relative abundance. Finally, Hackman (1985) 
studied the impact of internal power, external power, and resource negotiation strategies 
on resource allocation. Core units, typically academic departments, with the greatest 
external funding, internal support from administration, and that focused most upon their 
own needs while negotiating (rather than the best interests of the institution) were 
generally the most successful in acquiring resources. Peripheral units (e.g. administrative 
and support units) that secured the most external funding, had substantial internal 
visibility and administrative support, and focused on the benefits they provided to the 
university received the most resources.  
Revenue Theory of Costs and Prestige Maximization 
One of the most enduring theories that has been proposed to explain the economic 
behavior of American colleges and universities is Bowen’s revenue theory of costs 
(Bowen, 1980). In his groundbreaking work The Costs of Higher Education, Bowen 
(1980) proposed the following rules that govern college and university behavior:  
1. The primary goals of the university consist of educational excellence, prestige,
and influence
2. In seeking excellence, prestige, and influence there is essentially no limitation on
the amount of capital an institution will spend on educational endeavors
3. Each institution raises as much capital as it can
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4. Each institution spends all of the capital it raises 
5. The result of rules one through four is a continual increase in total expenditures 
In short, Bowen’s theory suggests that there is no limit to how much colleges or 
universities will spend other than the necessary condition that as non-profit entities their 
annual expenditures cannot exceed revenues. Institutions have an apparently 
unquenchable appetite for resources, and are continually able to justify any new 
expenditures in the name of quality improvement to the education and research they 
provide. Bowen further observed that each group providing funding to the university – 
federal and state governments, students, donors, private corporations, etc. – can exert 
some level of influence over the expenditures of the university, but its activities are not 
closely regulated by any one group (Bowen, 1980).  
Bowen’s theory is consistent with property rights theory, which suggests that non-
profit institutions will have difficulty holding down costs due to attenuation of the 
owner’s property rights. His theory is also consistent with principal-agent theory that 
suggests actors’ pursuit of their own self-interests will ultimately serve to increase costs. 
It has often been observed that since the rise of federally sponsored research following 
World War II, many faculty have come to identify more closely with their profession 
than their own institution (Paulsen, 2014). Faculty increasingly view themselves as 
members of a discipline - biologists or economists for example - who merely have their 
offices and labs located at a particular institution of higher learning and work more 
frequently with colleagues who are located elsewhere.  
 Garvin (1980) argues, however, that Bowen’s theory has several shortcomings in 
its characterization of university behavior. First, he notes that although the university may 
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at times engage in revenue-maximizing behavior, it also tends to focus upon quality 
improvement of its services. Furthermore, some institutions – notably the selective, 
private liberal arts colleges – actively restrict the number of seats in their freshman class. 
If the university truly sought maximum revenues, it would likely hold quality constant 
while raising tuition and fees and recruiting as many students as possible (Garvin, 1980). 
Second, Garvin has noted that institutions have at times invested in academic 
departments that do not improve their ability to attract students but that the institution 
may view as important to its liberal arts mission. Finally, it is well documented that the 
true cost of providing an education at most colleges and universities is subsidized through 
a number of sources including institutional aid such that the student is only responsible 
for paying a portion of the total cost of his or her education (Paulsen, 2001). Rationally 
speaking, a revenue-maximizing enterprise would not subsidize the cost of its products or 
services.  
Garvin (1980) has proposed that colleges and universities seek to maximize a 
utility function that is dependent primarily upon institutional prestige. He suggests that 
the university’s overall prestige is a weighted sum of the prestige of each academic 
department, where certain programs and departments provide greater recognition than 
others. Graduate programs, particularly doctoral, are more important to an institution’s 
reputation than undergraduate in most cases, which explains the proliferation of new 
graduate programs at small colleges and regional universities in recent decades. At the 
academic department level, Garvin has argued that reputation is derived mainly from 
research productivity and sponsored research funding, and that the two means of 
improving reputation are to recruit higher quality faculty or increase the number of 
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faculty. This proposition was confirmed through Garvin’s ordinary least squares 
estimates, which showed that the average improvement to an institution’s average 
departmental prestige (as measured by the Cartter and Roose-Anderson ratings) was 
positively and significantly correlated with both a positive change in the number of 
faculty and a positive change in the average faculty salary (proxy for faculty quality) 
(Garvin, 1980).  
Summary 
Three economic models of organizational behavior were reviewed in this section: 
the property rights theory of the firm, principal-agent theory, and resource dependence 
theory (RDT). Bowen’s economic model of higher education, known as the revenue 
theory of costs, was also presented. Each model appears to have some merit in explaining 
university decision-making processes under various conditions. From property rights 
theory, one can understand that, as non-profit organizations, there is little incentive for 
colleges and universities to hold down costs. Furthermore, each department or unit may 
come to view access to its annual budget as a property right, making it difficult for 
administrators to decrease unit-level funding when needed.  
Principal-agent theory suggests that the principal, for example the president or 
provost, allocates responsibility for management of institutional resources to various 
agents – faculty, staff, and at times students. However, the agent may not share the same 
goals as the principal and therefore could be inclined to divert resources in order to 
pursue individual or departmental rather than organizational goals. Such principal agent 
problems can only be held in check through regulatory, incentivizing, or persuasive 
tactics. Reflecting on the previous chapter, one can see how university budget models 
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frequently employ one or both of these strategies in an effort to limit wasteful spending. 
However, these approaches have been met with varying degrees of success.  
Resource dependence theory (RDT) has been used by a number of theorists and 
researchers to explain the behavior of colleges and universities in developing 
administrative structures and allocating resources. Those units that are most central to the 
mission of the institution and successful in providing scarce and valuable resources, 
whether it be prestige or external funding, receive preferential treatment when it comes to 
internal resources. Departments are most likely to exercise power during times of 
campus-wide financial distress. Finally, Bowen’s revenue theory of costs postulates that 
the university’s primary goal is to increase its prestige and influence. In its quest for 
prestige a university will raise as much revenue as it can and spend all that it raises. This 
suggests that institutions will invest in the departments and programs that are most likely 
to produce the greatest dividends in terms of prestige and additional capital.  
Research Questions 
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the preceding review of 
the literature and economic theories of organizational and university behavior. First, it is 
clear that many public universities have willingly allocated large subsidies in the form of 
student fees and institutional funds to support intercollegiate athletics departments. This 
has occurred despite a lack of convincing evidence that Division-I athletics programs 
produce sizeable indirect benefits to universities. Second, the athletics department is 
generally located within student services or serves as an auxiliary unit at public, Division-
I institutions. However, athletics departments that are set up as auxiliary units do not 
appear to be held accountable in the same manner as other auxiliary units that are 
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responsible for generating sufficient revenues to cover their expenses. In fact, it is 
common for institutions with this model to allocate large subsidies in the tens of millions 
from the general fund to support the athletics department.  
The willingness of colleges and universities to allocate large and increasing 
subsidies to support intercollegiate athletics can be interpreted through several of the 
theories that have been discussed. Bowen (1980) notes that the main objective of most 
institutions is to increase their prestige and influence. RDT suggests that the athletics 
department is afforded considerable power and influence within the institution because of 
its perceived ability to provide the institution with its most important commodity – 
prestige. This power in turn allows athletics to negotiate for and receive internal 
resources, potentially at the expense of other units. On the one hand, Bowen (1980) has 
suggested that universities seek to raise additional revenues rather than decrease 
expenditures. On the other hand, state institutions are limited in the amount that they are 
able to increase tuition and fees on an annual basis. Thus, public universities may have at 
times reduced expenditures to other core areas in order to fund growing athletics 
subsidies.  
 Existing research has studied the relationship between athletics success and 
student tuition and fees. However, the effect(s) of intercollegiate athletics subsidies on 
resource allocation to other core areas of the institution has not been studied empirically. 
This dissertation sought to address this gap in the literature by examining the correlation 
between athletics subsidies and resource allocation to education and related expenditures 
in public, Division-I colleges and universities. More specifically, this study examined the 
following research questions: 
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1. How do the rates of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school
funds per FTE compare to the rate of growth in education and related (E&R)
expenditures per FTE for public Division I institutions between 2005 and
2014?
2. What is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R
expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors?
3. Is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R
expenditures per FTE dependent upon institution type (research university,
flagship university) or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting
structure, level of play), controlling for other factors?
4. What is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures
per FTE, controlling for other factors?
5. Is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per
FTE dependent upon institution type (research university, flagship university)
or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level of play),
controlling for other factors?
The next chapter begins with a presentation of the hypotheses pertaining to the above 
research questions. Subsequently, the institutional sample, data sources, and variables 
that were examined are discussed. The chapter proceeds with a presentation of the 
statistical models and methods used to analyze the datasets in order to address the five 
research questions above. Finally, several limitations that have been identified for the 
study are discussed.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter provides an overview of the methods that were used in addressing 
the five research questions for this dissertation. The chapter begins with a presentation of 
the hypotheses for each of the research questions, drawing upon the literature review and 
theoretical framework discussed in chapter two. Next, the institutional sample, variables, 
and data sources are discussed followed by the empirical models and statistical 
procedures used to investigate the research questions. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of study limitations.  
Research Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
How do the rates of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE 
compare to the rate of growth in education and related (E&R) expenditures per FTE for 
public Division I institutions between 2005 and 2014? 
Theory and the available evidence suggest that athletics subsidies have grown at a 
faster rate than instruction and other education-related expenditures at most Division-I 
institutions. Desrochers (2013) has shown that athletics subsidies per athlete have 
increased by 51 and 61 percent at FBS and FCS football institutions compared to 
increases in academic spending per student of 23 and 22 percent between 2005 and 2010. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that this trend has persisted and the rate of increase in 
athletics subsidies per FTE has outpaced the increase in education and related (E&R) 
spending per FTE for Division-I institutions during the period of 2004-05 to 2013-14.  
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Research Question 2 
What is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures 
per FTE, controlling for other factors? 
It is hypothesized that E&R expenditures will be negatively correlated with 
intercollegiate athletics subsidies for public Division I institutions. The rationale behind 
this hypothesis is two-fold. First, while Bowen’s revenue theory of costs suggests that 
colleges and universities seek to increase revenues rather than decrease spending, it is 
likely that the present fiscal climate in higher education has seriously limited the ability 
of public institutions to secure additional funding. As a result, institutions may be forced 
to cut spending in other functional areas, such as instruction or student services, in order 
to provide additional subsidies to athletics. This proposition is further supported by the 
recent study from Jones and Rudolph (2016) that found the relationship between athletics 
subsidies and student tuition and fees is non-significant, despite the statistically 
significant rise in athletics subsidies over time. If public institutions have been unable or 
unwilling to substantially increase student tuition and fees to fund growing athletics 
subsidies, it stands to reason that funds from other university activities are being diverted 
to athletics.  
Second, from both Bowen (1980) and Garvin (1980), it is supposed that the 
primary objectives of colleges and universities are to increase their influence and 
prestige. Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) further suggests that those organizational 
units most capable of securing the resources that are vital to the organization’s continued 
success receive the most internal resources and power in decision-making processes 
(Johnson, 1995). Therefore, the perceived ability of a successful Division-I athletics 
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program to enhance a university’s reputation should lead to significant power, influence, 
and resources being directed to the athletics department. Although prior studies have not 
examined the result of competition for resources between athletics and academic units, it 
has been shown when comparing academic departments that those disciplines with the 
greatest prestige and ability to secure external funding are the most successful in 
obtaining scarce resources from the institution (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; Hackman, 
1985).  
Research Question 3 
Is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per 
FTE dependent upon institution type (research university, flagship university) or 
characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level of play), controlling 
for other factors? 
It is hypothesized that the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE 
and E&R expenditures per FTE will depend upon characteristics of the institution and the 
athletics program. Differences in spending on instruction and other core activities 
according to institution type, for example Carnegie classification, have been well 
documented by Bowen (1980), Ehrenberg (2001), and others. In general, state flagship 
and large research institutions generate more revenues and have greater expenditures in 
most categories than other types of public four-year institutions. It has also been shown 
that athletics subsidies differ based upon the level of athletics competition (Desrochers, 
2013) and conference affiliation (Denhart & Vedder, 2010), with comprehensive public 
institutions in the less prestigious FBS and FCS conferences having substantially larger 
per-student subsidies than members of a “power five” conference (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, 
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Pac 10, SEC). Since athletics subsidies generally represent a larger portion of core 
revenues at non-research and non-flagship institutions, the correlation between athletics 
subsidies per student and E&R expenditures per student was predicted to be stronger for 
these types of institutions compared to research and flagship universities. In fact, it was 
anticipated that the findings from this dissertation may identify that a significant and 
negative relationship between subsidies and E&R spending exists for non-research or 
non-flagship institutions, but that the relationship between these two variables is non-
significant for research and flagship universities.  
In addition to research, flagship, or FBS status, the reporting location of the 
athletics department within the university budget was included as a moderating variable. 
Generally, athletics departments at the Division I level are located within student services 
or an auxiliary or similar unit (Barr & McCellan, 2011). Auxiliary units other than 
athletics (e.g. housing, dining services), while they often enjoy a high level of financial 
autonomy, are typically responsible for generating sufficient revenues to cover their 
expenses. If this is true for athletics departments as well, it may be that campus 
administrators at institutions with the auxiliary model of athletics have been more 
successful in limiting increases to athletics subsidies than those at institutions that have 
located athletics within student services. The ability to place greater restrictions on 
athletics spending and particularly athletics subsidies would presumably prevent or limit 
the diversion of educational funds to athletics. Thus, it was predicted that the correlation 
between total athletics subsidies per student and E&R expenditures per student would be 
stronger for institutions whose athletics departments report within student services than 
for those whose athletics departments are treated as auxiliary or other units. 
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Research Question 4 
What is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE, 
controlling for other factors? 
The hypothesis for research question four followed the same rationale as question 
two: the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE 
would be statistically significant and negative for the institutions in the dataset. However, 
where question two examined total athletics subsidies – an aggregate measure of school 
funds and student athletics fees - question four examined only school funds. Compared to 
the total athletics subsidies variable, it was expected that school funds may have a 
stronger correlation with E&R expenditures. One reason is that student fees are generally 
subject to review by a governing board and state legislature, which limits annual fee 
increases, including those to athletics (Barr & McClellan, 2011). Moreover, because of 
this approval process student athletics fees can be budgeted for from one year to the next 
with relative certainty, barring substantial fluctuations in student enrollment. With respect 
to athletics subsidies from school funds, it is presently unclear the extent to which 
institutions budget for these expenses. If one assumes that school funds are at least in part 
the result of athletics budget shortfalls, then it may be that institutions are forced to revise 
their budgets and redirect funds from other functional areas such as instruction during the 
fiscal year. This may lead to more dramatic changes in university resource allocation than 
the gradual changes resulting from increases to student athletics fees. And while 
significant recurring budget shortfalls would likely not be tolerated for an academic or 
auxiliary unit, such behavior by athletics departments may be permitted by campus 
administrators due to the perceived value of the athletics department for enhancing 
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institutional prestige and securing external resources (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; 
Fowles, 2014).  
Research Question 5 
Is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE 
dependent upon institution type (research university, flagship university) or 
characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level of play), controlling 
for other factors? 
The final research hypothesis asserted that the relationship between school funds 
per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE would depend upon both characteristics of the 
institution and athletics department. As noted above, substantial differences exist in the 
expenditures of different types of Carnegie institutions such as instruction, student 
services, and research. While school funds have not been examined specifically in the 
literature, athletics subsidies have been found to differ based upon the level of athletics 
competition and conference affiliation (Desrochers, 2014; Denhardt & Vedder, 2010). As 
discussed for research question three, the relationship between school funds per student 
and E&R expenditures per student was expected to be stronger for non-research, non-
flagship, and FCS institutions due to the fact that these institutions have access to fewer 
core revenues per student and yet have higher school funds per student compared to 
research, flagship, FBS institutions. Additionally, institutions whose athletics 
departments are located within student services were hypothesized to have a stronger 
relationship between school funds per student and E&R spending per student compared 
to institutions whose athletics departments are treated as an auxiliary or similar unit.  
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Sample and Data Collection 
The population of interest for this study includes all colleges and universities that 
had a Division-I athletics program during one or more years of the chosen time period. 
Due to the reliance on public data sources and the lack of available information for 
private institutions, the sample consisted exclusively of public institutions. Data were 
drawn primarily from two sources: the USA Today NCAA Athletic Department Revenue 
Database (2016a) and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) 
(Department of Education, 2015b). The USA Today database provides institution-level 
athletics revenue and expense data for public colleges and universities with Division-I 
programs. These data are obtained by USA Today directly from the institutions through 
the Freedom of Information Act (USA Today, 2016b). Private institutions, however, are 
not required to comply with such requests and, not surprisingly, have not provided their 
data voluntarily. IPEDS is one of the most comprehensive sources of higher education 
data and contains information on university finances, human resources, enrollment, and 
financial aid, although the detail available is limited (Toutkousian, 2001). All colleges 
and universities that participate in Title IV financial aid programs are required to 
complete annual IPEDS reports, which means that IPEDS data are available for all 
institutions appearing in the USA Today dataset (Department of Education, n.d.a).  
Owing to the size of the USA Today database, the initial sample for this study 
consisted of 231 public colleges and universities. The availability of data for multiple 
years allowed for the creation of a panel dataset consisting of all data that were available 
from both USA Today and IPEDS between 2004-05 and 2013-14. Although a number of 
institutions did not report athletics data in one or more years, use of Full Information 
73
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedures for the analysis allowed for inclusion of all 
institutions regardless of the number of observations (Byrne, 2016). Issues with the data 
provided from two institutions necessitated their removal, which resulted in a final 
sample size of 299. Additionally, several institutions had outlying values for one or more 
variables, and these were treated as missing values when running the analyses. Data 
cleaning procedures are discussed in further detail on p. 86.  
Variables 
Research question one examined the change in three continuous variables over the 
time period of 2004-05 to 2013-14: total athletics subsidies per FTE student, school funds 
per FTE student, and total E&R expenditures per FTE student. The change in each 
variable was estimated using latent growth curve modeling. Research question two 
involved the estimation of fixed-effects regression models (FEMs) using E&R 
expenditures per FTE as the dependent variable, athletics subsidies per FTE as the 
independent variable of interest, and three control variables. Research question three 
repeated the analysis for question two by including interaction terms between the primary 
independent variable and four categorical variables for institutional characteristics. 
Lastly, research questions 4-5 proceeded through the same analyses as questions 2-3 
except that school funds per FTE was used in place of total athletics subsidies per FTE as 
the main independent variable. Each of the variables used in the analysis is described 
below.  
Education and Related Expenditures 
Education and related (E&R) expenditures per FTE served as a dependent 
variable for all five research questions. To obtain the total E&R expenditures variable, all 
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E&R expenditures were extracted from IPEDS for the time period of interest. This 
consisted of the instruction and academic support expense categories of the IPEDS 
finance survey. The IPEDS glossary defines instructional expenses as those for “general 
academic instruction, occupational and vocational instruction, community education, 
preparatory and adult basic education, and regular, special, and extension sessions” 
(Department of Education, n.d.b). Academic support is specified as those expenses that 
support instruction, research, and public service through such activities as libraries, 
museums, information technology, special clinics, etc. While an argument could be made 
for including student services expenditures as well, a number of institutions in the sample 
have located the athletics department under student services, which could confound the 
results for several reasons. First, athletics are generally not considered part of the 
academic mission of the university and second, athletics subsidies may be contained 
within the reported student services expenses. Total student FTE enrollment was also 
extracted from IPEDS and used to divide the total E&R expenses in creating the per 
student expense measure. The decision was made to use the per FTE student measure as 
opposed to total expenditures so that institutional size could be taken into account and 
thereby provide a more direct comparison between different institutions. 
Athletics Subsidies and School Funds 
Total athletics subsidies per FTE served as one of three dependent variables in 
research question one and as the primary independent variable in questions 2-3. School 
funds per FTE served as a dependent variable in research question one and the primary 
independent variable for questions 3-4. Athletics subsidies from school funds and 
athletics subsidies from student fees were obtained from the USA Today Athletics 
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Finance database (USA Today, 2016a). Student athletics fees, as the name suggests, are 
direct (mandatory) fees assessed to all students that have been earmarked for athletics. 
School funds consist of both direct institutional subsidies (i.e. tuition, tuition waivers, 
state funds, etc.) and indirect subsidies (i.e. facilities, utilities, administration services, 
depreciation, etc.) that have been allocated to the athletics department (USA Today, 
2016b). Total athletics subsidies was taken as a sum of school funds and student fees. As 
with the dependent variable, total athletics subsidies and school funds were each divided 
by total student FTE enrollment to provide the average per-student costs of both variables 
for each institution.  
Control Variables 
FTE Enrollment 
One of the control variables that was used in the statistical model for research 
questions 2-5 is the total full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment. This variable was 
extracted from IPEDS and provides an important measure of institutional size and 
complexity. An FTE variable is available directly from the IPEDS database and thus did 
not require any additional manipulation; however, its derivation is worth noting. Total 
student FTE enrollment from IPEDS represents a weighted sum of part-time and full-time 
undergraduate and graduate student headcounts (fall enrollment only). In the FTE 
formula, both undergraduate and graduate full-time students are assigned a value of one. 
A part-time undergraduate student is counted as the equivalent of 0.402543 FTE students, 
whereas a part-time graduate student is counted as 0.361702 FTE students (Department 
of Education, n.d.b).  
FTE enrollment was included in the models for research questions 2-5 due to 
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existing evidence that suggests colleges and universities have had some measure of 
success in achieving economies of scale (Brinkman, 1990). Economies of scale occur 
when per-unit costs decrease as additional inputs are introduced (Toutkoushian & 
Paulsen, 2016). In a meta-analysis by Brinkman and Leslie (1986), data aggregated from 
13 studies showed that both two- and four-year institutions generally improve their per-
unit costs in instruction as enrollment rises. Data also suggested that very small 
institutions with enrollments between 500 and 600 observe the most substantial gains in 
per-unit costs as their enrollments approached 2,000 – 3,000 students. Another study by 
Koshal and Koshal (1995) found strong evidence for economies of scale across all types 
of doctoral institutions, estimating that the minimum scale of efficiency ranged from 
11,758 for group IV institutions (Doctoral-II) to 30,957 for group I (Research-I). Finally, 
in a study by Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989), average educational expenditures were 
significantly predicted by the total number of graduate and undergraduate students taught 
and research grants acquired for both public and private institutions. Even though the 
other independent and dependent variables in the model have each been divided by FTE, 
this merely served to provide a more consistent measure of resources with which to 
compare diverse types of institutions. Such “scaling” does not directly take into account 
economies of scale, which is why the FTE variable was also included in the statistical 
models for questions 2-5.  
Core Revenues per FTE 
Another control variable in the model for research questions 2-5 was the total core 
revenues per FTE student. Revenue totals by source were obtained from IPEDS for the 
following categories: student tuition and fees; state and local appropriations; federal, 
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state, and local operating and non-operating grants and contracts; private gifts; private 
grants and contracts; investment return; and other operating revenues for 2004-05 to 
2013-14. These revenue source totals were summed to create a new variable for total core 
revenues for each year. The core revenues variable thus provided a measure of all 
revenues related to educational activities of the institution and excluded revenues from 
hospitals, auxiliary enterprises, capital appropriations, and other sources that are not 
directly related to its primary mission of teaching and research. Lastly, total core 
revenues was divided by the number of FTE students to adjust for institutional size.  
The justification for including this variable in the model is rooted in Bowen’s 
revenue theory of costs that suggests institutions raise as much revenue as they can and 
spend all the capital they raise. Therefore, it is expected that institutions with more 
available core revenues per student FTE will expend greater amounts on all core 
activities, including instruction. Furthermore, Ehrenberg (2003) and Stake (2006) have 
suggested that USNWR and other high-profile rankings provide a direct incentive for 
institutions to not only maintain high levels of spending on instruction-related resources 
(number of full-time faculty, average faculty salaries, etc.) but to increase their spending 
in order to move up in the rankings. Although athletics is generally not considered a 
“core” activity, it also stands to reason that an institution with more revenues available 
will be able to allocate more institutional funds to athletics in the form of subsidies.  
Lastly, there was expected to be some correlation between each of the 
independent variables of interest – total athletics subsidies per student and school funds 
per student – and core revenues per student due to the fact that athletics subsidies are 
derived from core revenues. However, this issue was addressed by including covariances 
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in the fixed-effects model between each pair of independent variables. In this way, the 
relationships between independent variables were both estimated and controlled for. 
Number of Tenure-track Faculty per 100 FTE Students 
The final control variable included in the models for research questions 2-5 is the 
total number of tenure-track (including tenured) faculty per 100 FTE students. IPEDS 
provides data each year on the number of tenured, tenure-track, and non-tenure-track 
faculty regardless of rank for each institution. For this dissertation, only the number of 
faculty in the former two categories was extracted from IPEDS for the years 2004-05 to 
2013-14. These headcounts were then summed for each year to create a total headcount 
of tenured and tenure-track faculty, which was divided by the number of FTE students. It 
was then necessary to scale the number of tenure track faculty per FTE students by 100 
so that the resulting variable could be on a similar scale as the other variables in the 
models. Ill-scaled variables can lead to issues in estimating the variance-covariance 
matrix in structural equation models (Kline, 2011).  
The faculty variable was viewed as an important control for the models in 
research questions 2-5 due to the inherent lack of flexibility institutions have in 
eliminating tenure-track positions from one budget cycle to the next (Ehrenberg, 2006). 
Moreover, human resource costs are known to be the largest category within college and 
university budgets (Smart & Paulsen, 2012). If viewed as a fixed cost within an 
institution’s budget, the number of tenure-track faculty may impact not only education 
and related expenditures but also the amount of core revenues an institution has available 
to allocate to athletics in the form of subsidies. An institution cannot, for example, readily 
lay off a dozen or more faculty in order to balance an athletics budget deficit of $1.5M. 
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Categorical Variables 
Four categorical variables were included in the dataset: Carnegie classification as 
a research institution, status as a flagship university, reporting location of athletics within 
the university budget, and level of athletics competition. These variables were not 
included directly in the statistical models used to investigate research questions 2-5 
because time invariant predictors (fixed-effects) were already accounted for. Rather, 
these variables were entered as interaction terms with the primary independent variable to 
determine whether the relationship between athletics subsidies per FTE or school funds 
per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE depended upon the institutional characteristics 
represented by the categorical variables. The compilation and preparation of the four 
categorical variables is described below. 
Classification as a Research University 
The Carnegie Classification system provides a framework for grouping U.S. 
colleges and universities according to their similarities on the basis of academic mission 
(Rosow, 2010). The classifications were first published in the early 1970s and have since 
been updated approximately every 10 years, with the most recent list being published for 
2015 (IU Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.). Because the dataset spans the time 
period of 2004-05 to 2013-14, each institution’s 2005 Carnegie classification was used. 
The basic 2005 classification identifies the following types of institutions: doctoral 
universities; master’s colleges and universities; baccalaureate colleges; 
baccalaureate/associate’s colleges; associate’s colleges; special focus institutions; and 
tribal colleges and universities (NCES, 2015a). Doctoral institutions are further divided 
into sub-classifications of highest research activity, higher research activity, and 
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moderate research activity, often referred to as RI, RII, and RIII. Master’s institutions are 
separated into larger, medium, and smaller programs while baccalaureate colleges are 
grouped according to whether they have a mission that is focused on arts and sciences or 
other diverse fields. Due to the nature of the institutions in the sample for this study, all 
are found within the doctoral, master’s, and baccalaureate classes, with most falling in the 
first two.  
For the analysis, a dummy variable was created based upon Carnegie 
classification to denote research institutions. This dummy variable was then multiplied 
with total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE to create interaction 
terms for the models in research questions three and five. The reason for including these 
interaction terms is that prior research has shown institutions that differ in size and scope 
tend to exhibit important differences in their revenues, expenditures, and complexity 
(Brinkman, 1981; Koshal & Koshal, 1995; Sav, 2004). Moreover, while Carnegie 
classifications were intended as a means of identifying and studying like institutions, it 
has also come to signify institutional prestige (Aldersley, 1995). Therefore, it is 
understood that doctoral institutions tend to have different spending patterns compared to 
master’s and baccalaureate institutions. In particular, research and doctoral institutions 
generally have larger per-student core revenues and educational expenditures and at the 
same time smaller athletics subsidies than other types of institutions. As noted above in 
the hypotheses for research questions three and five, it is expected that the relationship 
between total athletics subsidies per student (and school funds per student) and E&R 
expenditures per student will be stronger for non-research institutions.   
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Classification as a State Flagship University 
Another institutional characteristic that was included in the dataset was 
classification as the state flagship university. A list of flagship institutions was compiled 
from the College Board annual publication called Trends in College Pricing (College 
Board, 2016). Using this information, a dummy variable was used to denote institutions 
in the dataset as “flagship” or “non-flagship.” The dummy variable was then interacted 
with total athletics subsidies per FTE and with school funds per FTE. It was hypothesized 
that the relationship between the two primary independent variables and E&R 
expenditures per FTE may depend on status as a flagship institution. Flagship universities 
are unique because they generally receive the largest state appropriations, are the most 
selective, and often receive the most federal research support of the public institutions in 
their respective states (Bowser, 2017; Stocum, 2013). In addition, flagship institutions 
tend to compete and excel at the highest levels of athletics competition (e.g. Florida, 
LSU, Michigan). As noted by Thelin (2011), state flagship universities have come to 
embody both “big athletics” and “big science,” particularly medicine. In short, flagship 
institutions, in addition to having access to more core revenues than other institutions, 
have less need to subsidize athletics due to the success and often considerable revenues 
generated by their athletics programs. It is therefore expected that the correlation between 
athletics subsidies per FTE or school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE will 
be smaller for flagship compared to non-flagship universities.  
Athletics Reporting Structure 
Division I athletics departments are often established as auxiliary units within the 
university reporting structure (Barr, 2004). In such cases, athletics is generally afforded a 
82
high degree of autonomy and the athletics director reports to the university president 
directly. A similar model that perhaps provides even greater autonomy is to establish an 
entirely separate athletics foundation. This arrangement has been adopted by a handful of 
the most successful Division I programs (e.g. Georgia and Florida). While auxiliary units 
may be allowed to retain all of the revenues they generate, they are also expected to be 
self-sufficient. The other budget reporting structure commonly used by Division I 
institutions is to locate the athletics department within student affairs or student services 
(NCES, 2015a).  
Little research has been conducted to this point on the financial or structural 
differences between the two reporting arrangements of athletics. If auxiliary athletics 
departments are held to the same standards as other auxiliary units, then athletics 
subsidies should be very near to zero at those institutions. For athletics departments 
located within student services, the university may have greater difficulty containing 
athletics costs. The fact that athletics is located within student services may be an 
indication the university views athletics both as an activity worth supporting and as one 
that requires support in much the same way as tutoring services or a counseling center. 
Furthermore, athletics costs may prove difficult for administrators to track because they 
are contained within the larger student services budget.  
Information on the location of the athletics department within the university 
budget structure was obtained from the IPEDS database for all institutions in the USA 
Today dataset. Each institution’s response was examined from 2004-05 to 2013-14. Most 
institutions indicated the same reporting structure for athletics in each survey year – 
auxiliary, student services, or other. In cases where responses differed, the most frequent 
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response for that institution was selected. A handful of institutions (n=10) selected the 
“other” category in most or all years. Institutions that select “other” when completing the 
IPEDS survey are required to provide an explanation. These comments were examined 
and used to recode institutions in the dataset as either student services or auxiliary 
depending upon which they were most similar to. In total, nine institutions were recoded 
as auxiliary and one as student services. Following this recoding, interaction terms were 
created for the two athletics subsidies variables with the athletics reporting structure 
variable. 
Level of Competition 
The final categorical variable in the dataset was used to indicate the level of 
athletics competition for each institution. This variable was created using information 
from two sources. The first was the Equity in Athletics Data Analysis (EADA) cutting 
tool provided by the U.S Department of Education (Office of Postsecondary Education, 
2016). Data on the number of athletics teams and student athletes, cost of athletics 
scholarships, and NCAA affiliation status of all NCAA participating institutions can be 
obtained from EADA. After gathering information on the level of NCAA competition for 
the institutions in the USA Today dataset, it was compared against the College Football 
Data Warehouse (2017) records. The College Football Data Warehouse compiles detailed 
football data – win-loss records, bowl and conference championship outcomes, 
conference affiliation, and divisional status – for all Division I and Division II football 
programs.  
In cases where the two databases did not agree, attempts were made to triangulate 
the information using at least one other source such as news articles or university press 
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releases announcing, for example, a transition from Division II to Division I. Some 
differences were the result of an institution transitioning from a lower level of 
competition to a higher level over a period of several years. These institutions may have 
moved up one level in football first, followed by other sports later, or vice versa. The 
determination of which classification to use for such institutions was made based upon 
football affiliation due to the importance of football in shaping the overall athletics 
revenues and expenses. Once the data were verified and cleaned, a dummy variable was 
created to indicate institutional status as an FBS or FCS institution in each year between 
2004-05 and 2014-15. To simplify the analysis, only the dummy variable for the level of 
competition in 2004-05 was used to create the interaction terms with total athletics 
subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE. Institutions that were classified as Division 
II in 2004-05 were treated as FCS institutions because in each case these institutions 
transitioned to FCS during the time period of the study.  
The level of athletics competition was identified as an important institutional 
characteristic that could shape the nature of the relationship between the two athletics 
subsidies variables and E&R expenditures per FTE. In terms of athletics subsidies, FBS 
institutions had lower average per-athlete subsidies in 2010 ($19,318) than both FCS 
institutions with football ($24,407) and FCS institution without football ($29,601) 
(Desrochers, 2013). The opposite was true for academic spending: FBS institutions had 
higher per-student academic spending than either FCS football or FCS non-football 
institutions. In other words, the portion of core revenues allocated to athletics subsidies is 
often larger for FCS institutions than FBS. Consequently, it was expected that a stronger 
85
correlation would be observed between total athletics subsidies per FTE or school funds 
per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE for FCS compared to FBS institutions.  
Analysis 
Data Cleaning 
The initial sample size for this study consisted of 231 public Division I 
institutions that had data available from IPEDS and the USA Today Athletics Finance 
Database. One institution was immediately removed because it was a multi-campus 
university and the financial data for all campuses had been reported in aggregate to 
IPEDS (Penn State University). A second institution was removed because it used the 
FASB accounting standards as opposed to the GASB standards used by all other 
institutions in the dataset during the time period of interest (University of Delaware). 
After removing these two institutions, the continuous variables were tested for deviations 
from multivariate normality. It was determined that all but one of the continuous 
variables (total number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE) exhibited skewness and 
kurtosis indices that exceeded the acceptable range of -3.0 to 3.0 (Abbott, 2011). 
Consequently, each continuous variable was log-transformed and re-checked for 
normality issues. Although it did not require transformation, the number of tenure track 
faculty per 100 FTE was log-transformed so that it was scaled in a similar manner to the 
other variables.  
Several variables continued to exhibit deviations from multivariate normality 
despite the log transformation. To address this issue, variables were checked for extreme 
outliers that were more than 3.0 standard deviations above or below the mean. It was 
found that a handful of institutions (between one and seven) had outlying values for a 
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particular variable in any given year. Rather than delete cases listwise that contained 
outlying values, the decision was made to treat outliers as missing values when running 
the analyses. The use of full-information maximum likelihood, which was the method 
used in this study, allows for all available data to be used when calculating estimates and 
does not require missing values to be imputed (Little, 2013). The final dataset consisted 
of 229 institutions.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The first stage in the statistical analysis was the compilation of descriptive 
statistics for all of the variables in the dataset. The original, non-transformed continuous 
variables were used in preparing these statistics so that the data could be easily 
interpreted in the context of prior research. However, due to the normality issues of the 
original variables discussed above, the medians and interquartile ranges were reported as 
opposed to means and standard deviations. The median is preferred for non-normal 
distributions because, unlike the mean, it is not impacted by skewness (Sprinthall, 2007). 
In addition to compiling descriptive statistics for all institutions in the dataset, the 
medians and interquartile ranges for the continuous variables were compared for different 
types of institutions based upon Carnegie classification. Lastly, descriptive statistics for 
the athletics subsidies variables were provided according to the level of athletics play and 
location of athletics within the university budget structure.  
Analysis for Research Question 1  
Three separate statistical analyses were conducted to address the five research 
questions for this dissertation. For question one, a simple graphical analysis was first 
completed to compare the change over time in average athletics subsidies per FTE (log), 
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school funds per FTE (log), and E&R expenditures per FTE (log). These three variables 
were compared over the time period of 2004-05 to 2013-14 in order to provide insight 
into the shape of the growth curves (e.g. linear, curvilinear, exhibited multiple slopes, 
etc).  Following the graphical analysis, separate latent growth curve (LGC) models were 
estimated for each of the three variables using a structural equation modeling (SEM) 
approach. Each of these models was unconditional because exogenous variables were not 
included.  
A basic LGC model diagram using the reticular action method (RAM) 
representation of variables has been provided in Fig. 3.1 for four waves of data. In the 
RAM framework, latent variables (unobserved) are represented as circles, observed 
variables as rectangles, direct effects as single-headed arrows, and covariances as two-
headed arrows (McArdle & McDonald, 1984). As shown in Fig. 3.1, the intercept and 
slope for the time-varying dependent variable are represented as latent variables. Each 
time point in which the dependent variable has been measured (observed) is treated as an 
indicator of the two latent variables. The factor loadings from the intercept to each 
repeated measure is fixed to 1.0, because it is assumed that the intercept influences each 
time point equally (Little, 2013). The model shown in the diagram represents a linear 
LGC where each of the four indicators have been constrained to equal intervals between 
0.0 and 3.0. Other, non-linear slope configurations can be utilized when estimating a 
LGC including a freed-loading approach where only the first and final loadings are fixed 
or a piecewise model that estimates unique slopes for different time periods (Bollen & 
Curran, 2006). Another option is to include additional latent slope terms representing 
quadratic, cubic, or other higher-order polynomials. Lastly, each of the observed 
88
variables in Fig. 3.1 has been assigned a disturbance, or error term, which represents the 
variance that is not accounted for by the model (Hoyle, 2012). Because disturbance terms 
are not measured directly they are treated as latent variables in SEM.  
Figure 3.1 
Path Diagram for a Linear Latent Growth Curve with Four Waves of Data 
 
In the latent growth curve (LGC) diagram above, α represents the intercept, β the slope, 
and y1 – y4 the four time points for the endogenous variable y. A disturbance term εi has 
been assigned to each observation of y. Source: Bollen & Curran (2006).  
The model shown in Fig. 3.1 is considered an unconditional LGC model because 
no additional time-invariant or time-varying variables have been included. The basic 
equations for unconditional LGC models involve a trajectory equation in level one and 
intercept and slope equations in level two (Bollen & Curran, 2006). The trajectory 
equation appears as follows: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (eq. 3.1) 
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In the above equation, yit is the value of the dependent variable y for case i at time t, αi is 
the random intercept for case i, βi is the random slope for case i, and εit is the disturbance 
term for case i at time t. λt is the time variable – a constant that ranges between t=0 to T-1 
where T is the total number of time points (observations). The level two equations are: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼 + 𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  (eq. 3.2) 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 =  𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽 + 𝜁𝜁𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  (eq. 3.3) 
where αi and βi are the intercept and slope terms from the level one equation, μα and μβ 
are the mean intercept and slope for all cases, and ζαi and ζβi are the disturbance terms for 
the intercept and slope. Time-invariant covariates (TICs) or time-varying covariates 
(TVCs) can also be added to a LGC model. In a conditional model where only TICs have 
been added to the unconditional model, the level one equation remains the same and the 
new variables are introduced into the level two equations. In a model with only TVCs, on 
the other hand, the covariates appear only in the level one equation with the level two 
equations remaining the same as in the unconditional model.  
The method used to estimate the LGC models was Full-information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML). It is necessary to use FIML as opposed to traditional ML due to the 
presence of missing data in the dataset. Use of FIML has a number of advantages, namely 
that all available data can be utilized and it provides estimates that are generally less 
biased compared to other missing data techniques (Byrne, 2016). A number of key 
assumptions are made when estimating a SEM model using any form of ML. First, it is 
assumed that the model has been specified correctly by the researcher (Kline, 2011). 
Second, endogenous variables are expected to be multivariate normal and exogenous 
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variables measured without error. Third, the error variances may differ over time, but are 
assumed to be the same for all individuals in a given time period (Bollen & Curran, 
2006). Finally, LGC analysis also assumes that the mean of the disturbance terms are 
zero (E(εit) =0) for all cases and time periods, the intercept and slope terms are 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term and the disturbances for different individuals are 
not correlated.  
The LGC analysis for research question one proceeded through several steps. 
First, three initial LGC models were estimated for each dependent variable: total athletics 
subsidies per FTE, school funds per FTE, and E&R expenditures per FTE. These models 
included a no-growth model, a linear growth model similar to that shown in Fig. 3.1, and 
a quadratic linear growth model as shown in Fig. 3.2. Two additional LGC models were 
also estimated for each variable – a piecewise linear model and a piecewise non-linear 
model because each of the average growth curves plotted during the graphical analysis 
demonstrated the presence of at least two distinct slopes. Path diagrams for a piecewise 
linear model and a piecewise non-linear model with six waves of data are shown in Fig. 
3.3 and 3.4. Initially, adjacent pairs of disturbance terms were allowed to correlate in 
each model (e.g. ε1  ε2). Non-significant disturbance correlations were removed 
iteratively until only significant correlations remained. Adjacent disturbance terms for the 
same indicator are often correlated in longitudinal SEM models due to the fact that one or 
more omitted variables may be represented within the disturbances (Bollen, 2006). After 
estimating all of the growth models for each variable, the model of best fit was 
determined using a number of fit criteria: χ2, Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Aikaike 
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Information Criterion (AIC). The model of best fit was used to report the coefficients, 
standard errors, and correlations. AMOS v. 23 was used to estimate all LGC models. 
Figure 3.2 
Path Diagram for a Quadratic Latent Growth Curve Model with Five Waves of Data 
 
In the latent growth curve (LGC) diagram above, α represents the intercept, β1 the first 
linear slope term, β2 the second linear slope term and y1 – y5 the five time points for the 
endogenous variable y. A disturbance term εi has been assigned to each observation of y. 
Source: Bollen & Curran (2006). 
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Figure 3.3 
Path Diagram for a Piecewise Linear Latent Growth Curve for Six Waves of Data 
Source: Bollen & Curran (2006). 
Figure 3.4 
Path Diagram for a Piecewise Nonlinear Latent Growth Curve for Six Waves of Data 
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Analysis for Research Questions 2 through 5 
The four remaining research questions for this study were investigated using 
fixed-effects models (FEMs). Fixed-effects modeling was selected because it is well-
suited to the analysis of panel datasets and controls for time-invariant variables that have 
not been identified or cannot be measured (Allison, 2009). In the case of this dissertation, 
time fixed-effects such as institution type (public or private, land grant, HBCU, etc.), 
location, and mission were automatically controlled for in the FEMs. Fixed-effects 
models can be estimated using a number of different approaches, including ordinary least 
squares regression and structural equation modeling (SEM). The latter method was used 
for this dissertation. Advantages of using the SEM approach include the ability to 
estimate: hybrid fixed- and random-effects models, models with feedback loops, and 
models with latent variables that contain multiple indicators (Allison, 2009). Another 
advantage is that SEM software packages provide a wide range of model fit criteria that 
can be used to optimize model fit and select the best model among several viable 
alternatives (Bollen & Brand, 2010).  
The equation for a classic FEM is as follows: 
yit = Byx xit + λt ηi + εit (eq. 3.4) 
where Bxy is the vector of coefficients for the independent variables x, assumed to be 
equal across time and individuals, xit is the vector of independent variables (time-varying) 
for case i at time t, λt is the coefficient for the unobserved time-invariant variable ηi at 
time t, ηi is an unobserved (latent) time-invariant variable that represents all time-
invariant covariates that predict yit, and εit is a random disturbance term for case i at time t 
(Bollen & Brand, 2010). The coefficient for the time-fixed effects, λt, is constrained to 
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one for all waves of data because it is assumed to have a constant effect on the outcome 
variable. The variance of the disturbance terms (σεit) can be constrained or allowed to 
vary across individuals, but is assumed to be constant with time (σεit = σεi).  
A path diagram for a classic FEM using SEM is shown in Fig. 3.5 for four waves 
of data. As with the LGC models on p. 17-20, the FEM in 3.5 is depicted using the RAM 
notation. In the model shown in Fig. 3.5, none of the variables have been time-lagged. 
The observation of the independent variable x at time t is used to predict the 
corresponding observation of the dependent variable y at time t, with a constant 
regression weight of B1. The time-fixed effects term, η, is treated as a latent variable and 
used to predict each observation of y, with a constant regression weight of one for each 
time t. Lastly, each observation of x is covaried with the three other observations of x as 
well as η.  
In addition to the classic FEM in Fig. 3.5, one can estimate a FEM where the 
dependent variable(s) are time-lagged relative to one or more of the independent 
variables, where the dependent variable itself is time-lagged, or where both types of time-
lagged effects are included (Bollen & Brand, 2010). A path diagram for a FEM that uses 
a lagged dependent variable is shown in Fig. 3.6. From the diagram, the first observation 
of the dependent variable, y1, is treated as an independent variable and is used to predict 
the second observation of the dependent variable. It is also made to covary with each 
observation of the independent variable, x1t, and the time-fixed effects term, η.  
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Figure 3.5 
Classic Fixed Effects Model for Four Waves of Data using SEM 
In the above figure, each observation of the dependent variable, x1t, is used to predict the 
corresponding observation of the dependent variable yt. A disturbance term, εt, is 
included for each observation of yt, and η represents the fixed effects latent variable. 
Source: Bollen & Brand (2010).  
Figure 3.6 
Fixed Effects Model with a Time-Lagged Dependent Variable for Four Waves of Data  
In the figure, the dependent variable is time-lagged such that the first observation, y1, is 
treated as an exogenous variable and used to predict the second observation, y2. Each 
remaining observation of yt is used to predict the subsequent observation, yt+1. The 
independent variable has not been time-lagged, so the first observation, x11, has not been 
included. A disturbance term, εt, is included for each observation of yt following y1, and η 
represents the fixed effects latent variable. Source: Bollen & Brand (2010).  
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Each remaining observation of y is treated as a dependent variable but is also used to 
predict the subsequent observation of y. In this particular model, the independent variable 
is not time-lagged, which has led to the first observation of x being dropped from the 
equation (x11). 
For research question two, the dependent variable was E&R expenditures per FTE 
(log), the independent variable of interest was total athletics subsidies per FTE (log), and 
the control variables were core revenues per FTE (log), student FTE enrollment (log), 
and the number of tenure-track faculty (log). Multiple FEMs were estimated for research 
question two in order to identify the model of best fit. The models included: a classic 
FEM with no time-lagged variables, a FEM with a lagged dependent variable, a FEM 
with lagged independent-dependent variable effects, and a FEM with both types of 
lagged effects. The models were compared using several fit criteria, and the best-fitting 
model was used to report the results from the analysis. 
Research question three re-estimated the best-fitting model from research 
question two after including interaction terms between the independent variable of 
interest and four categorical, time-invariant variables. The interaction terms were 
between athletics subsidies per FTE (log) and each of the following: Carnegie 
classification as a research university; classification as the state flagship university; 
reporting location of the athletics department within the university budget structure; and 
level of athletics competition. Four separate FEMs were estimated with one of the four 
interaction terms included in each model in order to determine whether the relationship 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE depended upon 
any of the categorical variables. The analyses for research questions 4-5 were identical to 
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those for questions 2-3 except that school funds per FTE was used as the primary 
independent variable in place of total athletics subsidies per FTE.  
As with the LGC models used to investigate research question one, the FEMs 
were estimated using full-information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). FIML 
assumes that continuous variables are multivariate normal and exogenous variables were 
measured without error (Kline, 2011). It is also assumed that the disturbance terms are 
uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. All FEMs were estimated using AMOS v. 23. 
An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance for the coefficients.  
Limitations 
A number of important limitations have been identified for this dissertation. First 
and foremost, the accuracy of the USA Today Athletics Finance Database is somewhat 
suspect. In theory, institutions are required to disclose all direct and indirect subsidies to 
their athletics departments through the NCAA annual athletics finance data request (USA 
Today, 2016b). This information was acquired by USA Today using the Freedom of 
Information Act and published online. However, historically not all institutions have 
participated in the NCAA data collections and the accuracy of these data have been called 
into question (Thelin, 1996). Institutions may be providing misleading or incomplete 
information by, for example, excluding athletics facilities from the accounting of indirect 
subsidies to the athletics department.  
A second limitation is the scope of this dissertation. Currently, athletics subsidies 
data are only available for public Division I institutions, which represent a relatively 
small fraction of all U.S. colleges and universities. Moreover, the findings from this study 
may not be applicable to private institutions or public institutions that compete at the 
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Division II or III levels. Additionally, only the relationship between athletics subsidies 
and education and related expenditures has been examined. It is possible that changes in 
athletics subsidies may be correlated with changes in other expenditure categories such as 
student services, student scholarships (non-athletic), or physical plant.  
A final limitation identified for this study is the possibility of omitted variable 
bias in the fixed-effects models. While the models accounted for time- and year-fixed 
effects, there may be other time-varying covariates that affect both athletics subsidies and 
education and related expenditures and that have unique values for each institution. For 
example, changes in institutional priorities stemming from new policies in the state 
legislature (e.g. performance-based funding) or new academic leadership (e.g. president) 
may impact the allocation of financial resources. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the research hypotheses were presented followed by a description 
of the sample, data sources, and the methods used to analyze the datasets. Several 
limitations identified for this study have also been discussed.  The research hypotheses 
were developed by drawing upon the economic and higher education theories presented 
in chapter two. Here, it has been supposed that as colleges and universities increase their 
intercollegiate athletics subsidies, they in turn have decreased resource allocation to other 
core functions that are dependent upon the general fund, controlling for other factors. 
Further, colleges and universities may be increasing their internal support to athletics due 
to belief in the indirect benefits of athletics as well as an inability to properly oversee and 
control athletics spending.  
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The size and scope of the dataset is somewhat limited for this study. However, it 
focuses upon arguably the most important group of institutions in terms of intercollegiate 
athletics: public Division I colleges and universities. With the exception of a select 
number of private institutions, the institutions examined in this study have the largest 
athletics budgets as well as athletics subsidies. Moreover, these institutions have 
allocated general fund revenues to intercollegiate athletics – funds that are at least in part 
provided from state tax revenues intended to serve the public good. 
The methods used in this dissertation are a robust and proven means of analyzing 
panel datasets. The use of fixed-effects models allows for institutional variables that did 
not change during the time period of this study to be controlled for. Additionally, 
variables that changed over time but had a constant effect across institutions could also be 
controlled for. In this way, it is believed that the risk of omitted variable bias has been 
reduced as much as possible. The next chapter will present the results from the statistical 
analyses.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Chapter four presents the results from the data analyses for this dissertation. The 
analyses were designed to address the following research questions: 
1. How do the rates of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds 
per FTE compare to the rate of growth in education and related (E&R) 
expenditures per FTE for public Division I institutions between 2005 and 2014?  
2. What is the relationship between total intercollegiate athletics subsidies per FTE 
and E&R expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors? 
3. Is the relationship between total intercollegiate athletics subsidies per FTE and 
E&R expenditures per FTE dependent upon institutional type (research university, 
state flagship) or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level 
of play), controlling for other factors? 
4. What is the relationship between athletics subsidies from school funds per FTE 
and E&R expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors? 
5. Is the relationship between athletics subsidies from school funds per FTE and 
E&R expenditures per FTE dependent upon institutional type (research university, 
state flagship) or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level 
of play), controlling for other factors? 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one presents the descriptive 
statistics for all variables in the dataset. Section two provides the results from the latent 
growth curve (LGC) models used to estimate average growth in total athletics subsidies 
per FTE, athletics subsidies from school funds per FTE, and E&R expenditures per FTE 
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for research question one. Section three presents the results from the time fixed effects 
models (FEMs) used to estimate the relationship between total athletics subsidies per 
FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE, both with and without interaction terms (research 
questions two and three). Similarly, section four presents the results from the time FEMs 
used to estimate athletics subsidies from school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per 
FTE, with and without interaction terms (research questions four and five). The chapter 
concludes with a brief summary of key findings. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all continuous variables used in the analyses are 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. From Table 4.1, the institutions in the dataset brought in 
substantially more total core revenues on average in 2014 than 2005 ($364.3M vs. 
$246.3M), allocated more funding to E&R activities ($167.2M vs. $116.1M), and 
enrolled 19 percent more students. Even after accounting for inflation, the increases to 
total core revenues and E&R expenditures were 22.0 and 18.8 percent, respectively. Real 
increases in core revenues per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE were more modest, 
however, at 6.0 and 4.7 percent. This suggests that much of the growth in total core 
revenues and E&R expenditures was the result of expanded student enrollments. On the 
one hand, additional students translate into more tuition and fee dollars, while on the 
other hand they generally require greater expenditures on faculty, classroom facilities, 
technology, etc. The most conspicuous variable in the dataset is the median number of 
tenure-track faculty, which decreased slightly from 2005 to 2014 despite an increase in 
median student enrollment of nearly 2,700. This finding is consistent with other research 
that has shown institutions have not increased the number of tenure-track faculty 
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commensurately with enrollment (Bunton & Mallon, 2007; McMurtry & McClelland, 
1997; and Gappa, 2000).  
Athletics subsidies are represented as four different measures in the dataset: total 
athletics subsidies, total athletics subsidies per FTE, athletics subsidies from school funds 
(referred to herein as school funds), and school funds per FTE. In Table 4.2, all four 
subsidies measures increased substantially from 2005 to 2014: between 50 and 66 percent 
in actual 2014 dollars. These increases in athletics subsidies far outpaced the increases in 
total and per-student E&R expenditures noted above. This result is consistent with 
previous findings by Desrochers (2013) who showed that athletics subsidies per student 
athlete increased by 61 percent for FBS and 42 percent for FCS institutions between 2005 
and 2010. By comparison, FBS and FCS institutions saw increases of 23 and 22 percent 
in academic spending per FTE during that time. Even though athletics subsidies remain a 
relatively small portion of the overall university budget, the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
demonstrate that the fraction of core revenues expended on athletics subsidies has 
increased from 2.1 percent in 2005 to 2.7 percent in 2014. 
Table 4.3 provides the frequencies for the time-invariant categorical variables. In 
reviewing the 2005 and 2010 Carnegie Classifications, the majority of institutions in the 
dataset for either year were considered research or doctoral, with very few at the 
baccalaureate level. While the frequency distributions of the two sets of classifications 
appear similar, there was considerable institutional movement from 2005 to 2010. A total 
of 25 institutions “moved up” one category (e.g. Research II to Research I), 2 institutions 
moved up two categories, and 3 institutions moved down one category. This movement 
may be reflective of the fact that, although not intended to serve as such, the Carnegie  
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Table 4.1 
M
edians and Interquartile Ranges for D
ependent and C
ontrol Variables 
Total E&
R
 Expenditures 
E&
R
 Expenditures 
/FTE 
FTE Enrollm
ent 
Total C
ore R
evenues 
C
ore R
evenues /FTE 
N
um
ber of Tenure-
Track 
Faculty 
N
um
ber of Tenure-
track Faculty/ 100 
FTE 
2014 
167,257,383.0 
(85,823,651.0 – 306,602,604.0) 
9,905.8 
(7,938.9 – 
13,361.7) 
16,716.0 
(9,958.5 – 24,984.5) 
364,269,596.0 
(183,445,857.0 – 
784,806,397.0) 
23,089.9 
(16,866.6 – 32.736.9) 
542.0 
(337.5 – 890.5) 
3.5 
(3.0 – 4.1) 
2013 
166,740,729.0 
(82,539,480.5 – 293,029,225.5) 
9,515.8 
(7,639.7 – 
12,653.1) 
16,971.0 
(10,140.5 – 24,865.5) 
346,954,062.0 
(179,189,896.0 – 
735,658,526.0) 
22,243.5 
(16,306.1 – 31,697.8) 
551.0 
(346.0 – 879.5) 
3.4 
(3.0 – 4.0) 
2012 
159,422,442.0 
(80,802,879.0 – 277,604,700.5) 
9,257.6 
(7,351.9 – 
12,121.2) 
17,104.0 
(10,048.5 – 25,026.0) 
338,802,494.0 
(176,285,406.5 – 
725,215,104.0) 
21,792.0 
(16,216.9 – 30,651.0) 
566.0 
(341.5 – 917.0) 
3.6 
(3.0 – 4.2) 
2011 
155,410,866.0 
(78,512,870.0 – 274,751,562.0) 
9,166.1 
(7,401.8 – 
11,792.7) 
16,316.0 
(10,016.0 – 24,284.0) 
340,044,638.0 
(178,775,506.5 – 
691,903,543.0) 
21,819.9 
(16,863.0 – 31,019.3) 
565.0 
(342.0 – 908.2) 
3.6 
(3.0 – 4.3) 
2010 
147,616,494.0 
(76,009,565.0 – 260,279,403.0) 
9,224.0 
(7,215.5 – 
11,740.1) 
16,001.0 
(9,882.0 – 23,934.5) 
322,300,702.0 
(174,317,979.0 – 
659,238,415.5) 
21,874.2 
(16,045.2 – 30,124.8) 
576.0 
(336.5 – 893.5) 
3.8 
(3.1 – 4.3) 
2009 
146,984,532.0 
(78,693,239.5 – 259,524,340.5) 
9,254.2 
(7,492.6 – 
12,309.0) 
15,812.0 
(9,447.5 – 23,284.0) 
293,927,234.0 
(168,262,175.5 – 
567,376,332.0) 
20,335.5 
(15,425.5 – 28,637.2) 
570.0 
(342.5 – 898.0) 
3.8 
(3.2 – 4.5) 
2008 
140,716,561.0 
(76,359,929.5 – 245,823,619.0) 
9,178.0 
(7,282.2 – 
12,220.1) 
15,155.0 
(9,157.0 – 22,841.5) 
291,827,553.0 
(158,299,318.0 – 
571,591,009.5) 
20,776.4 
(15,561.7 – 30,540.9) 
567.0 
(338.0 – 891.0) 
3.8 
(3.2 – 4.5) 
2007 
129,889,993.0 
(70,796,635.5 – 226,555,130.0) 
8,688.1 
(6,936.6 – 
11,531.4) 
14,642.0 
(9,205.0 – 22,403.5) 
297,608,177.0 
(151,778,465.5 – 
573,561,615.5) 
20,271.4 
(14,899.8 – 29,592.6) 
559.0 
(324.0 – 880.5) 
3.8 
(3.3 – 4.6) 
2006 
119,983,290.0 
(66,316,733.5 – 211,335,679.5) 
8,292.7 
(6,625.8 – 
10,777.7) 
14,785.0 
(9,278.5 – 22,281.0) 
273,026,915.0 
(142,653,735.5 – 
528,192,544.0) 
19,117.9 
(14,150.4 – 27,772.9) 
549.0 
(319.0 – 858.5) 
3.8 
(3.2 – 4.6) 
2005 
116,100,967.0 
(62,104,268.5 – 198,449,823.5) 
7,802.0 
(6,295.3 – 
10,294.4) 
14,053.0 
(9,426.0 – 22,389.0) 
246,333,315.0 
(132,103,002.5 – 
496,054,679.0) 
17,978.5 
(13,217.4 – 25,654.7) 
546.5 
(326.0 – 854.8) 
3.8 
(3.2 – 4.6) 
a A
 total of 229 unique institutions are included in the dataset use to report the figures above. A
ll institutions reported data for the variables above to IPED
S for each year betw
een 2005 and 2014. 
Interquartile ranges are show
n in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2 
M
edians and Interquartile Ranges for Independent Variables 
N
 a
Total A
thl. Subsidies 
A
thl. Subsidies /FTE 
N
b
School Funds 
School Funds/FTE 
2014 
228 
9,755,460.5 
(6,811,373.2 – 14,788,811.5) 
774.6 
(466.2 – 1,084.4) 
228 
5,287,278.5 
(2,146,248.0 – 8,963,623.8) 
370.0 
(114.3 – 696.5) 
2013 
228 
9,440,802.5 
(6,532,314.5 – 13,772,626.5) 
736.9 
(452.2 – 1,018.2) 
229 
5,007,224.0 
(2,015,886.0 – 8,346,743.0) 
343.6 
(122.7 – 660.8) 
2012 
226 
8,926,498.5 
(6,128,058.0 – 13,578,986.2) 
685.4 
(396.4 – 989.3) 
226 
4,554,341.0 
(1,976,627.0 – 7,757,227.5) 
328.0 
(102.6 – 627.8) 
2011 
224 
8,338,475.0 
(5,757,774.2 – 12,472,799.2) 
658.4 
(395.5 – 913.4) 
224 
4,228,209.5 
(1,954,152.8 – 7,747,055.5) 
304.2 
(100.5 – 576.8) 
2010 
226 
7,956,826.5 
(5,391,245.2 – 11,568,538.5) 
605.4 
(385.0 – 856.8) 
226 
3,946,062.0 
(1,834,804.2 – 7,336,244.5) 
263.3 
(101.5 – 532.5) 
2009 
224 
7,543,496.0 
(5,156,941.8 – 11,474,264.5) 
617.8 
(381.6 – 832.4) 
224 
3,953,725.0 
(1,847,509.0 – 7,339,900.8) 
275.5 
(107.0 – 538.5) 
2008 
223 
7,002,634.0 
(4,708,944.0 – 10,199,008.0) 
553.4 
(342.3 – 771.8) 
223 
3,474,923.0 
(1,504,908.0 – 6,687,658.0) 
246.9 
(95.4 – 509.1) 
2007 
223 
6,286,050.0 
(4,140,612.0 – 9,423,905.0) 
498.1 
(313.8 – 713.7) 
223 
2,942,863.0 
(1,381,811.0 – 5,911,203.0_ 
217.2 
(89.2 – 457.8) 
2006 
221 
6,032,607.0 
(3,834,108.0 – 8,459,281.5) 
475.2 
(277.1 – 673.0) 
221 
2,889,681.0 
(1,208,203.5 – 5,357,919.5) 
206.3 
(75.5 – 441.6) 
2005 
222 
5,233,447.0 
(3,233,852.8 – 7,563,707.2) 
426.2 
(256.7 – 612.1) 
222 
2,591,236.0 
(811,370.2 – 4,621,233.8) 
183.3 
(57.8 – 379.1) 
a A
 total of 229 unique institutions are included in the dataset used to report the figures above. H
ow
ever, a handful of institutions did not report athletics finance data in any given year. 
Interquartile ranges are show
n in parentheses. 
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Table 4.3 
Frequency Distribution of Time-invariant Categorical Variables 
Variable Frequency (%) 
2010 Carnegie Classification 
Research-I 65 (28.4) 
Research-II 63 (27.5) 
Research-III/Doctoral 21 (9.2) 
Master’s a 72 (31.4) 
Baccalaureate b 8 (3.5) 
2005 Carnegie Classification 
Research-I 56 (24.5) 
Research-II 64 (27.9) 
Research-III/Doctoral 21 (9.2) 
Master’s a 79 (34.5) 
Baccalaureate b 9 (3.9) 
State Flagship University 
Flagship 47 (20.5) 
Non-flagship 182 (79.5) 
Athletics Control 
Auxiliary/Other Unit 161 (70.3) 
Student Services 68 (29.7) 
a Includes institutions in all three masters’ Basic Carnegie Classifications (larger, medium, and smaller programs) 
b Includes institutions in all three baccalaureate Basic Carnegie Classifications (Arts & Sciences, Diverse Fields, and 
Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges)  
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Table 4.4 
Frequency D
istribution of Tim
e-varying C
ategorical Variable 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
Level of Play 
D
-I - FB
S
96 
98 
98 
98 
98 
99 
99 
99 
102 
104 
D
-I - FC
S
74 
72 
73 
74 
76 
77 
79 
80 
77 
76 
D
-I - non-football 
46 
47 
48 
50 
51 
49 
48 
48 
49 
49 
D
-II  a
13 
12 
10 
7 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
a A
 total of 13 different institutions in the dataset transitioned from
 D
-II to D
-I betw
een 2005 and 2014. H
ow
ever, these institutions generally provided data only in the years for w
hich they w
ere a) in 
transition from
 D
-II to D
-I or b) already classified as D
-I. A
s such, they w
ere classified as either D
-I - FC
S or D
-I - non-football for the subsequent analyses that involved level of play interaction term
s. 
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classifications have come to be viewed as a measure of institutional prestige. A desire to 
“move up” from the baccalaureate to masters category or masters to doctoral may serve 
as an incentive for institutions to add graduate and professional programs (Iglesias, 
2014). Also shown in the table is the number of flagship institutions in the dataset, 47. 
Flagship universities are unique for a variety of reasons, including the fact that they are 
among the oldest and largest institutions in their respective states and generally receive 
more state appropriations than public non-flagship institutions (Bowser, 2017; Stocum, 
2013). The final variable, athletics control, indicates the location of the athletics’ budget 
within the university structure. More than two-thirds of the institutions indicated that the 
athletics department is treated as an auxiliary/other unit, with the remaining one-third 
reporting that it was located within student services.  
The frequency distribution for the lone time-varying categorical variable 
indicating the level of athletics play is provided in Table 4.4. In all years, the majority of 
institutions in the dataset competed at the FCS level and sponsored a football program. 
However, there has been a clear upward trend for institutions to move from Division II to 
Division I and from FCS to FBS. When combined, 21 of the 229 institutions in the 
dataset moved up one level of play (9.2 percent). A handful of institutions were classified 
as Division II in at least one year from 2005 to 2014; however, athletics subsidies data 
were generally not available for these institutions until they began their transition to 
Division I. Division II programs that did provide subsidies data were treated as Division I 
FCS or Division I non-football in the analyses. 
The continuous variables in 2014 are reported in Table 4.5 on the basis of the 
2005 Carnegie Classifications. From the table, differences exist across institution types in 
108
terms of the “horsepower” variables – total E&R expenditures, total core revenues, 
enrollment, and the number of tenure-track faculty. Research I institutions appear the 
most distinctive, with medians for each of these variables that were between 1.5 and 3.5 
times those of the next closest category of institutions, Research II.  Some similarities 
emerge, however, when comparing institution types on a per-student basis. For example, 
the E&R expenditures per FTE are similar for Research II and Research III and across 
Master’s and Baccalaureate institutions.  
The athletics subsidies variables in Table 4.5 exhibit several important trends. The 
largest median total subsidies occurred at Research II universities followed by Research 
III and Master’s. However, this trend is reversed when examining the per-student 
variables. Baccalaureate institutions had the highest total subsidies per FTE and school 
funds per FTE followed by Master’s and Research III institutions. These findings suggest 
the possibility of certain fixed costs associated with athletics that large research 
universities are able to spread out over a much larger student body compared to Master’s 
and Baccalaureate institutions.  
Table 4.6 presents the median percent change in the continuous variables from 
2005 to 2014 for each of the Carnegie classifications. With the exception of the two 
faculty variables, all institution types saw appreciable increases in each of the continuous 
variables. However, there appear to be differences in the amount of growth that occurred 
for each class of institution. The largest increases in total and per-student core revenues 
and E&R expenditures were generally observed for Research I institutions. Considering 
that Research I institutions also had the highest core revenues and E&R expenditures 
among institution types in 2005 (not shown), it appears that the gap between 
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Table 4.5 
2014 M
edians and Interquartile Ranges for C
ontinuous Variables by 2005 C
arnegie C
lassification 
R
esearch I 
R
esearch II 
R
esearch III/ D
octoral 
M
aster’s 
B
accalaureate. 
Total E&
R
 Expenditures 
458,400,349.0 
(347,333,797.0 – 
797,547,991.5) 
167,257,383.0 
(85,825,651.0 – 
306,602,604.0) 
124,564,898.0 
(81,646,475.5 – 
193,973,390.0) 
79,669,792.0 
(52,108,683.0 – 
128,086,248.0) 
40,214,517.0 
(28,027,008.5 – 
138,343,899.5) 
E&
R
 Expenditures/ FTE 
16,263.8 
(12,536.9 – 21,327.2) 
10,356.8 
(8,824.0 – 13,051.1) 
9,226.8 
(8,757.9 – 11,010.7) 
7,554.5 
(6,915.7 – 8,986.2) 
8,531.2 
(7,150.9 – 24,727.7) 
FTE Enrollm
ent 
28,773.5 
(24,362.8 – 39,395.8) 
18,072.5 
(13,017.0 – 23,163.0) 
12,791.0 
(8,904.5 – 18,496.5) 
10,356.0 
(6,890.0 – 16,449.0) 
4,591.0 
(2,916.0 – 6,999.0) 
Total C
ore R
evenues 
1,215,874,483 
(908,586,509 – 
1,873,873,986) 
364,269,596.0 
(183,445,857.0 – 
784,806,397.0) 
255,164,744.0 
(168,777,562.5 – 
346,302,241.0) 
175,500,638.0 
(116,200,234.0 – 
259,983,922.0) 
76,967,303.0 
(66,672,365.5 – 
302,280,528.0) 
C
ore R
evenues/ FTE 
43,691.7 
(33,444.6 – 56,910.6) 
25,833.4 
(21,496.6 – 29,478.0) 
21,126.9 
(17,353.2 – 23,556.4) 
16,545.2 
(14,972.8 – 19,538.0) 
22,697.5 
(13,560.5 – 55,575.4) 
N
um
ber of tenure-track 
faculty 
1,282.5 
(1,011.8 – 1,506.8) 
542.0 
(337.5 – 890.5) 
412.0 
(313.5 – 568.5) 
334.0 
(202.0 – 500.0) 
131.0 
(48.5 – 228.0) 
N
um
ber of tenure-track 
faculty/ 100 FTE 
4.0 
(3.5 – 4.9) 
3.5 
(3.0 – 4.1) 
3.5 
(3.1 – 4.0) 
3.2 
(2.7 – 3.8) 
3.0 
(1.2 – 4.4) 
Total A
thl. Subsidies 
8,026,863.0 
(2,109,120.2 – 15,025,883.0) 
12,640,747.5 
(7,583,256.0 – 18,597,633.0) 
10,041,697.0 
(8,802,100.5 – 14,591,949.0) 
9,432,961.0 
(7,945,097.2 – 1 1,904,057.2) 
6,037,876.0 
(4,810,823.5 – 15,901,683.5) 
A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE 
225.8 
(64.6 – 652.2) 
706.5 
(424.2 – 994.4) 
892.0 
(724.5 – 1,091.4) 
930.9 
(703.7 – 1,217.3) 
2,202.8 
(1,089.6 – 2,613.9) 
School funds 
3,288,551.0 
(251,579.0 – 9,615,525.5) 
5,287.278.5 
(2,146,248.0 – 8,963,623.8) 
6,159,730.0 
(3,308,823.0 – 8,412,618.5) 
6,106,560.0 
(2,922,446.5 – 8,497,718.8) 
5,085,138.0 
(1,946,623.5 – 13,679,943.0) 
School funds/FTE 
102.9 
(6.8 – 395.9) 
370.0 
(114.3 – 696.5) 
459.4 
(222.0 – 856.8) 
600.4 
(262.4 – 811.6) 
696.7 
(382.0 – 2,366.9) 
N
 
56 
229 
21 
79 
9 
Interquartile ranges are show
n in parentheses. 
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Table 4.6 
M
edians and Interquartile Ranges for Percent C
hange for C
ontinuous Variables from
 2005 to 2014 by 2005 C
arnegie C
lassification 
R
esearch I 
R
esearch II 
R
esearch III/ D
octoral 
M
aster’s 
B
accalaureate 
Total E&
R
 Expenditures 
50.9 
(44.6 – 65.8) 
49.7 
(32.8 – 59.9) 
39.7 
(15.1 – 63.5) 
41.0 
(25.3 – 56.3) 
37.6 
(18.7 – 84.2) 
E&
R
 Expenditures/ FTE 
37.0 
(26.1 – 50.8) 
26.9 
(17.3 – 40.8) 
21.1 
(13.0 – 42.7) 
26.7 
(14.7 – 38.5) 
29.1 
(10.0 – 44.2) 
FTE Enrollm
ent 
12.8 
(6.8 – 17.8) 
16.1 
(4.1 – 23.9) 
5.4 
(-4.4 – (+25.6)) 
11.3 
(0.6 – 20.9) 
9.8 
(0.1 – 25.9) 
Total C
ore R
evenues 
50.6 
(39.6 – 66.4) 
47.7 
(30.3 – 63.8) 
41.5 
(25.0 – 64.9) 
45.1 
(27.7 – 59.6) 
32.9 
(19.1 – 62.4) 
C
ore R
evenues/ FTE 
35.6 
(25.5 – 49.1) 
27.3 
(21.6 – 40.3) 
30.2 
(18.4 – 42.2) 
30.3 
(21.0 – 41.2) 
37.0 
(7.7 – 42.8) 
N
um
ber of Tenure Track 
Faculty 
-1.4
(-5.4 – (+6.6)) 
2.2 
(-5.0 – (+9.8)) 
-1.8
(-14.4 – (+11.9)) 
9.8 
(-8.2 – (+15.4)) 
6.5 
(-0.8 – (+41.1)) 
N
um
ber of Tenure Track 
Faculty/ 100 FTE 
-10.4
(-20.6 – (-3.9)) 
-10.7
(-18.8 – (-3.8)) 
-5.0
(-24.5 – (+0.8)) 
-3.5
(-17.4 – (+6.4)) 
-0.1
(-5.0 – (+8.2)) 
Total A
thl. Subsidies 
66.0 
(-2.5 – (+110.2)) 
74.8 
(42.8 – 120.5) 
81.6 
(65. 6 – 141.5) 
98.9 
(64.1 – 150.4) 
121.5 
(87.1 – 158.6) 
A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE 
42.2 
(-11.0 – (+92.2)) 
52.9 
(25.7 – 84.8) 
78.8 
(51.6 – 117.8) 
80.2 
(53.8 – 122.5) 
88.2 
(47.4 – 150.6) 
School funds 
53.4 
(-42.4 – (+213.6)) 
74.8 
(35.0 – 121.0) 
81.3 
(50..0 – 166.5) 
96.7 
(52.8 – 161.1) 
220.7 
(52.6 – 258.6) 
School funds/FTE 
28.6 
(-47.2 – (+146.6)) 
57.3 
(23.0 – 99.5) 
78.7 
(34.8 – 192.3) 
76.9 
(32.3 – 138.0) 
137.8 
(40.6 – 256.4) 
N
 
56 
64 
21 
79 
9 
Interquartile ranges are show
n in parentheses. 
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Table 4.7 
2005 and 2014 M
edians and Interquartile Ranges for Athletics Subsidies and School Funds by Type of Athletics C
ontrol and Level of Play 
A
thletics C
ontrol 
Level of Play 
Student Services 
A
uxiliary/ O
ther 
FB
S 
FC
S/ D
II 
2005 Total A
thl. Subsidies 
5,626,437.0 
(3,643,101.0 – 7,532,772.0) 
5,184,678.0 
(3,154,288.0 – 7,593,204.0) 
5,404,062.0 
(2,832,151.8 – 9,089,959.8) 
5,105,512.5 
(3,596,446.2 – 6,907,948.0) 
Total A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE 
490.7 
(320.8 – 666.6) 
385.6 
(230.1 – 586.1) 
256.2 
(115.7 – 484.8) 
487.7 
(361.8 – 685.6) 
School Funds 
3,374,085.0 
(2,341,541.0 – 5,318,677.0) 
1,929,490.0 
(513,920.0 – 4,177,275.0) 
2,578,354.5 
(572,224.0 – 5,595,643.5) 
2,591,236.0 
(1,035,771.2 – 4,315,333.2) 
School Funds/ FTE 
353.0 
(174.1 – 527.1) 
130.4 
(37.0 – 317.1) 
108.7 
(22.0 – 295.8) 
254.6 
(92.2 – 432.9) 
2014 Total A
thl. Subsidies 
11,179,898.0 
(8,646,618.0 – 15,112,785.0) 
9,243,641.0 
(5,100,641.0 – 14,766,688.0) 
9,756,739.0 
(3,896,660.2 – 18,323,731.0) 
9,790,183.0 
(7,969,310.5 – 13,267,709.8) 
Total A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE 
943.3 
(674.9 – 1,243.9) 
700.2 
(291.1 – 957.9) 
454.3 
(112.2 – 894.6) 
875.7 
(678.7 – 1,182.6) 
School Funds 
8,218,132.0 
(5,554,993.0 – 10,428,712.0) 
3,911,202.0 
(1,270,728.5 – 7,506,599.0) 
4,981,218.0 
(1,037,442.8 – 10,132,502.2) 
5,360,767.5 
(2,826,110.5 – 8,323,706.8) 
School Funds/ FTE 
696.7 
(354.1 – 1,056.4) 
228.2 
(80.1 – 559.0) 
108.7 
(22.0 – 295.8) 
477.7 
(213.8 – 736.7) 
2005- 2014 M
edian %
 C
hange 
Total A
thl. Subsidies 
94.2 
(65.8 – 158.9) 
76.0 
(46.6 – 121.4) 
66.0 
(32.6 – 122.0) 
92.2 
(63.2 – 134.3) 
Total A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE 
83.1 
(45.5 – 134.0) 
56.6 
(29.5 – 100.4) 
51.3 
(14.6 – 100.4) 
75.2 
(43.4 – 111.7) 
School Funds 
97.8 
(50.3 – 168.0) 
79.1 
(22.8 – 145.4) 
56.2 
(15.2 – 138.0) 
91.7 
(46.5 – 172.1) 
School Funds/ FTE 
77.7 
(34.6 – 142.2) 
54.9 
(9.6 – 125.8) 
49.7 
(-5.0 – (+127.0)) 
76.9 
(29.2 – 138.5) 
N
 
68 
161 
96 
133 
Interquartile ranges are show
n in parentheses. 
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elite research universities and all other public institutions only became wider with time. 
Although Research II universities had the second-largest increases in total core revenues 
and E&R expenditures, they ranked fourth and fifth among institutional types in per-
student increases to E&R expenditures and core revenues.  
Total athletics subsidies and school funds increased by more than 50 percent for 
all classes of institutions and more than 74 percent for all but Research I universities 
between 2005 and 2014. Overall, the trend in Table 4.6 is that from left to right the 
percent increases in total and per-student athletics subsidies and school funds grow 
larger. Thus, smaller institutions have expanded their athletics subsidies at a faster rate 
than larger institutions. As noted by Frank (2004), this could indicate an athletics arms 
race where the gap in revenues between the most prominent programs, namely those in 
power five conferences, and other FBS and FCS is widening. Smaller FBS and FCS 
schools have been forced to increasingly subsidize their athletics programs in order to 
remain competitive. It is also worth noting that the rate of increase in total athletics 
subsidies was highly similar to the rate of increase in school funds for each type of 
institution. This shows that the portion of total athletics subsidies occupied by direct and 
indirect institutional funds has at minimum held constant over time.  
Athletics subsidies and school funds are reported in Table 4.7 according to where 
the athletics department reports within the university structure (athletics control) and the 
level of athletics play. The table shows that both athletics departments reporting within a 
student services unit and those within an auxiliary/other unit received large athletics 
subsides and school funds in 2005 and 2014. In comparing the two structures, the median 
total athletics subsidies was similar for the two types of institutions in 2005, but by 2014 
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the median total subsidies for student services-located departments was nearly $2M 
greater than that of auxiliary/other-located departments. Additionally, a much larger 
portion of the total subsidies was derived from school funds for student services-located 
departments (74 percent in 2014) than for auxiliary/other-located departments (42 percent 
in 2014). Lastly, student services-located departments tended to have much higher per-
student athletics subsidies and school funds.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, it appears that athletics 
departments established as an auxiliary/other unit are not held to the same financial 
standards as other auxiliary units such as hospitals and dining services, which must 
generate sufficient revenues to cover their expenses. Second, although the magnitude and 
rate of growth for the subsidies variables is somewhat less for auxiliary/other athletics 
departments, there is no compelling evidence that having this type of administrative 
structure provides an institution with greater control in limiting athletics subsidies.  
Athletics subsidies and school funds have also been reported in Table 4.7 
according to the level of athletics play (FBS v. FCS). As shown, the total athletics 
subsidies and school funds were similar for the two types of institutions in both 2005 and 
2014. When compared on a per-student basis, however, FCS institutions had total 
subsidies and school funds that were approximately twice those for FBS institutions. This 
reflects the fact that enrollment at FCS institutions was typically smaller than for FBS 
institutions (11,555.5 vs. 23,756.0 in 2014). Lastly, the rate of increase in total and per-
student subsidies and school funds was between 20 and 30 percent greater for FCS 
compared to FBS institutions.  
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The descriptive statistics presented in this section show that differences appear to 
exist on the basis of institutional characteristics for the dependent variable and 
independent variables. Larger, more research-focused institutions typically had greater 
core revenues per student, E&R expenditures per student, and student enrollments and 
lower athletics subsidies per student than Masters and Baccalaureate institutions. 
Athletics departments that were aligned within a student services unit and those playing 
at the FCS level typically had higher total athletics subsidies per student and school funds 
per student than those aligned as an auxiliary/other unit or competing at the FBS level. 
Although the fixed-effects models (FEMs) accounted for such time-invariant institutional 
characteristics as the 2005 Carnegie Classifications, it was important to include 
interaction terms to test whether the relationship between E&R expenditures and athletics 
subsidies (and school funds) depended upon institutional characteristics. 
Results for Research Question 1 
Research question one sought to determine whether the rate of growth differed 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE, school funds per FTE, and E&R expenditures 
per FTE from 2005 to 2014. To understand the shape of the average growth curve for 
each variable, a simple graphical analysis was conducted by plotting the mean of each 
variable from 2005 to 2014. Prior to conducting the analysis, each variable was log-
transformed to address deviations from multivariate normality. The results of the 
graphical analysis are presented in Figure 4.1.Total athletics subsidies per FTE (LOG) is 
shown in panel one of Figure 4.1, school funds per FTE (log) in panel two, and E&R 
expenditures per FTE (log) in panel three. 
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Figure 4.1 
Mean Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE (log), School Funds per FTE (log), and E&R 
Expenditures per FTE (log) from 2005 to 2014 
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From the top panel of Figure 4.1, the total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) curve 
appears to exhibit three different slopes – all positive and approximately linear. The first 
slope occurs from 2005 to 2009, the second from 2009 to 2011, and the third from 2011 
to 2014. Although less linear, the school funds per FTE (log) curve also exhibits a steep 
slope from 2005 to 2009, a slight decline from 2009 to 2011, and then continues to 
increase between 2011 and 2014. The third variable, E&R expenditures per FTE (log) 
increases sharply from 2005 to 2009 as well, declines briefly from 2009 to 2010, and 
resumes its ascent from 2010 to 2014. The different periods of growth for the three 
dependent variables suggested the possibility of using a piecewise linear growth model 
that could account for the presence of multiple slopes.  
Following the graphical analysis, latent growth curve models (LGC) were 
estimated for total athletics subsidies per FTE (log), school funds per FTE (log), and 
E&R expenditures per FTE (log). The following unconditional models were fitted for 
each of the variables: linear, quadratic, piecewise linear, and piecewise non-linear to 
identify the model of best fit. A null or no growth model was also estimated to provide a 
baseline for comparison. The piecewise models were developed based upon the results 
from the graphical analysis.  
Three slopes were used for the piecewise models for school funds per FTE (log) 
to address the time periods of 2005 to 2009, 2009 to 2011, and 2011 to 2014. Due to 
some uncertainty as to whether the total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) and E&R 
expenditures per FTE (log) piecewise models should contain two or three slope terms, 
both configurations were estimated and compared. The two-slope model for both total 
athletics subsidies per FTE (log) and E&R expenditures per FTE (log) contained slope 
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terms from 2005 to 2009 and 2009 to 2014. The three-slope model for total athletics 
subsidies per FTE (log) contained slopes for 2005 to 2009, 2009 to 2011, and 2011 to 
2014 whereas the model for E&R expenditures per FTE (log) had slopes for 2005 to 
2008, 2008 to 2010, and 2010 to 2014. Fit criteria for each of the LGC models are 
provided in Table 4.8. 
From Table 4.8, the χ2 fit statistic was statistically significant for all of the LGC 
models. This suggests that the estimated variance-covariance matrix differed significantly 
from the data variance-covariance matrix, which is not the desired result. However, χ2
tends to produce a significant result with sample sizes of 200 or larger and for variables 
that exhibit non-normal distributions (Schumacher & Lomax, 2016). This could explain 
the significance for the models in Table 4.8 because the sample size exceeds 200 and the 
school funds per FTE variable continued to produce kurtosis indices outside of the 
acceptable range after log transformation.  
The two best-fitting models for total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) were the 
piecewise models containing two slopes. Both models had acceptable fit for total athletics 
subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE based upon CFI (≥ .95) and TLI (≥ .90), but 
had values for RMSEA that were slightly outside of the acceptable range of < .10. Of 
these two models, the two-slope linear piecewise was selected as the best fitting model 
because it outperformed the three-slope nonlinear piecewise model according to χ2/df, 
TLI, and RMSEA, and required fewer degrees of freedom.  
For school funds per FTE (log), the linear piecewise model and quadratic model 
provided a similar fit to the data, and were acceptable based upon all of the fit indices. 
Even though the quadratic model was somewhat simpler, the piecewise model was 
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chosen because it was favored slightly by each fit criteria and required only two 
additional degrees of freedom compared to the quadratic.  
The final set of models, used to estimate the growth of E&R expenditures per 
FTE (log), exhibited similar issues to that of the total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) 
models. The two best fitting models were the three-slope piecewise models, and although 
both had acceptable fit based on the TLI and CFI indices, they were slightly outside of 
the desired range for RMSEA. Among the two, the linear three-slope piecewise model 
was selected because it required fewer degrees of freedom and the fit criteria only slightly 
favored the nonlinear version of the model.  
 The decision was made to proceed with the analysis even though the RMSEA 
indices for all of the models for total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) and E&R 
expenditures per FTE (log) were outside of the acceptable range for several reasons. 
First, RMSEA takes into account model parsimony and also tends to over-reject true 
models when the sample size is ≤ 250 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Second, some deviations 
from multivariate normality continued to persist in these variables, which also negatively 
influences model fit. Third, a large number of models had been estimated in order to 
identify the best-fitting model. And fourth, the models had acceptable fit to the data based 
upon the TLI and CFI indices.  
 Tables 4.9-4.11 present the correlation matrices for the piecewise models for each 
of the three variables. The bivariate correlations for any two years were positive and 
strong to very strong in magnitude, ranging between 0.857 to 0.983 for total athletics 
subsidies per FTE, 0.733 to 0.963 for school funds per FTE, and 0.916 to 0.991 for E&R 
expenditures per FTE. As shown, the correlations for school funds per FTE over time 
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were somewhat weaker than for the other two variables, particularly for observations that 
were more than 5 years apart. This suggests that past values may be better predictors of 
future values for total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE than for 
school funds per FTE.  
The results from the piecewise LGC models for each of the three variables are 
reported in Table 4.12. The coefficient for the intercept in each model, μα, is an estimate 
of the average value for the dependent variable in 2005. In the case of the total subsidies 
model, the intercept suggests that the average total athletics subsidies per FTE in 2005 
was $379.9. The average school funds per FTE was estimated to be $109.2 in 2005 and 
the average E&R expenditures per FTE $8,184.5. In terms of growth, the slope 
coefficients (μβ1, μβ2, μβ3) provide estimates of the increase in the dependent variable 
given a one-year increase during each of the three time periods. Because the variables 
have been log-transformed, their slope coefficients can be interpreted directly as 
percentages. The coefficients for the total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) estimate that a 
one-year increase in time is associated with a 7.7 percent increase in total athletics 
subsidies per FTE each year from 2005 to 2009 and a 3.1 percent increase each year from 
2009 to 2014. In total, athletics subsidies per FTE (log) was expected to increase 46.3 
percent during the entire time period of 2005 to 2014. Similarly, the slope coefficients for 
the two remaining variables suggest total increases in school funds per FTE (log) and 
E&R expenditures per FTE (log) of 59.3 and 25.6 percent between 2005 and 2014. 
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Table 4.8 
Fit C
riteria for LG
C
 M
odels for Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE, School Funds per FTE, and E&
R Expenditures per FTE 
M
odel 
χ
2 
df 
χ
2/df 
p 
C
FI 
TLI 
R
M
SEA
 
A
IC
 
Total A
thl. Subsidies/ FTE (LO
G
) 
1. N
ull (no grow
th) a
682.198 
36 
18.950 
.000 
.885 
.862 
.246 
720.198 
2. Linear b
288.910 
33 
8.755 
.000 
.955 
.943 
.158 
332.910 
3. Q
uadratic c
199.788 
31 
6.445 
.000 
.971 
.961 
.130 
247.788 
4. Piecew
ise Linear 2 slopes d, e
180.490 
33 
5.482 
.000 
.975 
.968 
.118 
224.490 
5. Piecew
ise N
onlinear 2 slopes d, e
155.577 
20 
7.779 
.000 
.978 
.966 
.123 
215.577 
6. Piecew
ise Linear 3 slopes
327.905 
29 
11.307 
.000 
.948 
.926 
.180 
379.905 
7. Piecew
ise N
onlinear 3 slopes
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
School Funds/ FTE (LO
G
) 
1. N
ull (no grow
th) f
266.197 
34 
7.829 
.000 
.945 
.931 
.149 
308.197 
2. Linear g
156.845 
34 
4.613 
.000 
.972 
.965 
.106 
198.845 
3. Q
uadratic h 
122.519 
31 
3.952 
.000 
.980 
.973 
.093 
170.519 
4. Piecew
ise Linear i, j
114.448 
29 
3.946 
.000 
.981 
.974 
.092 
166.448 
5. Piecew
ise N
onlinear j, k 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
E&
R
 Expenditures/ FTE (LO
G
) 
1. N
ull (no grow
th) 
1045.734 
34 
30.757 
.000 
.861 
.827 
.316 
1087.734 
2. Linear f 
437.535 
31 
14.114 
.000 
.945 
.926 
.206 
485.535 
3. Q
uadratic l
389.155 
28 
13.898 
.000 
.951 
.930 
.201 
443.155 
4. Piecew
ise Linear, 2 slopes m
, n
328.185 
29 
11.317 
.000 
.960 
.944 
.180 
380.185 
5. Piecew
ise N
onlinear, 2 slopes n, o
232.224 
26 
8.932 
.000 
.973 
.959 
.155 
290.224 
6. Piecew
ise Linear, 3 slopes p, q
164.742 
27 
6.102 
.000 
.982 
.974 
.123 
220.742 
7. Piecew
ise N
onlinear, 3 slopes p, q
123.713 
20 
6.186 
.000 
.987 
.977 
.117 
193.713 
a C
orrelated disturbances: ε
05 
ε
06 ; ε
06 
ε
07 ; ε
07 
ε
08 ; ε
08 
ε
09 ; ε
11 
ε
12 ; ε
12 
ε
13 ; ε
13 
ε
14  
b C
orrelated disturbances: ε
05 
ε
06 ; ε
06 
ε
07 ; ε
07 
ε
08 ; ε
08 
ε
09 ; ε
09 
ε
10 ; ε
11 
ε
12 ; ε
13 
ε
14  
c C
orrelated disturbances: ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
09  
 ε
10 ; ε
11  
 ε
12  
d Piecew
ise m
odel contains tw
o slope term
s: 2005-2009 and 2009-2014 
e C
orrelated disturbances: ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
11  
 ε
12  
f  A
ll disturbances w
ere correlated. 
g C
orrelated disturbances: ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
09  
 ε
10 ; ε
10  
 ε
11 ; ε
11  
 ε
12 ; ε
13  
 ε
14  
h C
orrelated disturbances: ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
09  
 ε
10 ; ε
10  
 ε
11 ; ε
11  
 ε
12  
i C
orrelated disturbances: ε
09  
 ε
10 ; ε
11  
 ε
12 ; ε
12  
 ε
13 ; ε
13  
 ε
14  
j Piecew
ise m
odel contains three slope term
s: 2005-2009; 2009-2011; and 2011-2014 
k Produced an inadm
issible solution (H
eyw
ood C
ase)  
l C
orrelated disturbances: ε
05  
 ε
06 ; ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
09  
 ε
10 ; ε
10  
 ε
11 ; ε
11  

 ε
12 ; ε
12  
 ε
13
m C
orrelated disturbances: ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
10  
 ε
11 ; ε
11  
 ε
12 ; ε
12  
 ε
13 ; ε
13

 ε
14
n Piecew
ise m
odel contains tw
o slope term
s: 2005-2009 and 2009-2014 
oC
orrelated disturbances: ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
07  
 ε
08 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
10  
 ε
11 ; ε
11  
 ε
12
p C
orrelated disturbances: ε
06  
 ε
07 ; ε
08  
 ε
09 ; ε
11  
 ε
12 ; ε
12  
 ε
13
q Piecew
ise m
odel contains three slope term
s: 2005-2008; 2008-2010; and 2010-2014 
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Table 4.9 
C
orrelation M
atrix for O
bserved Variables in Piecew
ise Linear LG
C
 M
odel for Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE (log) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2014 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2013 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2012 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2011 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2010 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2009 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2008 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2007 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2006 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2005 (LO
G
) 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2014 (Log) 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2013 (LO
G
) 
.976 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2012 (LO
G
) 
.968 
.978 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2011 (LO
G
) 
.956 
.965 
.982 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2010 (LO
G
) 
.954 
.966 
.965 
.976 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2009 (LO
G
) 
.941 
.957 
.959 
.965 
.978 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2008 (LO
G
) 
.931 
.947 
.949 
.954 
.971 
.983 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2007 (LO
G
) 
.908 
.923 
.925 
.930 
.946 
.953 
.970 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2006 (LO
G
) 
.896 
.910 
.912 
.917 
.933 
.939 
.949 
.957 
1.000 
Total A
thl. 
Sub./ FTE 
2005 (LO
G
) 
.857 
.870 
.872 
.872 
.891 
.897 
.916 
.924 
.906 
1.000 
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Table 4.10 
C
orrelation M
atrix for O
bserved Variables in Piecew
ise Linear LG
C
 M
odel for School Funds per FTE (log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2014 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2013 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2012 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2011 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2010 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2009 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2008 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2007 
(Log) 
School Funds/ 
FTE 2006 
(Log) 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2005 (Log) 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2014 (Log) 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2013 (Log) 
.950 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2012 (Log) 
.905 
.925 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2011 (Log) 
.882 
.908 
.932 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2010 (Log) 
.862 
.889 
.898 
.937 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2009 (Log) 
.840 
.868 
.879 
.901 
.963 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2008 (Log) 
.817 
.842 
.850 
.870 
.899 
.923 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2007 (Log) 
.768 
.790 
.795 
.811 
.837 
.865 
.896 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2006 (Log) 
.772 
.791 
.794 
.807 
.833 
.859 
.856 
.851 
1.000 
School 
Funds/ FTE 
2005 (Log) 
.733 
.749 
.749 
.760 
.782 
.806 
.813 
.794 
.853 
1.000 
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Table 4.11 
C
orrelation M
atrix for O
bserved Variables in Piecew
ise N
onlinear LG
C
 M
odel for E&
R Expenditures per FTE (log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2014 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2013 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2012 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2011 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2010 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2009 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2008 
(Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ FTE 
2007 (Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2006 
(Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2005 
(Log) 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2014 
(Log) 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2013 
(Log) 
.985 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2012 
(Log) 
.976 
.991 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2011 
(Log) 
.968 
.981 
.990 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2010 
(Log) 
.958 
.975 
.981 
.988 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2009 
(Log) 
.944 
.960 
.966 
.973 
.978 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2008 
(Log) 
.932 
.948 
.954 
.960 
.965 
.985 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2007 
(Log) 
.933 
.948 
.953 
.958 
.962 
.970 
.981 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2006 
(Log) 
.916 
.930 
.933 
.938 
.941 
.948 
.959 
.980 
1.000 
E&
R
 exp/ 
FTE 2005 
(Log) 
.924 
.937 
.940 
.943 
.945 
.952 
.962 
.978 
.975 
1.000 
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Table 4.12 
Unstandardized Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors for Quadratic 
LGC Models  
Total Athl. Subsidies/ FTE (LOG) School Funds/ FTE (Log) E&R Expenditures/FTE (Log) 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Means 
μα 5.940*** 0.053 4.693*** 0.122 9.010*** 0.025 
μβ1 0.077*** 0.006 0.116*** 0.018 0.054*** 0.002 
μβ2 0.031*** 0.005 -0.039 0.027 -0.003 0.003 
μβ3 0.069*** 0.021 0.025*** 0.002 
Variances 
ψαα 0.602*** 0.060 2.975*** 0.336 0.140*** 0.013 
ψβ1β1 0.006*** 0.001 0.038** 0.013 0.001*** 0.000 
ψβ2β2 0.004*** 0.000 0.095*** 0.025 0.002*** 0.000 
ψβ3β3 0.056** 0.021 0.001*** 0.000 
Covariances 
ψαβ1 0.004 0.005 -0.024 0.045 -0.002* 0.001 
ψαβ2 0.015*** 0.004 0.011 0.050 0.001 0.001 
ψαβ3 -0.038 0.039 0.001+ 0.001 
ψβ1β2 -0.001+ 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.000 0.001 
ψβ1β3 -0.011+ 0.006 0.000* 0.000 
ψβ2β3 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Unique Variances 
VAR(ε05) 0.066*** 0.010 0.658*** 0.151 0.000 0.001 
VAR(ε06) 0.049*** 0.004 0.524*** 0.094 0.006*** 0.001 
VAR(ε07) 0.039*** 0.005 0.709*** 0.080 0.002*** 0.000 
VAR(ε08) 0.017*** 0.002 0.333*** 0.049 0.002*** 0.000 
VAR(ε09) 0.002 0.001 0.118*** 0.065 0.004*** 0.000 
VAR(ε10) 0.012*** 0.001 0.277** 0.039 0.001*** 0.000 
VAR(ε11) 0.052*** 0.005 0.260*** 0.066 0.002*** 0.000 
VAR(ε12) 0.036*** 0.004 0.360*** 0.054 0.002*** 0.000 
VAR(ε13) 0.023*** 0.003 0.245*** 0.067 0.001*** 0.000 
VAR(ε14) 0.021*** 0.004 0.179** 0.134 0.003*** 0.001 
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† p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001
Several additional insights can be gleaned from the estimates in Table 4.12. All of 
the intercept and slope variances (ψαα, ψββ) are statistically significant. This means that 
individual institutions differed in terms of their initial values for total athletics subsidies 
per FTE, school funds per FTE, and E&R expenditures per FTE in 2005. Moreover, the 
rate of growth in each of the three variables varied across institutions. Also of interest is 
the lack of statistical significance for most of the intercept-slope covariances. Evidently, 
there was no significant correlation between an institution’s initial expenditures in total 
athletics subsidies per FTE, school funds per FTE, or E&R expenditures per FTE and the 
rate at which that variable changed over time.  
The results from the LGC models presented in this section provide important 
insight into research question one. On the one hand, average E&R expenditures per FTE 
were substantially larger than total athletics subsidies per FTE or school funds per FTE in 
any given year. On the other hand, the rate of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE 
and school funds per FTE was approximately twice that of E&R expenditures per FTE 
during this time period. At this pace it would require about 100 years for total athletics 
subsidies per FTE to exceed E&R expenditures per FTE. However, it is unclear how 
large athletics subsidies would need to become in order to impact resource allocation to 
E&R activities and other core areas of the institution. The next section investigated 
whether the amount of total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE 
between 2005 and 2014 had a significant relationship with E&R expenditures.  
Results for Research Questions 2 and 3 
A series of fixed effects models (FEMs) were estimated using a structural 
equation modeling (SEM) framework to investigate research questions two through five. 
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This section provides the results for questions two and three where total athletics 
subsidies per FTE student was used as the primary independent variable in the models. 
Section four reports the results for questions four and five that used school funds per FTE 
as the independent variable of interest. As a first step, four different models were 
developed and estimated: a classic FEM with no time lag between the variables, a FEM 
with a lagged dependent variable, a FEM with lagged effects from the independent 
variables, and a FEM with both a lagged dependent variable and lagged independent 
variable effects. In addition, a nested model was estimated for each baseline model with 
the added constraint that the covariances between the time-fixed effects and the 
independent variables be constrained to zero.  
A comparison of fit criteria for the first three FEM models is shown in Table 4.13. 
Fit criteria for the fourth model, which had both time-lagged effects from the independent 
variables and a time-lagged dependent variable, are not reported because an acceptable 
solution could not be obtained for either the unconstrained or constrained model. From 
the table, the χ2 statistic was statistically significant for all of the models shown. Because 
χ2 is a test of whether the estimated variance-covariance matrix differs from the data 
variance-covariance matrix, a non-statistically significant result is desired. However, χ2
tests are sensitive to sample size such that sample sizes greater than 200 tend to generate 
a significant p-value (Schumacher & Lomax, 2016). Moreover, χ2 is sensitive to 
departures from multivariate normality. Due to the fact that the sample size for this study 
exceeds 200 and several variables continued to exhibit some skewness and kurtosis after 
log transformation and removal of outliers, additional fit indices were considered when 
evaluating whether or not to reject any of the models. 
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From Table 4.13, only the two dependent variable (DV)-lagged models had 
acceptable fit based upon CFI and TLI. However, none of the tested models met the 
criteria for RMSEA. This is not altogether surprising given that RMSEA takes into 
account model parsimony and a large number of covariances have been estimated in the 
models. The decision was made to proceed with the reporting of results using the best 
fitting model (DV-lagged with COV (xit, η) = 0) because its RMSEA approached .10 and 
the constraining of additional covariances would decrease model fit according to the 
other fit criteria. This DV-lagged model was then re-estimated four additional times to 
include interaction terms between total athletics subsidies per FTE and institutional type 
(land grant, research institution) and athletics program characteristics (athletics control, 
level of competition).  
The unstandardized parameter estimates and standard errors for each of the fixed-
effects models using total athletics subsidies per FTE as the primary independent variable 
are reported in Table 4.14. Standardized parameter estimates are provided in Table 4.15. 
Column two of both tables provides the estimates for model one (no interaction terms) 
and columns three through six provide the estimates for the four models with interaction 
terms. The unstandardized estimates for model one suggest that the relationship between 
total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE is statistically significant 
(p=0.029). Although the magnitude of the coefficient is small, (b=0.010), it is positive, 
suggesting that increased spending on athletics subsidies is associated with greater 
spending on E&R expenditures per student, controlling for other factors. This runs 
counter to the hypothesized relationship of a negative impact of increased subsidies per 
student on E&R spending per student. 
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The three control variables in model one were all statistically significant (p < 
.001). The coefficient for the number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE students (b = 
0.212) indicates that a 10 percent increase in this variable would lead to an increase in 
E&R expenditures per FTE of 2.1 percent, on average. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in 
core revenues per FTE would be associated with an increase in E&R expenditures per 
FTE of 1.8 percent. Therefore, both increases to the number of tenure-track faculty per 
100 students and having access to additional core revenues per student, which includes 
tuition and fees, positively correlate with E&R spending per student.  
The sign of the coefficient for the final control variable, fall FTE, is also positive, 
suggesting that increases in student enrollment are associated with increases in E&R 
expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors. This finding is somewhat surprising 
because existing research has generally shown that U.S. colleges and universities have 
had some success in achieving economies of scale (Brinkman & Leslie, 1986; Koshal & 
Koshal, 1995; Laband & Lentz, 2003). However, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
relatively small, indicating that a 10 percent increase in student FTE is correlated with a 
0.4 percent increase in E&R expenditures per FTE.  
In addition to the control variables and the independent variable of interest, the 
preceding observation of E&R expenditures per FTE was used to predict the subsequent 
observation in the model. The unstandardized estimates in Table 4.14 range from 
b=0.631 to b=0.693 for the direct effect of E&R expenditures per FTEt-1 on E&R 
expenditures per FTEt. This suggests that a 10 percent increase in E&R expenditures per 
FTE the previous year would be associated with between a 6.4 and 7.0 percent increase in 
E&R expenditures per FTE in the current year, controlling for other factors.  
129
Table 4.13 
Fit C
om
parison for Fixed Effects M
odels using Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE 
M
odel 
χ
2
df 
χ
2/df 
p 
C
FI 
TLI 
R
M
SEA
 
A
IC
 
C
lassic FEM
 (N
o tim
e lag) 
2347.594 
359 
6.539 
.000 
.953 
.853 
.144 
4179.594 
a. C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
2687.537 
399 
6.736 
.000 
.945 
.845 
.148 
4439.537 
FEM
 – lagged D
V
1293.700 
280 
4.620 
.000 
.974 
.914 
.114 
2895.700 
a . C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
1393.014 
316 
4.408 
.000 
.972 
.918 
.112 
2923.014 
FEM
 – lagged IV
-D
V
 effects
2282.889 
282 
8.095 
.000 
.946 
.829 
.162 
3788.889 
a . C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
2583.615 
318 
8.124 
.000 
.938 
.825 
.164 
4017.615 
The follow
ing constraints w
ere im
posed on all fixed effects m
odels: σ
εt  = σ
ε ; β
xyt  = β
xy ; β
yz =0; λ
t =1. Path diagram
s for each of the three m
odels are provided in Figure 3.***.  
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Table 4.14 
U
nstandardized Estim
ates and Asym
ptotic Standard Errors for SEM
 Fixed Effects M
odels using Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE 
(log) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
Total athl subsidies/ FTE (log) 
0.010 (0.004)* 
0.008 (0.005) 
0.005 (0.004) 
0.010 (0.004)* 
0.012 (0.004)** 
Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.002 (0.002) 
Total athl. subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.001 (0.002) 
Total athl subsidies/ FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
0.000 (0.001) 
Total athl subsidies/ FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.004 (0.001)** 
Fall FTE (log) 
0.040 (0.007)*** 
0.036 (0.008)*** 
0.037 (0.007)*** 
0.041 0.007)*** 
0.050 (0.008)*** 
Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.212 (0.020)*** 
0.216 (0.020)*** 
0.213 (0.020)*** 
0.212 (0.020)*** 
0.215 (0.020)*** 
C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.177 (0.011)*** 
0.176 (0.012)*** 
0.176 (0.012)*** 
0.178 (0.011)*** 
0.180 (0.011)*** 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 05 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.640 (0.021)*** 
0.632 (0.021)*** 
0.639 (0.021)*** 
0.640 (0.021)*** 
0.645 (0.021)*** 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.631 (0.021)*** 
0.623 (0.021)*** 
0.630 (0.021)*** 
0.631 (0.021)*** 
0.636 (0.021)*** 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.631 (0.021)*** 
0.622 (0.021)*** 
0.629 (0.021)*** 
0.630 (0.021)*** 
0.636 (0.021)*** 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.693 (0.020)*** 
0.683 (0.021)*** 
0.691 (0.021)*** 
0.693 (0.020)*** 
0.699 (0.020)*** 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.672 (0.021)*** 
0.663 (0.021)*** 
0.670 (0.021)*** 
0.672 (0.021)*** 
0.678 (0.021)*** 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.642 (0.020)*** 
0.633 (0.021)*** 
0.639 (0.020)*** 
0.641 (0.020)*** 
0.647 (0.020)*** 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.682 (0.020)*** 
0.673 (0.021)*** 
0.679 (0.021)*** 
0.682 (0.020)*** 
0.688 (0.020)*** 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.688 (0.020)*** 
0.679 (0.020)*** 
0.686 (0.020)*** 
0.688 (0.020)*** 
0.693 (0.020)*** 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.664 (0.019)*** 
0.655 (0.020)*** 
0.661 (0.020)*** 
0.663 (0.019)*** 
0.669 (0.019)*** 
χ
2 
1393.014 
1528.166 
1519.557 
1541.5 
1545.3 
df 
316 
387 
387 
387 
387 
C
FI 
.972 
.979 
.978 
.978 
.978 
TLI 
.918 
.926 
.923 
.925 
.924 
R
M
SEA
 
.112 
.104 
.103 
.104 
.105 
A
IC
 
2923.014 
3834.166 
3825.557 
3847.5 
3851.3 
† p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 4.15 
Standardized Estim
ates for SEM
 fixed effects M
odels using Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE (log) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Total athl subsidies/FTE (log) 
0.022 
0.017 
0.013 
0.023 
0.027 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.021 
0.016 
0.014 
0.022 
0.026 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.022 
0.017 
0.013 
0.023 
0.027 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.022 
0.017 
0.014 
0.023 
0.027 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.021 
0.017 
0.014 
0.022 
0.027 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Total athl subsidies/FTE (log) 
0.023 
0.018 
0.014 
0.024 
0.029 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.023 
0.018 
0.014 
0.024 
0.029 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.023 
0.018 
0.014 
0.024 
0.029 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Total athl subsidies /FTE (log) 
0.024 
0.019 
0.015 
0.025 
0.030 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.018 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.018 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.018 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.017 
06 E&
R
/FTE 
 06 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
07 E&
R
/FTE 
 07 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
08 E&
R
/FTE 
 08 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
09 E&
R
/FTE 
 09 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
10 E&
R
/FTE 
 10 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
11 E&
R
/FTE 
 11 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
12 E&
R
/FTE 
 12 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
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Table 4.15 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
13 E&
R
/FTE 
 13 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
14 E&
R
/FTE 
 14 Total athl subsidies/ FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.005 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Total athl subsidies /FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.002 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.030 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.031 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.032 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.031 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.031 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.031 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.030 
13 E&
R
/F TE (log) 
 13 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.030 
14 E&
R
/F TE (log) 
 14 Total athl subsidies /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.030 
06 E&
R
/F TE (log) 
 06 Fall FTE (log) 
0.069 
0.062 
0.063 
0.070 
0.087 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Fall FTE (log) 
0.069 
0.062 
0.063 
0.070 
0.087 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Fall FTE (log) 
0.071 
0.064 
0.065 
0.072 
0.089 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Fall FTE (log) 
0.070 
0.063 
0.064 
0.071 
0.088 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Fall FTE (log) 
0.068 
0.061 
0.062 
0.069 
0.085 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Fall FTE (log) 
0.069 
0.062 
0.063 
0.070 
0.087 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Fall FTE (log) 
0.068 
0.061 
0.062 
0.069 
0.085 
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Table 4.15 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Fall FTE (log) 
0.067 
0.060 
0.061 
0.068 
0.084 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Fall FTE (log) 
0.068 
0.061 
0.062 
0.069 
0.085 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.124 
0.127 
0.124 
0.124 
0.127 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.118 
0.121 
0.119 
0.119 
0.121 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.119 
0.122 
0.120 
0.120 
0.122 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.117 
0.120 
0.118 
0.118 
0.120 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.115 
0.118 
0.116 
0.116 
0.118 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.116 
0.119 
0.117 
0.117 
0.119 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.114 
0.117 
0.115 
0.115 
0.117 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.108 
0.111 
0.109 
0.109 
0.110 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.110 
0.113 
0.111 
0.111 
0.113 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.214 
0.212 
0.212 
0.214 
0.217 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.220 
0.217 
0.218 
0.220 
0.223 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.208 
0.206 
0.206 
0.208 
0.211 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.200 
0.198 
0.197 
0.200 
0.203 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.209 
0.207 
0.207 
0.209 
0.212 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.212 
0.210 
0.210 
0.212 
0.215 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.203 
0.201 
0.201 
0.203 
0.206 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.206 
0.204 
0.204 
0.206 
0.209 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.209 
0.207 
0.207 
0.209 
0.211 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 05 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.639 
0.630 
0.637 
0.638 
0.643 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.633 
0.625 
0.632 
0.633 
0.638 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.645 
0.636 
0.643 
0.644 
0.650 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.674 
0.665 
0.673 
0.674 
0.680 
10  E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.656 
0.647 
0.653 
0.655 
0.661 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.651 
0.642 
0.648 
0.651 
0.656 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.663 
0.655 
0.661 
0.663 
0.668 
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Table 4.15 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.671 
0.663 
0.669 
0.671 
0.676 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.667 
0.658 
0.664 
0.667 
0.672 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.130 
0.134 
0.132 
0.130 
0.124 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.131 
0.134 
0.133 
0.131 
0.125 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.134 
0.137 
0.135 
0.134 
0.128 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.130 
0.133 
0.132 
0.130 
0.124 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.127 
0.130 
0.129 
0.127 
0.121 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.129 
0.132 
0.130 
0.129 
0.123 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.125 
0.128 
0.127 
0.125 
0.119 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.122 
0.125 
0.124 
0.122 
0.116 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.123 
0.126 
0.124 
0.123 
0.117 
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Table 4.16 
Squared M
ultiple C
orrelations for D
ependent Variables in SEM
 Fixed Effects M
odels using Total Athletics Subsidies per FTE (log) 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
14 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.979 
0.979 
0.979 
0.979 
0.978 
13 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.979 
0.979 
0.979 
0.979 
0.979 
12 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.978 
0.978 
0.978 
.978 
0.978 
11 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.977 
0.977 
0.977 
.977 
0.976 
10 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.977 
0.977 
0.977 
.977 
0.977 
09 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.976 
0.976 
0.976 
.976 
0.976 
08 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.975 
0.975 
0.975 
.975 
0.974 
07 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.976 
0.976 
0.976 
.976 
0.975 
06 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.976 
0.976 
0.976 
.976 
0.976 
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The standardized coefficients in Table 4.15 can be used to compare the effect 
sizes of the independent variables on the outcome variables. From the table, the largest 
standardized coefficients are those from the preceding observations of E&R expenditures 
per FTE (β=0.633 to 0.671). Thus, the most important predictor of E&R spending per 
student is past spending on E&R activities per student. The effect sizes of the three 
control variables, although less than that of E&R expenditure per FTEt-1, were 
nonetheless considerably larger than that of total athletics subsidies per FTE.  
Covariances were estimated between each pair of independent variables in the 
fixed effects models. The covariance as well as correlation estimates between 
independent variable pairs are reported in Appendix A and provide important insight into 
the nature of the relationship between the independent variables. In all years, covariances 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE and each of the three control variables were 
negative. Correlation estimates between total athletics subsidies per FTE and core 
revenues per FTE were generally weak to moderate, ranging from -0.435 to -0.221. The 
strength of the correlation between total athletics subsidies per FTE and FTE enrollment 
was moderate, ranging from -0.677 to -0.634. Total athletics subsidies per FTE and the 
number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE students, although negative, was not 
significantly correlated in any year, even at the more liberal alpha-level of 0.10.  
The existence of a negative correlation between student enrollment and total 
athletics subsidies per FTE is not entirely surprising given that there appear to be certain 
fixed costs in athletics such as facilities, scholarships, coaching staffs, etc. Smaller FCS 
institutions, for example, must invest in these resources in order to compete with larger 
institutions, but do not have large student enrollments over which to spread out athletics 
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subsidies. The negative correlation between core revenues per student and total athletics 
subsidies, on the other hand, is unexpected but may be confounded by the fact that many 
of the wealthiest public institutions (e.g. state flagship) also tend to field the most 
successful athletics programs that require fewer subsidies to operate.  
Results for the second FEM that included an interaction term between total 
athletics subsidies per FTE and classification as a research university are reported in 
column three of Tables 4.14 and 4.15. From Table 4.14, the interaction term for research 
status was not statistically significant, indicating that there is no statistical difference 
between research and non-research institutions with respect to the relationship between 
total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE. Similarly, for models 
three and four the interaction terms were also non-significant. Thus, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R 
expenditures per FTE differs based upon status as a flagship institution or the reporting 
location of the athletics department within the university budget. 
The final model in this section, model five, contained an interaction term for 
status as an FBS institution and total athletics subsidies per FTE. Unstandardized 
parameter estimates for this model are located in column six of Table 4.14 and 
standardized estimates in column six of Table 4.15. In this model, both the coefficient for 
athletics subsidies per FTE and the coefficient for the interaction term were statistically 
significant. This suggests that the relationship between subsidies and E&R expenditures 
is somewhat different for FBS and FCS institutions. It is estimated that for FCS 
institutions a 10 percent increase in total athletics subsidies per FTE is associated with an 
increase in E&R expenditures per FTE of 0.1 percent, controlling for other factors. A 10 
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percent increase in total athletics subsidies per FTE for FBS institutions was also 
expected to produce an increase in E&R expenditures per FTE, but it was slightly less 
than that of FCS institutions, at 0.08 percent. The interpretation of these results is 
somewhat unclear, but could be evidence that when either type of institution increases 
athletics subsidies, it increases E&R spending simultaneously in order to improve 
institutional prestige. Because core revenues per FTE have been controlled for in the 
model, these “striving” institutions may be re-allocating funds from another area not 
examined in this study (e.g. physical plant or student services) to increase support to both 
athletics and E&R activities.  
Lastly, the squared multiple correlations (R-squared) are reported in Table 4.16 
for each of the regression equations in the five fixed-effects models. All of the squared 
multiple correlations range between 0.975 and 0.979. This suggests that the estimated 
models were able to predict about 98 percent of the variance in E&R expenditures per 
student.  
In summarizing section three, the relationship between total athletics subsidies per 
FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was statistically significant and positive. This 
suggests that as an institution increases its athletics subsidies per student there is a 
corresponding increase in E&R expenditures per student, controlling for other factors. 
However, the small magnitude of the regression coefficient indicates that this effect has 
limited practical significance. Each of the control variables was statistically significant in 
the model, and estimates indicate that increases to the number of tenure-track faculty, the 
amount of core revenues per student, and the number of FTE students were associated 
with increases in E&R expenditures per student. While the signs of the first two control 
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variables are consistent with the directions hypothesized in chapter three, the positive 
correlation between student FTE and E&R expenditures per student is unexpected.  
It was also shown that the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE 
and E&R expenditures per student was not dependent upon status as a research or 
flagship institution or the reporting structure of the athletics department. Some evidence 
was found that the relationship between total athletics subsidies per student and E&R 
expenditures per student depends upon the level of athletics competition. However, the 
relationship was estimated to be positive for both FBS and FCS institutions and the effect 
size in either case was small. 
Results for Research Questions 4 and 5 
This section presents the results from the fixed effects models (FEMs) used to 
investigate research questions four and five that sought to understand the relationship 
between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE. In this analysis, four 
baseline models were initially estimated: a classic FEM with no time-lagged variables, a 
FEM with a time-lagged dependent variable, a FEM with time-lagged effects from the 
independent variables, and a FEM with both a time-lagged dependent variable and lagged 
independent variable effects. After estimating each, the models were re-estimated with an 
additional constraint that all covariances between the time-fixed effects and the 
independent variables were fixed to zero. Model fit criteria are reported in Table 4.17 for 
each of the first three baseline and constrained models. Fit criteria for the FEM with both 
a lagged dependent and independent variable effects are not reported because the baseline 
and constrained model produced unacceptable solutions.  
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Consistent with the results in section three, the χ2 statistic was statistically 
significant in all model specifications using school funds per FTE. Due to the limitations 
noted previously for the χ2 statistic, the decision was made to proceed with the analysis 
and to evaluate fit based upon other fit indices. Of the models tested, only the DV-lagged 
models had acceptable fit for the CFI and TLI indices. All models were outside of the 
desired range for RMSEA of < .10, but it should again be acknowledged that RMSEA is 
sensitive to model parsimony as well as sample size. Because the inclusion of additional 
constraints would decrease model fit for the other criteria and several models had an 
RMSEA that approached .10, the decision was made to proceed with the analysis.  
The DV-lagged FEM with the additional covariance constraint was selected as the 
best-fitting model because it was favored by the CFI, RMSEA, and had a lower χ2/df. 
Having identified the model of best fit, four additional models were estimated that 
included interaction terms between school funds per FTE and institution type (research or 
non-research), flagship status, athletics reporting structure (student services or 
auxiliary/other), and level of athletics competition (FBS or FCS).  
Table 4.18 reports the unstandardized parameter estimates, standard errors, and 
model fit information and Table 4.19 reports the standardized estimates for the models 
used to address research questions four and five. For the full FEM without interaction 
terms (model six), the coefficient for school funds per FTE (log) is zero and not 
statistically significant. This suggests that increases to school funds per student do not 
lead to significant increases or decreases in E&R expenditures per student. The three 
control variables were statistically significant for p ≤ .001, which is consistent with the 
earlier models using total athletics subsidies per FTE. In this model it was estimated that 
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a 10 percent increase in the number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE or core revenues 
per FTE would correspond with increases in E&R expenditures per FTE of 2.1 and 1.8 
percent, controlling for other factors. Once again, the sign of the coefficient for student 
FTE enrollment is positive, which runs counter to the hypothesized relationship between 
enrollment and the dependent variable. Estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in 
FTE is correlated with a 0.3 percent increase in E&R expenditures per student, 
controlling for other factors. Lastly, the coefficients for the preceding values of E&R 
expenditures per students ranged from 0.628 to 0.684, indicating that a 10 percent 
increase in E&R expenditures per student in year t-1 corresponds with an increase in 
E&R expenditures per student in year t of between 6.2 and 6.8 percent.  
The standardized coefficients reported in Table 4.19 can be interpreted as effect 
sizes, which allows the importance of each independent variable in predicting the 
outcome variables to be compared. From the table, the observation of E&R expenditures 
per FTE in year t-1 is clearly the strongest predictor of E&R expenditures per FTE in 
year t among all of the independent variables. The weight of the standardized coefficient 
for E&R expenditures per FTEt-1 is approximately three times the weight of core 
revenues per FTE, six times the weight of tenure track faculty per 100 FTE, and 12 times 
the weight of student FTE. The effect size of each of the control variables is substantially 
greater than that of school funds per FTE. Even the least important control variable, 
student FTE, has a standardized coefficient approximately 50 times that of school funds 
per FTE.  
Estimated covariances and correlations between each pair of independent 
variables have been reported in Appendix B for model six. From Table B.1, the 
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covariances between school funds per FTE and the three control variables were negative 
in all years, indicating that increases to core revenues per FTE, FTE enrollment, or the 
number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE were correlated with decreases in school 
funds per FTE. The estimated correlations in Table B.2 show that the correlations 
between school funds per FTE and core revenues per FTE and the number of tenure-track 
faculty per 100 FTE were generally weak to very weak, between -0.250 and -0.100. 
Correlations between school funds per FTE and FTE enrollment were somewhat stronger, 
ranging from -0.475 to -0.300.  
Model seven included an interaction term for school funds per FTE and status as a 
research institution. From Table 4.18, the coefficients indicate that some differences exist 
between research and non-research institutions in terms of the relationship between the 
independent variable of interest and dependent variable. Although the coefficient for 
school funds per FTE was only marginally significant, the coefficient for the interaction 
term was significant at a level of p ≤ .01. The estimates indicate that, in general, the 
relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE is negative 
for non-research institutions but positive for research institutions. Nonetheless, the 
coefficients are quite small, indicating that the effect is limited. Interpreted at the mean 
using 2014 data, a 10-percent increase in school funds per FTE at research institutions 
($42.6) would be correlated with an increase of 0.02 percent in E&R expenditures per 
FTE ($2.9). A 10-percent increase in school funds per FTE at non-research institutions 
($56.1) is expected to correlate with a 0.03 percent decrease in E&R expenditures per 
FTE ($3.0).  
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Models eight, nine, and 10 included interaction terms for school funds per FTE 
and status as the state flagship institution, reporting structure of the athletics department, 
and level of athletics competition. In each of these models the coefficients for school 
funds per FTE as well as the interaction terms were non-significant. This implies that the 
relationship between school funds and E&R expenditures per FTE does not differ based 
upon status as the flagship university, reporting location of athletics within the university 
budget (student services vs. auxiliary/other unit), or level of competition (FBS vs. FCS), 
controlling for other factors. 
The squared multiple correlations for each observation of the dependent variable 
in the five models using school funds per FTE have been provided in Table 4.20. These 
squared multiple correlations indicate the ability of the model to predict the variance in 
the outcomes variable, E&R expenditures per FTE.  Based on Table 4.20, between 97.5 
and 98.1 percent of the variance in each observation of the dependent variable was 
accounted for by each of the fixed-effects models. 
In concluding section four, the relationship between school funds per FTE and 
E&R expenditures per FTE was investigated using fixed-effects models. The results 
indicate that increases to school funds per FTE do not affect E&R expenditures per FTE, 
controlling for other factors. As with the models in section three, the control variables 
were statistically significant in each of the models. It is estimated that a 10 percent 
increase to the number of tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE and total core revenues per 
FTE would be associated with increases of 2.1 and 1.8 in the amount of E&R 
expenditures per FTE, on average. A 10 percent increase in FTE enrollment would also 
be associated with an increase in E&R expenditures per FTE of 0.3 percent.  
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In the model containing an interaction term for status as a research university, it 
was shown that the relationship between school funds per student and E&R spending per 
student was positive for research institutions but negative for other types of institutions. 
However, the small size of the coefficients suggests that this finding has limited practical 
significance. The interaction terms were non-significant in the remaining fixed-effects 
models, which leads to the conclusion that the relationship between school funds per 
student and E&R expenditures per student does not depend upon status as the state 
flagship university, reporting structure of athletics, or the level of athletics competition.  
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Table 4.17 
Fit C
om
parison for Fixed Effects M
odels using School Funds per FTE (log) 
M
odel 
χ
2
df 
χ
2/df 
p 
C
FI 
TLI 
R
M
SEA
 
A
IC
 
C
lassic FEM
 (N
o tim
e lag) 
2354.181 
359 
6.558 
.000 
.951 
.846 
.144 
4186.181 
a. C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
2687.151 
399 
6.735 
.000 
.943 
.839 
.148 
4439.151 
FEM
 – lagged D
V
1315.800 
280 
4.699 
.000 
. 972 
.909 
.115 
2917.800 
a. C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
1418.383 
316 
4.488 
.000 
.971 
.912 
.113 
2948.383 
FEM
 – lagged IV
-D
V
 Effects
2283.756 
282 
8.098 
.000 
. 944 
.822 
.162 
3789.756 
a. C
O
V
 (x
it , η) = 0 
2579.132 
318 
8.110 
.000 
.936 
.818 
.164 
4013.132 
The follow
ing constraints w
ere im
posed on all fixed effects m
odels: σ
εt  = σ
ε ; β
xyt  = β
xy ; β
yz =0; λ
t =1. 
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Table 4.18 
U
nstandardized Param
eter Estim
ates and Asym
ptotic Standard Errors for Fixed Effects M
odels using School Funds per FTE 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
School funds/FTE (log) 
0.000 (0.001) 
-0.003 (0.002)+ 
0.000 (0.002) 
0.001 (0.002) 
0.001 (0.002) 
School funds/FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.005 (0.004)** 
School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.002 (0.002) 
School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.001 (0.001) 
School funds /FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.002 (0.001) 
Fall FTE (log) 
0.033 (0.007)*** 
0.025 (0.007)*** 
0.032 (.0007)*** 
0.033 (0.007)*** 
0.037 (0.007)*** 
Tenured faculty/100 FTE (log) 
0.214 (0.020)*** 
0.221 (0.020)*** 
0.216 (0.020)*** 
0.215 (0.020)*** 
0.216 (0.020)*** 
C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.176 (0.011)*** 
0.173 (0.011)*** 
0.175 (0.012)*** 
0.177 (0.011)*** 
0.177 (0.011)*** 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 05 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.638 (0.021)*** 
0.625 (0.021)*** 
0.633 (0.021)*** 
0.637 (0.021)*** 
0.641 (0.021)*** 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.629 (0.021)*** 
0.617 (0.021)*** 
0.625 (0.021)*** 
0.628 (0.021)*** 
0.632 (0.021)*** 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.628 (0.021)*** 
0.616 (0.021)*** 
0.623 (0.021)*** 
0.627 (0.021)*** 
0.632 (0.021)*** 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.690 (0.020)*** 
0.676 (0.021)*** 
0.685 (0.021)*** 
0.689 (0.020)*** 
0.693 (0.020)*** 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.669 (0.021)*** 
0.656 (0.021)*** 
0.664 (0.021)*** 
0.668 (0.021)*** 
0.673 (0.021)*** 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.638 (0.020)*** 
0.625 (0.021)*** 
0.633 (0.021)*** 
0.637 (0.020)*** 
0.641 (0.020)*** 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.678 (0.021)*** 
0.665 (0.021)*** 
0.673 (0.021)*** 
0.677 (0.021)*** 
0.682 (0.020)*** 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.684 (0.020)*** 
0.672 (0.020)*** 
0.680 (0.020)*** 
0.684 (0.020)*** 
0.688 (0.020)*** 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.659 (0.020)*** 
0.647 (0.020)*** 
0.655 (0.020)*** 
0.659 (0. 020)*** 
0.663 (0.019)*** 
χ
2 
1418.383 
1529.470 
1548.117 
1519.372 
1551.455 
df 
316 
387 
387 
387 
387 
C
FI 
.971 
.976 
.975 
.977 
.975 
TLI 
.912 
.916 
.914 
.919 
.913 
R
M
SEA
 
.113 
.104 
.105 
.103 
.105 
A
IC
 
2948.383 
3835.470 
3854.117 
3825.372 
3857.455 
† p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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Table 4.19 
Standardized Param
eter Estim
ates for Fixed Effects M
odels using School Funds per FTE (log) 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.017 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.018 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.018 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.017 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.017 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.018 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.018 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.017 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 School funds/FTE (log) 
0.001 
-0.017 
-0.002 
0.003 
0.007 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0.033 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0.034 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0..035 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0.034 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0.033 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 School funds/FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.034 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 School funds/FTE  – R
esearch (log) 
0.034 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 School funds/FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.033 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 School funds/FTE – R
esearch (log) 
0.033 
06 E&
R
/FTE 
 06 School funds/FTE  – Flagship (log) 
0.011 
07 E&
R
/FTE 
 07 School funds/FTE  – Flagship (log) 
0.012 
08 E&
R
/FTE 
 08 School funds/FTE  – Flagship (log) 
0.012 
09 E&
R
/FTE 
 09 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.012 
10 E&
R
/FTE 
 10 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.012 
11 E&
R
/FTE 
 11 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.012 
12 E&
R
/FTE 
 12 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.011 
13  E&
R
/FTE 
 13 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.011 
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Table 4.19 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
14 E&
R
/FTE 
 14 School funds/FTE – Flagship (log) 
0.011 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.006 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 School funds/FTE – A
uxiliary/O
ther C
ontrol (log) 
-0.005 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 School funds/FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 School funds/FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 School funds/FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.016 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 School funds/FTE – FB
S (log) 
-0.016 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 School funds/FTE  – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 School funds/FTE  – FB
S (log) 
-0.016 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 School funds/FTE  – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 School funds/FTE  – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 School funds/FTE  – FB
S (log) 
-0.015 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Fall FTE (log) 
0.056 
0.044 
0.054 
0.057 
0.064 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Fall FTE (log) 
0.057 
0.044 
0.054 
0.057 
0.064 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Fall FTE (log) 
0.058 
0.045 
0.056 
0.059 
0.066 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Fall FTE (log) 
0.057 
0.044 
0.055 
0.058 
0.065 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Fall FTE (log) 
0.055 
0.043 
0.053 
0.056 
0.063 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Fall FTE (log) 
0.056 
0.043 
0.054 
0.057 
0.064 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Fall FTE (log) 
0.055 
0.043 
0.053 
0.056 
0.063 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Fall FTE (log) 
0.055 
0.042 
0.053 
0.055 
0.062 
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Table 4.19 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Fall FTE (log) 
0.056 
0.043 
0.054 
0.056 
0.063 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.125 
0.129 
0.126 
0.125 
0.127 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.119 
0.123 
0.120 
0.120 
0.121 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.120 
0.124 
0.121 
0.121 
0.122 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.118 
0.122 
0.119 
0.119 
0.120 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.116 
0.119 
0.117 
0.117 
0.118 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.117 
0.120 
0.118 
0.118 
0.119 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.115 
0.118 
0.116 
0.116 
0.117 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.109 
0.112 
0.109 
0.109 
0.110 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 Tenured faculty/ 100 FTE (log) 
0.111 
0.115 
0.112 
0.112 
0.113 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.213 
0.207 
0.211 
0.213 
0.213 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.218 
0.213 
0.217 
0.219 
0.219 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.207 
0.201 
0.205 
0.207 
0.207 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.199 
0.193 
0.197 
0.200 
0.200 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.208 
0.202 
0.207 
0.208 
0.208 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.211 
0.206 
0.209 
0.211 
0.211 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.201 
0.196 
0.200 
0.202 
0.202 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.204 
0.199 
0.203 
0.205 
0.205 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 14 C
ore revenues/FTE (log) 
0.207 
0.202 
0.206 
0.208 
0.207 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 05 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.636 
0.623 
0.631 
0.635 
0.639 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.631 
0.619 
0.627 
0.630 
0.635 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.642 
0.629 
0.637 
0.641 
0.646 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.672 
0.657 
0.667 
0.670 
0.675 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.652 
0.640 
0.647 
0.651 
0.656 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.647 
0.634 
0.642 
0.646 
0.650 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.659 
0.647 
0.654 
0.658 
0.663 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.667 
0.655 
0.662 
0.666 
0.670 
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Table 4.19 (C
ontinued) 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
0.662 
0.650 
0.658 
0.661 
0.666 
06 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.134 
0.139 
0.135 
0.134 
0.130 
07 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.134 
0.140 
0.136 
0.134 
0.131 
08 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.137 
0.143 
0.139 
0.137 
0.134 
09 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.133 
0.139 
0.135 
0.134 
0.130 
10 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.130 
0.135 
0.132 
0.130 
0.127 
11 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.128 
0.137 
0.134 
0.132 
0.129 
12 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.125 
0.134 
0.130 
0.129 
0.125 
13 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.125 
0.130 
0.127 
0.125 
0.122 
14 E&
R
/FTE (log) 
 Tim
e fixed effects 
0.111 
0.131 
0.127 
0.126 
0.122 
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Table 4.20 
Squared M
ultiple C
orrelations for D
ependent Variables in SEM
 Fixed Effects M
odels using School Funds per FTE (log) 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
14 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.981 
.979 
.979 
.979 
.979 
13 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.981 
.979 
.979 
.979 
.979 
12 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.980 
.978 
.978 
.978 
.978 
11 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.979 
.977 
.977 
.977 
.976 
10 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.979 
.978 
.977 
.977 
.977 
09 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.978 
.977 
.976 
.976 
.976 
08 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.977 
.975 
.975 
.975 
.975 
07 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.978 
.976 
.976 
.976 
.976 
06 E&
R
 expenditures per FTE (log) 
.978 
.976 
.976 
.976 
.976 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the results from the statistical analyses used to investigate 
the five research questions posed in this dissertation. The first section showed the 
descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in the dataset. Section two 
presented the results from the graphical analysis and latent growth curve (LGC) models 
used to address research question one, which sought to understand how the rate of growth 
compared for athletics subsidies, school funds, and education and related expenditures 
between 2005 and 2014. In section three, the results from a series of fixed-effects models 
that tested the relationship between athletics subsidies per FTE and education and related 
expenditures per FTE were presented in order to investigate research questions two and 
three. The final section provided the results for the fixed-effects models that were used to 
address research questions four and five, which sought to determine the nature of the 
relationship between school funds per FTE and education and related expenditures per 
FTE. 
The results from the graphical analyses showed that each of the three variables of 
interest – total athletics subsidies per FTE, school funds per FTE, and education and 
related expenditures per FTE – exhibited similar patterns of growth during the time 
period of this study. Each variable experienced its highest rate of growth from 2005 to 
2009, underwent a period of stability or decline between 2009 and 2010, and then 
continued to increase once again from 2011 to 2014. The LGC analysis demonstrated that 
each period of growth was statistically significant for the three variables. Moreover, the 
rate of growth was found to differ significantly across institutions, meaning that all public 
institutions did not experience the same growth (or decline) in any given year. The 
153
models also showed that although significant increases occurred over time for all three 
variables, the rate of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE 
was approximately twice that for education and related expenditures per FTE between 
2005 and 2014.  
The results from the fixed-effects models using total athletics subsidies per FTE 
as the independent variable of interest offer several important conclusions. First, although 
increases to athletics subsidies per FTE are significantly and positively correlated with 
institutional spending on education and related activities per student, the effect size is 
small. Nonetheless, this is an important finding in light of the criticism in recent years of 
institutional spending on intercollegiate athletics. Second, the relationship between total 
athletics subsidies and education and related expenditures does not depend on the type of 
institution – research or flagship – or the reporting location of the athletics department 
within the university. There is, however, some evidence that the level of athletics 
competition does impact the nature of this relationship. It was shown that increased 
athletics subsidies per FTE was associated with an increase in education and related 
expenditures per FTE for both types of institutions, but with FCS institutions seeing a 
greater percent increase in E&R expenditures per FTE than FBS institutions. This finding 
has little practical significance, however, as the effect sizes were very small.  
The final section of this chapter presented the results from the fixed-effects 
models using school funds per FTE as the primary independent variable. Unlike the 
models using total athletics subsidies per student, the relationship between school funds 
per student and education and related expenditures per student was not statistically 
significant. This suggests that although institutions may have greater flexibility to 
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increase their school funds to athletics from year to year compared to student fees, any 
such changes do not significantly increase or decrease education and related spending. In 
the interaction model for research institution status, both the interaction coefficient and 
the school fund per student coefficient were statistically significant. It was shown that 
increases to school funds per student are associated with increases in E&R spending per 
student for research institutions and decreases in E&R spending per student for non-
research institutions. In the three remaining interaction models using school funds per 
student, the interaction terms were consistently non-significant. Therefore, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the relationship between school funds per student and E&R 
spending per student depends upon status as the state flagship institution, reporting 
location of athletics, or level of athletics competition.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the purpose of the study as well as the specific research questions 
that were investigated are reviewed. Next, the results from the statistical analyses are 
briefly summarized. The chapter proceeds with the interpretation and discussion of the 
results within the context of existing higher education theory and research. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of study limitations and implications for future research.  
Purpose of the Study 
Public colleges and universities have faced growing financial challenges over the 
past several decades. Public support for higher education has steadily declined, 
prompting institutions to increase their reliance upon other revenue sources, most notably 
student tuition and fees (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2016; “Federal and state 
funding,” 2015). Not surprisingly, repeated tuition increases have sparked an outcry from 
parents, students, politicians, and others who have become increasingly suspicious of the 
management of public colleges and universities. Institutions have been accused of “gold-
plating,” by building suite-style dormitories and large recreational facilities and offering 
gourmet meal plans to students (Zemsky, Wegner, & Massy, 2005; Winston, 2000; 
Smart, 2007). Such concerns have led to calls for greater transparency and accountability 
as well as restrictions on annual tuition increases (Wollan & Lewin, 2009; Nelson, 2013). 
Yet, even with increases to student tuition and fees, many public institutions have faced 
such dramatic state budget cuts that they have been forced to furlough employees, defer 
maintenance, freeze or eliminate vacant positions, and in some cases close academic 
departments (Wollan & Lewin, 2009; Nelson, 2013; Woodhouse, 2015).  
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Amidst this current fiscal climate, one area that appears to be largely immune to 
recurring budget cuts as well as much of the public criticism is intercollegiate athletics. 
Despite an often-held perception that athletics generate revenues for the university, most 
Division I programs operate at a deficit and require support from the institution in the 
form of student fees and institutional funds. In addition, the dependence of athletics on 
institutional support appears only to have increased over the past decade (Desrochers, 
2013). Bowen’s revenue theory of costs suggests that, in order to fund growing athletics 
subsidies, institutions will seek to raise additional revenues rather than decrease spending 
elsewhere (Bowen, 1981). Knowing that state support has declined in many states, one 
possibility is that institutions have increased student tuition and fees. However, a recent 
study by Jones and Rudolph (2016) found that student tuition and fee charges (in-state 
and out-of-state) were uncorrelated with athletics subsidies. If institutions are unable or 
unwilling to increase their core revenues, it is possible that funds previously budgeted for 
another area of the university are being diverted to athletics.  
This dissertation explored the relationship between spending on one of the most 
important areas of colleges and universities – education and related activities – and 
intercollegiate athletics subsidies. The study was guided by five research questions: 
1. How do the rates of growth in total athletics subsidies per FTE and school funds
per FTE compare to the rate of growth in education and related (E&R)
expenditures per FTE for public Division I institutions between 2005 and 2014?
2. What is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R
expenditures per FTE, controlling for other factors?
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3. Is the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R
expenditures per FTE dependent upon institution type (research university,
flagship university) or characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure,
level of play), controlling for other factors?
4. What is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per
FTE, controlling for other factors?
5. Is the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE
dependent upon institution type (research university, flagship university) or
characteristics of the athletics program (reporting structure, level of play),
controlling for other factors?
The analysis for this dissertation proceeded through three stages. First, latent
growth curve (LGC) models were used to estimate and compare the rate of growth in 
total athletics subsidies per FTE, school funds per FTE, and E&R expenditures per FTE 
between 2005 and 2014 (research question one). The second stage of the analysis 
examined research questions two and three by estimating a series of fixed-effects models 
(FEMs) using a structural equation model (SEM) framework. In these models, E&R 
expenditures served as the dependent variable and total athletics subsidies per FTE as the 
independent variable of interest. The final stage repeated the analysis from the second 
stage using school funds per FTE as the independent variable of interest in place of total 
athletics subsidies per FTE. The following section provides a brief summary of the 
findings from each of the three stages of the analysis.  
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Results 
Results for Research Question 1 
The first part of this study sought to address research question one, which asked 
how the rate of growth compared for total athletics subsidies per FTE, school funds per 
FTE, and education and related (E&R) expenditures per FTE during the period of 2005 to 
2014. To understand the nature of the growth in each variable, a graphical analysis was 
conducted. The graphical analysis revealed a relatively consistent pattern across the three 
variables: the most growth (steepest slope) occurred between 2005 and 2009, 2009 to 
2010 represented a time of no growth or decline, and a new period of growth took place 
from 2010 to 2014. Multiple latent growth curve (LGC) models were then estimated for 
each of the three variables using SEM, and the model of best fit was identified using 
several fit criteria.  
It was estimated that the average total growth between 2005 and 2014 was 46 
percent for total athletics subsidies per FTE, 59 percent for school funds per FTE, and 26 
percent for E&R expenditures per FTE. Thus, the rate of increase in both subsidies 
variables was roughly twice that of E&R expenditures. The estimates also showed that, 
generally, the intercept and slopes were not significantly correlated, meaning that there 
was little relationship between an institution’s per student subsidies, school funds, or 
E&R expenditures in 2005 and the rate of change in that variable from 2005 to 2014. 
Additionally, the intercept and slope variances were each statistically significant, which 
suggests that there are important differences between institutions in terms of their initial 
spending on athletics subsidies, school funds, and E&R expenditures in 2005 and the rate 
at which these allocations changed over time.  
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Results for Research Questions 2 and 3 
The second part of this study sought to understand the nature of the relationship 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R spending per FTE (research questions 
two and three). Fixed-effects structural equation models were estimated using a panel 
dataset of public Division I institutions for the time period of 2005 to 2014. Three time-
varying control variables were included in the models: core revenues per FTE, number of 
tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE, and student FTE enrollment. Several FEMs were 
initially estimated and the models were compared using a number of different fit criteria. 
The best-fitting model was selected and used to report the results for research question 
two. This model was then re-estimated four times using one of four interaction terms in 
each model to address research question three. The four interaction terms were between 
total athletics subsidies per FTE and the following categorical variables: Carnegie 
classification as a research institution; status as the state flagship university; reporting 
location of the athletics department; and level of athletics competition.  
Estimates from the FEM without interaction terms showed that the relationship 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was positive 
and statistically significant. Although the sign of the coefficient is opposite the 
hypothesis, the effect size appears to be small. A 10 percent increase in total athletics 
subsidies per FTE was associated with a 0.1 percent increase in E&R expenditures per 
FTE, controlling for other factors. Interpreted at the mean using 2014 data, these would 
represent increases of $83 for total athletics subsidies per FTE and $12 for E&R 
expenditures per FTE. Each of the three control variables were positively and 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable. A 10 percent increase in core 
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revenues per FTE, tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE, or FTE enrollment were associated 
with increases of 1.8, 2.1, and 0.4 percent in E&R expenditures per FTE, respectively. 
The preceding observation of the dependent variable was also a significant predictor. It 
was estimated that a 10 percent increase in E&R expenditures per FTE for year t-1 was 
correlated with an increase in E&R expenditures in year t of between 6.3 and 6.9 percent.  
The first three interaction models did not exhibit statistical significance in the 
interaction terms with total athletics subsidies per FTE. This shows that there were no 
differences in the relationship between athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures 
per FTE based upon status as a research or flagship institution or having athletics located 
within student services versus an auxiliary or other unit. In the model containing an 
interaction term for level of athletics play, however, it was found that the relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent variable of interest differed for FBS and 
FCS institutions. Interpreting the coefficients at the mean using 2014 data, an increase of 
$99 (10 percent) in total athletics subsidies per FTE for FCS institutions was associated 
with an increase in E&R expenditures per FTE of $12 (0.1 percent), controlling for other 
factors. An increase of $61 (10 percent) in total athletics subsidies per FTE for FBS 
institutions was also correlated with an increase of $12 (0.08 percent) in E&R 
expenditures per FTE. 
Results for Research Questions 4 and 5 
The final part of this study examined the relationship between athletics subsidies 
from school funds (referred to as school funds) per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE. 
Using the same panel dataset as in part two, a series of fixed-effects models were 
estimated to test the relationship between the independent variable of interest and the 
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dependent variable. Core revenues per FTE, tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE, and FTE 
enrollment were included as control variables in each of the models. Again the different 
models were compared using several fit criteria and the best-fitting model was used to 
report the parameter estimates. After estimating the FEM for school funds per FTE and 
E&R expenditures per FTE, four additional models were estimated that each included an 
interaction term between school funds per FTE and one of the following: classification as 
a research institution, status as a flagship university, reporting location of the athletics 
department, or level of athletics competition.  
Findings from the FEM without interaction terms showed that the relationship 
between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was non-significant, 
controlling for other factors. Consistent with the results from part two, each of the three 
control variables was positive and statistically significant. A 10 percent increase in core 
revenues per FTE, tenure-track faculty per 100 FTE, or FTE enrollment was correlated 
with an increase of 1.8, 2.1, and 0.3 percent in E&R expenditures per FTE. It was also 
shown that a 10 percent increase in the preceding observation of E&R expenditures per 
FTE was associated with between a 6.3 and 6.9 percent increase in E&R expenditures per 
FTE in the current year, controlling for other factors.  
The interaction term between classification as a research insitutition and school 
funds per FTE was statistically significant, indicating that the relationship between the 
independent variable of interest and dependent variable differed for research and non-
research institutions. Interpreting the coefficients at the mean using 2014 data, a 10 
percent increase in school funds per FTE for research institutions ($36) is associated with 
a 0.02 percent increase in E&R expenditures per FTE ($3). A 10 percent increase in 
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school funds per FTE for non-research institutions ($74) is associated with a 0.03 percent 
decrease in E&R expenditures per FTE ($3). The interaction terms in each of the 
remaining interaction models for school funds per FTE were non-significant. This 
demonstrates that the relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures 
per FTE was approximately the same for flagship and non-flagship institutions, FBS and 
FCS institutions, and institutions whose athletics departments reported within student 
services and an auxiliary/other unit.  
Interpretation and Discussion of the Findings 
The findings from this dissertation shed new light on the relationship of athletics 
subsidies to the budget of public colleges and universities. Whereas prior research has 
focused on the relationship between athletics and institutional revenues, for example 
student tuition and fees, this study is the first to investigate whether changes in resource 
allocations to athletics subsidies are correlated with changes in resource allocations to 
other areas of the institution. Specifically, the relationship between athletics subsidies and 
education and related spending has been examined. In this section, an interpretation of 
the findings for each of the five research questions is presented.  
Research Question 1 
The key finding from part one of this study is the fact that the average rate of 
growth in athletics subsidies per FTE as well as school funds per FTE outpaced the rate 
of growth in E&R spending per FTE. Whereas E&R expenditures per FTE increased 
approximately at the rate of inflation from 2005 to 2014 (25.6 percent versus 21.2 
percent), both total subsidies per FTE and school funds per FTE increased more than 
twice the rate of inflation (46.3 and 59.3 percent) (US Department of Labor, 2015). This 
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finding is consistent with the hypothesis for question one as well as previous research by 
Desrochers (2013) who compared the average academic spending per student with the 
average athletic subsidy per student athlete for Division I institutions between 2005 and 
2010. In that study, it was shown that academic spending per student increased by 22 and 
23 percent at FBS and FCS-football institutions but only 11 percent at FCS non-football 
institutions. Athletics subsidies per student athlete, however, increased by 61 percent for 
FBS institutions, 42 percent at FCS-football institutions, and 38 percent at FCS-non 
football institutions.  
This trend in athletics subsidies is concerning, particularly during a time when 
public institutions have seen declining state support, greater competition for students, and 
state legislatures that have grown wary of repeated increases to tuition and fees. On the 
one hand, athletics subsidies represent a small, albeit growing percentage of total core 
revenues: 2.7 percent in 2014. On the other hand, with a median total subsidy of $9.8M in 
2014, athletics subsidies represent a potentially important opportunity cost for Division I 
colleges and universities.  
Even though intercollegiate athletics programs do not generally operate in the 
black, they have often been justified according to a number of perceived indirect benefits. 
The most common indirect benefits attributed to athletics include increased student 
applications and enrollments, student quality, and alumni giving (Clotfelter, 2011; 
Clopton, 2009; French, 2004; Bok, 2003). The relationship between intercollegiate 
athletics and each of these areas has been widely studied over the past several decades. 
However, findings have generally been mixed and effect sizes small when significant 
correlations have been identified. Studies by Murphy and Tandel (1994) and McEvoy 
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(2005), for example, estimated increases in student applications of 1.3 and 6.1 percent 
following a season in which a team’s football record had improved by 25 percent over the 
previous season. Although a number of early studies showed substantial increases in 
alumni giving following a successful football season (see Sigelman & Brookheimer, 1983 
and Baade & Sundberg, 1996) more recent evidence suggests that athletics only increase 
alumni giving to athletics (Humphreys & Mondello, 2007; Stinson & Howard, 2007).  
The lack of compelling evidence that intercollegiate athletics produce important 
indirect benefits raises the question as to why public Division I colleges and universities 
have been willing to invest institutional funds in intercollegiate athletics – an activity that 
many have argued is outside the scope of the mission of public higher education 
(Duderstadt, 2009; Sperber, 2000; French, 2004). One important theory that helps to 
explain this phenomenon is Bowen’s revenue theory of costs, which suggests that 
colleges and universities are driven by a desire to increase their prestige and influence 
(Bowen, 1981). As such, they attempt to raise as much revenue as they can and spend all 
of the revenues they obtain on activities that increase their prestige. Intercollegiate 
athletics are a prominent feature in American higher education and have come to be 
viewed as the “front door” to the university due to their unique ability to attract students, 
alumni, and other members of the community to campus (Toma & Cross, 1998). High-
profile athletics, most notably FBS institutions belonging to a power five conference 
(ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 10, and SEC), provide a great deal of national exposure and 
notoriety due to nationally televised football and basketball games and championships. It 
has been suggested that this exposure, and having a successful program in particular, 
produces a halo effect that increases institutional prestige by leading prospective students, 
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alumni, and others to conclude that a successful athletics program is representative of a 
successful institution (Fisher, 2009; Quattrone, 2008).  
Since colleges and universities seek to increase their prestige and athletics is 
viewed as an important means of acquiring prestige, Resource Dependence Theory 
maintains that athletics programs have obtained substantial political power on campus 
(Smart, 1999). This political power, in turn, allows athletics to secure important and 
scarce internal resources such as student scholarships, coaching and other staff positions, 
and facilities. Although previous research has not specifically examined political power 
for athletics, several studies have found that power in academic departments is largely 
determined by the ability to secure external funding, usually research grants, which is an 
external resource highly valued by the institution (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; Pfeffer & 
Moore, 1980).  
A final note from the findings for research question one is the recognition, based 
on the graphical and statistical analyses, that multiple slopes were needed in order to 
effectively model the growth in the three variables from 2005 to 2014. In each variable, 
total athletics subsidies, athletics subsidies from school funds, and education and related 
spending, the period of greatest growth occurred from 2005 to 2009. This period of 
growth was followed by a brief period of almost no growth or even slight decline from 
2009 to 2010 or 2011, until growth resumed between 2011 and 2014. This pattern is not 
altogether surprising in light of the economic recession that occurred in 2008 and that 
impacted university endowments, alumni giving, state appropriations, and other sources 
of university income (Brown & Hoxby, 2015). However, it appears that athletics 
subsidies and educational spending were not affected in the same way by the recession. 
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Whereas education and related spending per student declined by an average of $254 
between 2005 and 2009, total athletics subsidies per student actually increased by $10 per 
student. This could be evidence that institutions eagerly spread money around during 
times of prosperity, but have a greater willingness to decrease educational spending 
before athletics.  
Research Question 2 
The hypothesis for research question two anticipated that the relationship between 
total athletics subsidies per FTE would be negatively and significantly correlated with 
E&R expenditures per FTE at public Division I colleges and universities, controlling for 
other factors. The results from part two of this study showed that although the two 
variables were significantly correlated, the relationship was in fact positive. Although the 
effect size was small, this is an important result. At minimum the lack of the 
hypothesized relationship demonstrates that institutions are not increasing athletics 
subsidies on the one hand and decreasing E&R spending on the other. Given that core 
revenues were controlled for in the model and the fact that both athletics subsidies and 
E&R expenditures were shown to have increased during the time period of this study, it 
may be that institutions have reallocated funds from another area of the institution to 
support the increases to both athletics subsidies and E&R activities.  
If in fact institutions have selectively reallocated funds from another area to 
athletics subsidies and E&R activities, in all likelihood that area is one from which little 
to no institutional prestige is derived. Returning to the earlier discussion for research 
question one, Bowen’s revenue theory of costs suggests that the most important goal of 
colleges and universities is prestige and they will invest all available revenues in 
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activities that increase prestige (Bowen, 1981). This is further supported by Resource 
Dependence Theory (RDT), which states that the departments within a firm that are most 
successful in securing scarce and desired external resources for the organization, in this 
case prestige, those departments receive power in the organization which they can 
leverage to obtain internal resources (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). RDT has been applied 
successfully to higher education by a number of researchers, including Hackman (1985) 
who showed that non-academic or peripheral units that secured external funding, had 
high visibility, and were able to make a case that they provided important benefits to the 
institution received the most internal funding. Based upon this discussion one might 
hypothesize that less visible units and activities, especially those that are not directly 
rewarded by national rankings systems such as US News and World Report, would be 
particularly susceptible to budget cuts. Units such as the physical plant, student services, 
and community and outreach programs appear to be most at risk.  
Research Question 3 
The hypothesis for the third research question supposed that the relationship 
between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE would depend 
upon four institutional characteristics. Specifically, it was assumed that the relationship 
between the two variables would be stronger for non-research and non-flagship 
institutions compared to research and flagship institutions. It was also hypothesized that 
the relationship between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE 
would be stronger for institutions whose athletics departments were located within 
student services as opposed to an auxiliary/other unit and for those competing at the FCS 
versus the FBS level. The empirical findings from part two of the study showed that only 
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one of the four interactions was statistically significant - the interaction between FBS 
status and total athletics subsidies per FTE.  
The lack of statistical significance in the interaction terms for classification as a 
research university and state flagship status is somewhat surprising. Master’s and 
baccalaureate institutions generally have lower per-student spending on E&R activities, 
fewer core revenues per student, and higher per-student athletics subsidies compared to 
research institutions (Bowen, 1981; Desrochers, 2013; Fulks, 2015). Similarly, non-
flagship public institutions are in many cases less prestigious and receive far less state 
funding compared to flagship institutions. Furthermore, flagship institutions are 
disproportionately represented within the power five athletics conferences whose 
members generate the most athletics revenues and generally have the lowest athletics 
subsidies (College Football Data Warehouse, 2017; Cheslock & Knight, 2015; Denhart & 
Vedder, 2010). As such, one could expect that non-flagship and non-research institutions, 
who have access to fewer revenue sources, would be forced to re-allocate resources from 
another area of the institution to fund their growing athletics subsidies. This appears not 
to be the case for E&R expenditures; however, these institutions could be re-allocating 
funds from another area of the institution to athletics as discussed previously. 
Examining possible institutional differences on the basis of the reporting location 
of the athletics department was important in part because little research has been 
conducted in this area. The two common structures for Division I athletics departments 
are to report within student services or be established as an auxiliary or other similar unit 
(Barr & McClellan, 2011). Most auxiliary units are required to be financially self-
sufficient, meaning that they must generate sufficient revenues to cover their expenses. 
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Student services units, on the other hand, are generally not viewed as a source of revenue 
for the institution and contain such departments as career counseling, personal 
counseling, multicultural affairs, and other important services for students. Placement of 
athletics within a student services unit would seem to suggest a recognition by the 
university that intercollegiate athletics are both an activity that requires institutional 
support and one that is worth supporting. Moreover, having athletics located within a 
larger unit could make it more difficult for campus administrators to monitor athletics 
spending, which could give rise to principal-agent problems (Rodas, 1998).  
Nonetheless, the results from the fixed-effects models did not indicate a 
difference in the relationship between athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R spending per 
FTE for institutions with either type of athletics reporting structure. In light of the 
descriptive statistics, this finding is not entirely surprising. The median total athletics 
subsidy for athletics departments located within student services and for those located 
within an auxiliary/other unit was comparable in 2014: $10.8M versus $9.2M. An 
important conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that athletics departments 
serving as auxiliary/other units have not been held to the same level of financial 
accountability as other campus auxiliary units. Furthermore, there is little evidence to 
suggest that administrators at institutions whose athletics departments are located within 
an auxiliary/other unit have had greater success in holding down athletics subsidies 
compared with those whose athletics departments are located within student services.  
The one interaction term that was found to be statistically significant in the 
models for total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was that 
involving the level of athletics competition (FBS or FCS). Yet, interpretation of the 
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findings is somewhat unclear. The fact that the relationship was positive for both types of 
institutions was unexpected. Although the relationship between total athletics subsidies 
per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was expected to be non-significant for FBS 
institutions, it was hypothesized that this relationship would be negative for FCS 
institutions due to the fact that they typically receive fewer core revenues and yet have 
higher athletics subsidies.  
The presence of a positive correlation between athletics subsidies and E&R 
expenditures for either type of institution could be evidence of institutional “striving,” 
where institutions have simultaneously increased both athletics subsidies and E&R 
spending in order to increase prestige. That the correlation is stronger for FCS institutions 
could be an indication that some of these institutions, which are generally less 
prestigious, comprehensive institutions, have experienced upward pressure to move up in 
the national rankings through increased educational spending and exposure through 
athletics.  
Research Question 4 
The hypothesis for research question four stated that the relationship between 
school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE would be significant and negative, 
controlling for other factors. It was argued that even though a non-significant relationship 
might be estimated for the total subsidies variable in research question two, the 
correlation between school funds and E&R expenditures would be significant. The 
rationale was that the school funds variable, compared to total subsidies, does not include 
student athletics fees. It was supposed that if school funds, at least to some degree, 
represent unexpected budget overages by athletics, this may have led to the re-allocation 
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of funds from other areas of the institution during the fiscal year. Nonetheless, the 
estimates for part three of the analysis indicated that no statistically significant correlation 
existed between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE, controlling for 
other factors.   
One possible explanation for the absence of a significant relationship between 
school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE could be, as suggested for total 
subsidies, that colleges and universities have re-allocated funds from another area to 
athletics. For example, funding may have been decreased for student services or physical 
plant maintenance. Another, possibility is that institutions may not have reported all of 
the direct and indirect subsidies they provided to athletics each year. According to the 
USA Today Athletics Finance database, the school funds variable should capture all of the 
following: state funds and tuition dollars provided directly to athletics; federal work study 
students employed in athletics; administrative services provided by the university; 
facilities and maintenance; utilities; and debt service (USA Today, 2016b). Given the 
large number of resources provided to athletics that institutions are responsible for 
tracking, one cannot help but wonder whether institutions have done their due diligence 
in compiling this information or even how feasible it is for them to compile accurate 
information.  
Research Question 5 
The final research question sought to determine whether the relationship between 
school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE was moderated by any one of four 
institutional characteristics: classification as a research institution, status as the state 
flagship, reporting of athletics within an auxiliary/other unit or student services, and 
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competition at the FBS or FCS level. Consistent with research question three, it was 
hypothesized that the correlation between the independent variable of interest and 
dependent variable would be negative and stronger for non-research, non-flagship, and 
FCS institutions as well as those whose athletics departments that were located in student 
services. The results showed that although the interaction terms were non-significant for 
three of the four characteristics, significant differences were observed between research 
and non-research institutions.  
The overall relationship between school funds per FTE and E&R expenditures per 
FTE was found to be negative for non-research institutions and positive for research. As 
noted previously in this study, research institutions have access to more core revenues per 
FTE but also allocated fewer school funds per FTE to athletics compared to non-research 
institutions. Because school funds represent a larger portion of total core revenues at non-
research institutions, it is likely that large increases to school funds, particularly 
unexpected increases, have a more dramatic impact on the overall budget picture. An 
important question that emerges is whether non-research institutions, which are already 
facing financial difficulty in many cases, can justify their increasing investment in 
athletics. Even though the estimated effect size for the correlation between school funds 
per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE is small, future increases to school funds could 
be correlated with even larger decreases in educational spending. This in turn could lead 
to a decline in the quality of education provided by these institutions. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Several limitations have been identified for this dissertation, a number of which 
were raised in chapter three. Those limitations will be revisited here in part to motivate 
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future research. The first limitation is the scope of the study. At present, athletics 
subsidies data are only available for public Division I colleges and universities. This 
means that the findings may only be applicable to that specific type of institution, which 
represents a limited segment of all U.S. four-year colleges and universities – about 10 
percent (Department of Education, 2015). Athletics subsidies data are compiled by the 
NCAA for all institutions that participate in NCAA athletics; however, the NCAA has 
been unwilling to provide school-level data to researchers or release it publicly up to this 
point. An important area for future research, if one could obtain the data, would be to 
investigate differences in athletics subsidies on the basis of institution type – public or 
private. It would also be valuable to examine athletics subsidies for Division II and 
Division III programs. In particular it would be valuable to track athletics subsidies over 
time for institutions that have moved up from Division II to Division I. A number of such 
institutions are included in the dataset for this dissertation; however, data for these 
schools has generally not been included in the USA Today Athletics Finance Database 
prior to their entering Division I competition (USA Today, 2016b).  
A second potential limitation for the study is the use of retrospective data from the 
USA Today Athletics Database. These data were initially collected by the NCAA and 
obtained by USA Today through the Freedom of Information Act. The accuracy and 
completeness of these data have been called into question, in part, because institutions 
have historically not been forthcoming with their athletics financial data. Moreover, it is 
unclear what review, if any, the NCAA conducts to ensure the data are accurate. It also 
seems unlikely any penalties would be imposed on an institution if the NCAA were to 
find discrepancies or incompleteness in the annual athletics finance survey. 
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Consequently, the athletics subsidies data – particularly the school funds information – 
may not provide a complete picture of university financial support to athletics. One can 
only hope that in the future, as calls for greater transparency and accountability of higher 
education continue, that athletics finance data become part of mandatory state or federal 
government data collections such as IPEDS.  
Another possible limitation is the level of detail provided by the IPEDS financial 
data. IPEDS, although useful, provides a limited amount of information on university 
revenues and expenditures (Toutkoushian, 2001). As such, it is possible that the positive 
correlation observed between total athletics subsidies and education and related 
expenditures in the statistical analysis is the result of certain athletics subsidies, most 
likely indirect, being counted within the education and related spending category. For 
example, it is not uncommon for universities to provide additional academic support – 
tutoring, academic advising, etc. – to student athletes. It is quite likely that these expenses 
were counted within education and related spending in IPEDS, which may have 
confounded the results.  
The limitations associated with both the USA Today and IPEDS databases could 
be, in many respects, overcome by obtaining microdata in future studies. For such 
studies, researchers may be able to obtain detailed athletics finance data for one or a 
handful of Division I institutions in order to obtain a more complete picture of the true 
scope of athletics subsidies, how (and if) the subsidies are budgeted for within the overall 
university budget, and whether there are certain athletics subsidies that are simply not 
tracked by the institution (i.e. use of central services such as travel and purchasing). 
Moreover, a mixed-methods approach might be utilized where the researcher could speak 
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directly the university CFO and other administrators willing to provide financial details 
that to this point have not been studied in depth and are not currently captured within 
large national datasets.  
Another limitation is the fact that data were not inflation-adjusted as part of this 
study. The reason data were not adjusted is due to the fact that the fixed effects models 
controlled for year fixed effects, rendering the adjustment statistically unnecessary. In 
hindsight, however, use of inflation-adjusted variables would have aided the 
interpretation of the results for research question one, which compared the growth in 
athletics subsidies to educational activities over time.  
A final limitation identified for this dissertation is the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. Great care was taken to review the literature in order to determine what 
time-varying control variables should be included in the model. Moreover, time fixed 
effects models were used in order to control for unaccounted (or unmeasurable) time-
invariant control variables, such as Carnegie classification, prestige, and location. 
However, the possibility exists that one or more unaccounted time-varying variables that 
are correlated with athletics subsidies or school funds and education and related 
expenditures were omitted.  
In terms of future research, there are a number of ways in which this study could 
be extended. As noted above, if one could obtain athletics subsidies data for private 
Division I institutions, comparisons could be made between public and private 
institutions. For example, the analysis in this dissertation could be repeated using a 
dataset that included both types of institutions, and group differences could be tested for 
statistical significance. Another possibility is that a researcher could obtain athletics 
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subsidies data for public Division II and Division III programs through the Freedom of 
Information Act. Differences in athletics subsidies as well as the relationship between 
athletics subsidies and education and related spending could be examined for the three 
different levels of NCAA athletics. Further, institutions that have transitioned from 
Division II to Division I, for example, could be investigated using a case study approach 
to determine how their athletics finances have changed over time, and if changes in other 
areas of university finances have occurred as well. Lastly, the finding of a small, positive 
correlation between total athletics subsidies per FTE and E&R expenditures per FTE in 
the analysis suggests the possibility that institutions may have re-allocated resources from 
other areas of the institution to both athletics and educational activities. An important 
future study would be to examine the correlation between athletics subsidies (and school 
funds) with other areas such as non-athletic scholarships, physical plant maintenance, and 
public service. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 
Estimated covariances for fixed effect model using total athletics subsidies per FTE (log) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> TFE .042 .008 5.123 *** 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> TFE .092 .015 6.061 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> TFE .009 .003 3.034 .002 
Ln_ER_05 <--> TFE .043 .007 5.899 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.130 .026 -4.928 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.346 .042 -8.205 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.016 .012 -1.348 .178 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.086 .022 -3.999 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .103 .020 5.082 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .072 .008 8.923 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .151 .015 10.028 *** 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .006 .009 .691 .489 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_ER_05 .095 .017 5.552 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .058 .007 8.676 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> TFE -.075 .014 -5.223 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> TFE .044 .009 5.162 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> TFE .092 .015 6.076 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> TFE .008 .003 2.893 .004 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .617 .060 10.258 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .407 .038 10.641 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .042 .004 10.265 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .204 .019 10.564 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.129 .026 -5.029 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.127 .025 -5.063 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.326 .040 -8.154 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.324 .040 -8.112 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.012 .011 -1.108 .268 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.017 .012 -1.508 .131 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.080 .021 -3.914 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.136 .027 -5.016 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.345 .042 -8.208 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.012 .012 -1.079 .280 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .112 .021 5.354 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .112 .021 5.349 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .072 .008 9.052 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .072 .008 8.753 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .155 .015 10.042 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .020 5.212 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .069 .008 8.993 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .006 .009 .625 .532 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .009 .930 .352 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_ER_05 .096 .017 5.589 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .006 .009 .732 .464 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .057 .006 8.853 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> TFE -.079 .015 -5.309 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> TFE .040 .008 5.104 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> TFE .093 .015 6.068 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> TFE .008 .003 2.757 .006 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .621 .060 10.422 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .631 .062 10.249 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .409 .039 10.629 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .411 .039 10.657 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.988 *** 
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Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .041 .004 10.500 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .187 .018 10.514 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .192 .018 10.538 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.138 .026 -5.192 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.136 .026 -5.249 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.119 .024 -4.907 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.345 .042 -8.291 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.344 .041 -8.320 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.341 .041 -8.262 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.013 .011 -1.216 .224 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.013 .011 -1.198 .231 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.019 .012 -1.646 .100 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.090 .021 -4.267 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.113 .024 -4.767 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.326 .040 -8.114 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.012 .011 -1.136 .256 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.117 .025 -4.722 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.346 .042 -8.172 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.014 .011 -1.209 .227 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .113 .021 5.351 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .069 .008 8.951 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .107 .020 5.211 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .066 .008 8.807 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .096 .019 4.974 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .096 .019 5.014 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .096 .019 5.016 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .064 .007 8.953 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .066 .007 9.016 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .066 .008 8.706 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .142 .014 9.990 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .004 .009 .466 .641 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .005 .009 .604 .546 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .009 .954 .340 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .017 5.614 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .005 .009 .549 .583 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .007 .009 .750 .453 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .053 .006 8.590 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> TFE -.084 .016 -5.336 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> TFE .033 .007 4.752 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> TFE .093 .015 6.068 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.524 .012 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .646 .064 10.145 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .634 .062 10.314 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .670 .064 10.474 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .413 .039 10.614 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .414 .039 10.645 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .418 .039 10.655 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.890 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .041 .004 10.379 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .041 .004 10.521 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .160 .016 9.726 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .161 .017 9.628 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .158 .016 9.966 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.144 .028 -5.222 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.142 .027 -5.258 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.124 .025 -4.905 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.079 .024 -3.237 .001 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.370 .044 -8.388 *** 
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Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.366 .044 -8.391 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.365 .043 -8.418 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.362 .043 -8.359 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.015 .012 -1.264 .206 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.016 .012 -1.364 .173 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.016 .012 -1.343 .179 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.022 .012 -1.790 .073 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.095 .022 -4.281 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.076 .023 -3.269 .001 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.347 .042 -8.269 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.013 .011 -1.158 .247 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.070 .023 -3.097 .002 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.328 .041 -8.093 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.011 .011 -.994 .320 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.074 .024 -3.122 .002 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.349 .043 -8.162 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.013 .011 -1.124 .261 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .112 .021 5.268 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .068 .008 8.789 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.136 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .065 .008 8.647 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .096 .019 4.912 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .064 .007 8.820 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .070 .019 3.731 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .071 .019 3.833 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .072 .019 3.893 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .072 .019 3.906 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .057 .007 8.248 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .057 .007 8.326 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .058 .007 8.372 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .058 .007 8.031 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .124 .013 9.287 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.183 .855 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .355 .722 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .501 .616 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .009 .902 .367 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .017 5.559 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 .009 -.002 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .001 .009 .087 .931 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .002 .009 .273 .785 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .053 .006 8.463 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> TFE -.084 .016 -5.308 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> TFE .044 .008 5.234 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.603 .009 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .646 .064 10.131 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .631 .061 10.267 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .666 .064 10.426 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .708 .067 10.520 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .409 .039 10.598 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .411 .039 10.632 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .415 .039 10.643 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .420 .039 10.656 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.790 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .040 .004 10.244 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .041 .004 10.384 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .042 .004 10.540 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> TFE .093 .015 6.067 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .196 .019 10.456 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .202 .019 10.492 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .188 .018 10.522 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 9.922 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.147 .028 -5.296 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.145 .027 -5.325 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.128 .026 -4.998 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.081 .024 -3.304 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.146 .027 -5.365 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.372 .044 -8.400 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.370 .044 -8.415 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.368 .044 -8.408 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.366 .043 -8.427 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.363 .043 -8.365 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.018 .012 -1.482 .138 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.017 .012 -1.473 .141 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.018 .012 -1.551 .121 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.018 .012 -1.565 .118 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.025 .012 -1.980 .048 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.097 .022 -4.353 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.144 .027 -5.315 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.368 .044 -8.400 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.015 .012 -1.305 .192 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.139 .026 -5.327 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.346 .042 -8.281 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.014 .011 -1.215 .224 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.130 .025 -5.146 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.327 .040 -8.108 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.010 .011 -.955 .340 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.137 .027 -5.154 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.348 .043 -8.175 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.013 .012 -1.087 .277 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.279 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .067 .008 8.647 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.157 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .064 .008 8.525 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .019 4.915 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .063 .007 8.713 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.733 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .057 .007 8.159 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .112 .021 5.355 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .110 .021 5.331 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .113 .021 5.466 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .113 .021 5.513 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .114 .021 5.509 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.663 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.675 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.750 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .068 .008 8.814 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 .008 8.469 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .150 .015 9.962 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 .009 -.033 .974 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.002 .009 -.212 .832 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.272 .786 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .293 .770 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .456 .649 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .883 .377 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .017 5.557 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .001 .009 .155 .877 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .002 .009 .252 .801 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .004 .009 .398 .691 
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Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .052 .006 8.375 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> TFE -.089 .017 -5.334 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> TFE .045 .009 5.294 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> TFE .092 .015 6.052 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> TFE .008 .003 2.712 .007 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .654 .066 9.890 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .650 .064 10.126 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .679 .066 10.230 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .721 .070 10.328 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .726 .070 10.343 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .408 .039 10.584 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .410 .039 10.617 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .414 .039 10.627 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .420 .039 10.643 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .418 .039 10.656 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .038 .004 9.732 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .039 .004 10.140 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .040 .004 10.285 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .041 .004 10.416 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .042 .004 10.521 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .196 .019 10.458 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .202 .019 10.495 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .186 .018 10.482 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .160 .016 9.685 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .202 .019 10.600 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.166 .030 -5.610 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.163 .029 -5.633 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.143 .027 -5.252 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.091 .026 -3.524 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.164 .029 -5.629 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.169 .029 -5.793 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.381 .046 -8.260 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.384 .046 -8.269 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.382 .046 -8.278 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.380 .046 -8.276 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.378 .046 -8.288 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.374 .046 -8.204 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.024 .012 -1.912 .056 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.024 .013 -1.883 .060 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.023 .012 -1.869 .062 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.024 .012 -1.987 .047 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.026 .013 -2.082 .037 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.034 .013 -2.536 .011 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.112 .024 -4.725 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.151 .027 -5.505 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.369 .044 -8.390 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.018 .012 -1.557 .119 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.149 .027 -5.466 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.367 .044 -8.373 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.017 .012 -1.458 .145 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.144 .026 -5.484 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.345 .042 -8.259 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.015 .011 -1.330 .184 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.135 .025 -5.300 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.326 .040 -8.086 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.013 .011 -1.175 .240 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.142 .027 -5.300 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.347 .043 -8.155 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.015 .011 -1.311 .190 
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Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.280 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .066 .008 8.543 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.156 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .063 .007 8.428 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .019 4.923 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .061 .007 8.600 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.754 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .055 .007 8.018 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .110 .021 5.328 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .065 .008 8.583 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .116 .021 5.542 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .118 .021 5.610 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .116 .021 5.581 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .119 .021 5.721 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .119 .021 5.760 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .119 .021 5.753 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .065 .008 8.632 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.666 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.685 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.768 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .068 .008 8.832 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .068 .008 8.524 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .151 .015 10.009 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.307 .759 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.002 .009 -.250 .803 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.283 .777 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .292 .771 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .457 .648 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .855 .392 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_ER_05 .096 .017 5.535 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 .009 -.004 .997 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.002 .009 -.184 .854 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .002 .009 .176 .860 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .002 .009 .271 .786 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .004 .009 .403 .687 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .052 .006 8.346 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> TFE -.091 .017 -5.290 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> TFE .044 .008 5.248 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> TFE .093 .015 6.036 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.601 .009 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .679 .068 9.953 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .662 .066 10.084 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .694 .068 10.203 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .740 .072 10.318 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .748 .072 10.363 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .807 .077 10.468 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .412 .039 10.566 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .414 .039 10.599 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .418 .039 10.612 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .424 .040 10.630 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .422 .040 10.643 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .424 .040 10.656 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .037 .004 9.479 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .038 .004 9.961 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .039 .004 10.129 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .040 .004 10.238 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .041 .004 10.369 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .042 .004 10.526 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .190 .018 10.398 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .196 .019 10.424 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .183 .017 10.484 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 10.015 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .198 .019 10.584 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .197 .019 10.573 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.175 .031 -5.728 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.171 .030 -5.719 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.151 .028 -5.380 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.098 .027 -3.659 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.170 .030 -5.695 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.176 .030 -5.852 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.159 .029 -5.442 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.400 .048 -8.312 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.395 .048 -8.313 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.398 .048 -8.315 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.396 .048 -8.320 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.394 .047 -8.321 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.391 .047 -8.330 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.388 .047 -8.262 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.021 .013 -1.620 .105 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.026 .013 -1.996 .046 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.026 .013 -2.022 .043 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.026 .013 -2.047 .041 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.028 .013 -2.189 .029 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.029 .013 -2.265 .024 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.036 .014 -2.627 .009 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.115 .024 -4.729 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.153 .028 -5.397 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.385 .047 -8.234 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.021 .013 -1.646 .100 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.137 .027 -5.136 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.373 .045 -8.376 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.014 .012 -1.204 .228 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.135 .027 -5.097 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.371 .044 -8.363 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.013 .012 -1.120 .263 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.130 .025 -5.111 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.349 .042 -8.251 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.011 .011 -1.003 .316 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.123 .025 -4.962 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.329 .041 -8.066 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.011 .011 -1.031 .302 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.129 .026 -4.960 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.351 .043 -8.153 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.011 .012 -.985 .324 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .112 .021 5.233 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .065 .008 8.457 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.110 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .063 .007 8.342 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .096 .020 4.876 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .061 .007 8.528 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.693 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .055 .007 7.946 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .110 .021 5.264 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .065 .008 8.534 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .116 .021 5.484 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .065 .008 8.565 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .107 .021 5.186 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .108 .020 5.283 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .110 .021 5.353 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .108 .020 5.318 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .111 .020 5.461 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .111 .020 5.502 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .112 .020 5.509 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .065 .008 8.676 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .065 .007 8.669 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .065 .008 8.704 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .065 .007 8.715 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .065 .007 8.800 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .067 .008 8.828 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .065 .008 8.429 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .147 .015 9.958 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.006 .009 -.708 .479 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.375 .708 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.003 .009 -.300 .764 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.327 .743 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .002 .009 .246 .806 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .423 .672 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .010 .889 .374 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .018 5.504 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.005 .009 -.549 .583 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.002 .009 -.222 .824 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.004 .009 -.404 .686 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 .009 -.040 .968 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .001 .009 .065 .948 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .002 .009 .197 .844 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .051 .006 8.215 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> TFE -.093 .018 -5.252 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> TFE .046 .009 5.287 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> TFE .094 .016 6.024 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> TFE .006 .003 2.171 .030 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .712 .071 10.086 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .676 .067 10.070 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .715 .070 10.242 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .758 .073 10.325 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .771 .074 10.403 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .782 .077 10.179 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .415 .039 10.548 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .417 .039 10.582 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .421 .040 10.595 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .427 .040 10.614 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .425 .040 10.628 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .427 .040 10.643 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .434 .041 10.657 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .033 .004 9.082 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .035 .004 9.586 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .035 .004 9.755 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .037 .004 9.890 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .039 .004 10.214 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .040 .004 10.366 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 .831 .080 10.359 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .038 .004 10.022 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .197 .019 10.377 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .204 .020 10.418 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .189 .018 10.432 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 9.795 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .205 .019 10.567 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .206 .019 10.590 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .204 .019 10.614 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.176 .031 -5.652 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.172 .030 -5.648 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.154 .029 -5.365 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.103 .027 -3.761 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.173 .031 -5.662 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.177 .031 -5.773 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.162 .030 -5.406 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.170 .031 -5.467 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.422 .050 -8.416 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.416 .050 -8.402 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.411 .049 -8.395 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.413 .049 -8.398 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.411 .049 -8.409 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.408 .049 -8.392 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.406 .048 -8.404 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.403 .048 -8.354 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.012 .013 -.903 .366 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.021 .013 -1.570 .116 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.026 .013 -1.983 .047 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.025 .013 -1.918 .055 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.026 .013 -1.976 .048 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.027 .013 -2.106 .035 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.028 .013 -2.090 .037 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.033 .014 -2.392 .017 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.112 .025 -4.514 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.168 .030 -5.525 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.404 .049 -8.313 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.013 .012 -1.069 .285 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.163 .030 -5.510 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.387 .047 -8.220 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.013 .012 -1.080 .280 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.145 .028 -5.210 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.376 .045 -8.369 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.007 .011 -.587 .557 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.144 .028 -5.188 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.374 .045 -8.356 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.007 .011 -.584 .560 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.138 .027 -5.200 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.351 .043 -8.238 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.005 .011 -.411 .681 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.130 .026 -5.035 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.332 .041 -8.057 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.005 .011 -.484 .628 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.136 .027 -5.022 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.355 .044 -8.152 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.005 .011 -.436 .663 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .114 .022 5.264 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .059 .007 8.054 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .108 .021 5.136 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .056 .007 7.914 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .097 .020 4.907 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .055 .007 8.082 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .071 .019 3.706 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .050 .007 7.611 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .112 .021 5.280 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .059 .007 8.135 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .117 .021 5.494 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .059 .007 8.136 *** 
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Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .108 .021 5.194 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .059 .007 8.307 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .115 .022 5.300 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .114 .021 5.316 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .115 .021 5.422 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .118 .021 5.486 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .116 .021 5.461 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .119 .021 5.583 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .119 .021 5.620 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .119 .021 5.623 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .062 .007 8.289 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .068 .008 8.653 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .067 .008 8.646 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .068 .008 8.674 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .067 .008 8.693 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .068 .008 8.780 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .069 .008 8.823 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .068 .008 8.445 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .153 .015 9.970 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.014 .009 -1.517 .129 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.007 .009 -.709 .478 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.353 .724 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.003 .009 -.288 .774 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.310 .756 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .002 .009 .275 .784 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .452 .651 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .010 .911 .362 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_ER_05 .098 .018 5.500 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.013 .009 -1.442 .149 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.011 .009 -1.259 .208 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.008 .009 -.926 .354 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.010 .009 -1.117 .264 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.006 .009 -.713 .476 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.005 .009 -.617 .537 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.004 .009 -.488 .626 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .046 .006 7.834 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> TFE -.096 .018 -5.237 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> TFE .048 .009 5.381 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> TFE .095 .016 6.017 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> TFE .006 .003 2.130 .033 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.186 .032 -5.842 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.426 .051 -8.401 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.009 .013 -.723 .470 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 .897 .086 10.443 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.182 .031 -5.869 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.408 .049 -8.285 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.011 .013 -.882 .378 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 .873 .084 10.421 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.175 .030 -5.791 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.390 .048 -8.178 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.011 .012 -.887 .375 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .824 .080 10.256 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.157 .028 -5.530 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.380 .046 -8.344 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.004 .012 -.350 .727 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .779 .076 10.250 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.155 .028 -5.508 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.377 .045 -8.319 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.004 .012 -.346 .729 
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Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .769 .075 10.201 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.148 .027 -5.475 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.355 .043 -8.215 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.002 .011 -.195 .846 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .725 .072 10.111 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.139 .026 -5.294 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.336 .042 -8.040 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.003 .011 -.260 .795 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .688 .069 9.961 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.149 .028 -5.387 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.359 .044 -8.145 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.003 .011 -.245 .806 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .721 .072 9.943 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .205 .020 10.409 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .117 .022 5.336 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .060 .007 8.011 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.196 .033 -5.990 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .199 .019 10.361 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .111 .021 5.202 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .057 .007 7.874 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.193 .032 -6.016 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .190 .018 10.412 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .100 .020 4.964 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .055 .007 8.032 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.170 .030 -5.653 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .164 .017 9.653 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .074 .019 3.791 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .050 .007 7.518 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.113 .029 -3.947 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .206 .020 10.531 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .115 .022 5.345 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .059 .007 8.084 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.191 .032 -5.949 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .207 .020 10.558 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .120 .022 5.557 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .059 .007 8.089 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.197 .032 -6.103 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .203 .019 10.558 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .111 .021 5.256 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .060 .007 8.261 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.177 .031 -5.673 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .213 .020 10.596 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .118 .022 5.354 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .062 .008 8.252 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.187 .033 -5.742 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .125 .022 5.638 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .444 .042 10.653 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.013 .009 -1.422 .155 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.428 .052 -8.286 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .124 .022 5.653 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .438 .041 10.640 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.012 .009 -1.362 .173 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.422 .051 -8.264 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .125 .022 5.747 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .431 .041 10.622 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.011 .009 -1.183 .237 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.416 .050 -8.254 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .127 .022 5.797 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .431 .041 10.593 *** 
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Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.008 .009 -.912 .362 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.420 .051 -8.271 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .125 .022 5.776 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .430 .041 10.606 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.010 .009 -1.076 .282 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.417 .050 -8.270 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .127 .022 5.869 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .426 .040 10.581 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.007 .009 -.745 .456 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.416 .050 -8.279 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .127 .021 5.908 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .421 .040 10.565 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.006 .009 -.634 .526 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.413 .050 -8.290 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .127 .022 5.905 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .419 .040 10.530 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.004 .009 -.494 .622 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.409 .050 -8.217 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .060 .007 8.107 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.013 .009 -1.457 .145 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .041 .004 10.496 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.018 .013 -1.366 .172 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .066 .008 8.458 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.006 .009 -.611 .541 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .040 .004 10.294 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.028 .014 -2.036 .042 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .065 .008 8.460 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.002 .009 -.225 .822 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .039 .004 10.139 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.033 .014 -2.434 .015 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.486 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.001 .009 -.160 .873 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .038 .004 9.984 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.033 .014 -2.379 .017 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.517 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.177 .860 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .037 .004 9.868 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.033 .014 -2.391 .017 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.610 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .004 .009 .410 .682 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .036 .004 9.763 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.034 .014 -2.544 .011 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .068 .008 8.652 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .005 .009 .589 .556 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .035 .004 9.581 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.035 .014 -2.550 .011 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 .008 8.274 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .010 .010 1.019 .308 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .034 .004 9.067 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.043 .015 -2.971 .003 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .154 .015 9.939 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_ER_05 .101 .018 5.576 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .047 .006 7.759 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.125 .026 -4.821 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 .127 .022 5.655 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 .061 .008 8.112 *** 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE14 -.202 .033 -6.076 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.013 .009 -1.441 .150 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 -.434 .052 -8.288 *** 
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Table A.2 
Estimated correlations for fixed effects model using total subsidies per FTE (log) 
   Estimate 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> TFE -.593 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> TFE .583 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> TFE .885 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> TFE .261 
Ln_ER_05 <--> TFE .705 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.348 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.653 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.091 
Ln_SubFTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.277 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .358 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .736 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .892 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .046 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_ER_05 .397 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .706 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> TFE -.584 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> TFE .594 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> TFE .890 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> TFE .250 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .945 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .996 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .935 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .983 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.356 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.359 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.647 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.642 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.074 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.101 
Ln_SubFTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.271 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.355 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.653 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.072 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .380 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .380 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .753 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .715 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .894 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .369 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .745 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .042 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .062 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_ER_05 .400 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .049 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .727 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> TFE -.606 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> TFE .577 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> TFE .889 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> TFE .236 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .973 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .942 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .993 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .889 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .976 
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Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .974 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .979 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.369 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.374 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.346 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.661 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.665 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.658 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.082 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.080 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.111 
Ln_SubFTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.297 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.336 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.642 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.076 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.332 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.649 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.081 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .380 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .740 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .369 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .721 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .350 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .353 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .353 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .740 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .748 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .709 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .886 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .031 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .040 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .064 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_ER_05 .402 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .037 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .050 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .695 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> TFE -.616 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> TFE .485 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> TFE .887 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> TFE .212 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .923 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .952 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .980 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .991 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .996 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .874 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .954 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .846 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .831 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .882 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.371 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.374 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.346 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.221 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.672 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.673 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.676 
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Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.669 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.085 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.092 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.090 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.120 
Ln_SubFTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.298 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.224 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.659 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.078 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.212 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.640 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.067 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.213 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.648 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.075 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .719 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .363 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .702 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .345 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .723 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .256 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .263 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .268 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .269 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .655 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .664 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .669 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .631 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .783 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.012 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .024 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .033 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .060 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_ER_05 .397 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .006 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .018 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .680 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> TFE -.614 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> TFE .606 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> TFE .219 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .921 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .944 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .971 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .988 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .988 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .994 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .996 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .858 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .931 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .955 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .983 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> TFE .887 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .964 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .970 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .976 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .875 
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Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.377 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.380 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.353 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.226 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.383 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.674 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.675 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.675 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.677 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.670 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.100 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.099 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.104 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.105 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.133 
Ln_SubFTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.303 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.379 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.674 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.088 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.380 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.660 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.081 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.366 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.641 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.064 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.366 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.649 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.073 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .374 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .702 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .364 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .687 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .345 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .710 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .256 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .645 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .380 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .378 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .389 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .393 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .393 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .714 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .722 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .681 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .882 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.002 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.014 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.018 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .019 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .059 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_ER_05 .397 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .010 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .017 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .026 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .670 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> TFE -.615 
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Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> TFE .622 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> TFE .883 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> TFE .228 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .882 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .920 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .937 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .954 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .956 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .985 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .991 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .993 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .996 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .849 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .913 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .938 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .961 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .964 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .971 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .968 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .839 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .990 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.403 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.405 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.374 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.242 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.405 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.419 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.658 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.659 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.660 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.660 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.661 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.652 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.129 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.127 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.126 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.134 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.141 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.172 
Ln_SubFTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.332 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.394 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.672 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.105 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.391 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.671 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.098 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.393 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.658 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.089 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.378 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.639 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.079 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.378 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.647 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.088 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .374 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .689 
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Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .364 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .676 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .346 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .696 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .257 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .630 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .378 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .694 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .395 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .401 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .399 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .410 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .414 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .413 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .700 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .706 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .716 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .724 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .687 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .889 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.020 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.017 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.019 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .019 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .057 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_ER_05 .395 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .018 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .027 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .666 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> TFE -.613 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> TFE .607 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> TFE .878 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> TFE .216 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .891 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .912 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .931 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .951 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .959 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .979 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .982 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .988 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .990 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .994 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .996 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .812 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .885 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .912 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .930 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .952 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .953 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .958 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .969 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .890 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .987 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .985 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.413 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.412 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.384 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.252 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.410 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.423 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.389 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.664 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.664 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.664 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.664 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.665 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.666 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.658 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.109 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.135 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.136 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.138 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.148 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.153 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.178 
Ln_SubFTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.332 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.386 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.655 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.111 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.364 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.671 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.081 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.361 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.669 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.075 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.363 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.657 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.067 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.351 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.637 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.069 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.351 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.647 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.066 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .370 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .679 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .360 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .666 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .342 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .687 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .253 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .622 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .688 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .391 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .692 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .367 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .374 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .380 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .377 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .389 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .392 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .393 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .709 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .710 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .720 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .724 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .676 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .881 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.047 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.025 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.020 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.022 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .016 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .028 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .059 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_ER_05 .393 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.036 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.015 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.027 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.003 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .004 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .013 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .651 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> TFE -.610 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> TFE .616 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> TFE .875 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> TFE .173 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .913 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .909 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .938 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .952 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .966 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .927 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .979 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .985 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .987 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .991 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .993 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .996 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .758 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .828 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .853 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .873 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .926 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .952 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 .958 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .894 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .950 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .957 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .960 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .856 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .984 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .988 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .992 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.406 
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Estimate 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.406 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.383 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.259 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.407 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.417 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.386 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.391 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.675 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.674 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.673 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.673 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.674 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.672 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.674 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.668 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.060 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.105 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.134 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.129 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.133 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.142 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.141 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.162 
Ln_SubFTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.316 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.396 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.664 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.072 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.395 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.653 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.072 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.370 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.670 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.039 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.369 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.669 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.039 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.370 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.655 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.028 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.357 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.636 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.032 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.356 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.647 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.029 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .633 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .363 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .618 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .345 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .636 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .254 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .586 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .374 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .642 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .392 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .642 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .367 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .662 
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   Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .376 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .377 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .386 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .391 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .389 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .399 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .402 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .402 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .660 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .702 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .702 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .707 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .718 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .723 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .678 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .883 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.101 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.047 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.023 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.019 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.021 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .018 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .061 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_ER_05 .392 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.096 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.084 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.062 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.074 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.047 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.041 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.032 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .610 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> TFE -.607 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> TFE .637 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> TFE .874 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> TFE .170 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.422 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.674 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 -.048 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_13 .972 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.425 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.660 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 -.059 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_12 .969 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.418 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.649 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 -.059 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_11 .940 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.396 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.667 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 -.023 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_10 .939 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.395 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.664 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 -.023 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_09 .930 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.392 
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Estimate 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.653 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 -.013 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_08 .915 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.378 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.634 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 -.017 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_07 .892 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.385 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.646 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 -.016 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_SubFTE_06 .889 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .955 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .379 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .629 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.435 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .947 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .368 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .614 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.437 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .956 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .349 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .631 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.407 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .835 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .260 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .577 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.273 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .977 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .379 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .637 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.432 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .982 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .397 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .637 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.445 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .982 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .372 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .657 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.408 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .989 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .380 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .655 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.414 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .403 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.095 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.660 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .405 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .996 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.091 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.658 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .413 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .992 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.079 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.657 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .417 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .987 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.061 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.659 
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Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .415 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .989 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.072 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.658 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .423 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .985 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.050 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.659 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .426 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .982 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.042 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.661 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .426 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .975 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.033 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.652 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .639 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.097 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .975 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.092 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .679 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.041 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .940 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.137 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .679 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.015 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .913 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.165 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .682 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.011 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .888 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.161 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .686 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .870 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.162 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .697 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .027 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .854 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.172 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .702 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .039 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .827 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.173 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .658 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .068 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .756 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.202 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .878 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_ER_05 .399 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .602 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.339 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 .405 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 .640 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE14 -.443 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.096 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 -.660 
Ln_SubFTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.077 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.1 
Estimated covariances for fixed effects models using school funds per FTE (log) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> TFE -.108 .026 -4.080 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> TFE .041 .008 5.006 *** 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> TFE .090 .015 5.974 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> TFE .009 .003 2.930 .003 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.175 .057 -3.082 .002 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.477 .085 -5.585 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.040 .027 -1.484 .138 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.141 .047 -2.973 .003 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .103 .020 5.062 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .072 .008 8.923 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .151 .015 10.025 *** 
Ln_ER_05 <--> TFE .042 .007 5.825 *** 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .006 .009 .680 .497 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_ER_05 .095 .017 5.544 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .058 .007 8.674 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> TFE -.083 .025 -3.302 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> TFE .043 .008 5.047 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> TFE .090 .015 5.987 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> TFE .008 .003 2.797 .005 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 3.060 .315 9.723 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .407 .038 10.640 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .042 .004 10.265 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .203 .019 10.563 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.191 .061 -3.149 .002 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.175 .059 -2.965 .003 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.383 .086 -4.443 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.377 .086 -4.377 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.047 .027 -1.751 .080 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.050 .028 -1.759 .079 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.129 .049 -2.619 .009 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.194 .058 -3.322 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.482 .085 -5.653 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.038 .026 -1.479 .139 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .111 .021 5.343 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .112 .021 5.336 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .072 .008 9.051 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .072 .008 8.751 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .155 .015 10.039 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .105 .020 5.194 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .069 .008 8.994 *** 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .006 .009 .625 .532 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .009 .922 .356 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_ER_05 .096 .017 5.584 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .006 .009 .728 .466 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .057 .006 8.853 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> TFE -.103 .027 -3.855 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> TFE .038 .008 4.991 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> TFE .090 .015 5.980 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.658 .008 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.376 .336 10.057 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 3.091 .316 9.789 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .409 .039 10.627 *** 
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Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .410 .039 10.656 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.990 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .041 .004 10.499 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .186 .018 10.514 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .192 .018 10.537 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.218 .061 -3.575 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.203 .059 -3.419 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.189 .056 -3.361 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.457 .088 -5.180 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.452 .087 -5.173 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.444 .087 -5.079 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.054 .027 -2.049 .040 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.051 .027 -1.907 .057 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.056 .028 -1.991 .047 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.165 .050 -3.319 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.159 .056 -2.847 .004 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.389 .087 -4.480 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.047 .027 -1.777 .076 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.154 .054 -2.872 .004 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.488 .086 -5.681 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.040 .025 -1.560 .119 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .112 .021 5.339 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .069 .008 8.951 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .020 5.192 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .066 .008 8.809 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .095 .019 4.957 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .096 .019 4.998 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .096 .019 4.999 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .064 .007 8.953 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .066 .007 9.015 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .066 .008 8.705 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .142 .014 9.985 *** 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .004 .009 .471 .638 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .005 .009 .604 .546 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .009 .945 .345 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .017 5.607 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .005 .009 .553 .580 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .007 .009 .750 .453 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .053 .006 8.591 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> TFE -.106 .026 -3.995 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> TFE .032 .007 4.680 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> TFE .091 .015 5.981 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.415 .016 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 2.993 .303 9.890 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.098 .314 9.859 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.290 .322 10.204 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .413 .039 10.612 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .414 .039 10.644 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .418 .039 10.653 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.891 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .041 .004 10.378 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .041 .004 10.520 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .160 .016 9.729 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .161 .017 9.625 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .158 .016 9.968 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.212 .058 -3.654 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.189 .056 -3.353 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.176 .053 -3.298 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.069 .052 -1.334 .182 
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Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.502 .086 -5.815 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.498 .085 -5.829 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.493 .085 -5.822 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.490 .085 -5.773 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.056 .026 -2.193 .028 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.050 .025 -2.001 .045 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.047 .026 -1.850 .064 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.050 .027 -1.858 .063 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.146 .047 -3.103 .002 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.092 .055 -1.675 .094 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.459 .089 -5.154 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.060 .027 -2.228 .026 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.064 .055 -1.180 .238 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.391 .088 -4.460 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.048 .027 -1.780 .075 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.062 .052 -1.175 .240 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.492 .087 -5.664 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.039 .026 -1.535 .125 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.256 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .068 .008 8.789 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.116 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .065 .008 8.649 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .019 4.895 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .063 .007 8.820 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .070 .019 3.726 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .071 .019 3.828 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .072 .019 3.890 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .072 .019 3.900 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .057 .007 8.245 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .057 .007 8.323 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .058 .007 8.369 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .058 .007 8.032 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .124 .013 9.281 *** 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.182 .856 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .360 .719 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .501 .616 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .893 .372 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .017 5.552 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 .009 -.001 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .001 .009 .088 .930 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .002 .009 .270 .787 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .053 .006 8.463 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> TFE -.113 .028 -4.115 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> TFE .043 .008 5.120 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.492 .013 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 2.966 .306 9.698 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.044 .316 9.620 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.283 .327 10.055 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 3.343 .321 10.429 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .409 .039 10.597 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .411 .039 10.630 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .415 .039 10.641 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .420 .039 10.655 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .039 .004 9.794 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .040 .004 10.244 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .040 .004 10.383 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .042 .004 10.539 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> TFE .091 .015 5.980 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .195 .019 10.456 *** 
204
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .201 .019 10.491 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .187 .018 10.521 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 9.924 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.213 .059 -3.573 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.195 .058 -3.363 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.185 .055 -3.374 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.089 .053 -1.677 .094 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.210 .058 -3.598 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.536 .089 -6.021 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.527 .088 -5.964 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.531 .088 -6.026 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.527 .087 -6.025 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.520 .087 -5.953 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.064 .026 -2.434 .015 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.055 .026 -2.119 .034 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.047 .026 -1.825 .068 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.045 .026 -1.708 .088 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.050 .028 -1.827 .068 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.149 .048 -3.099 .002 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.198 .057 -3.483 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.493 .086 -5.762 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.062 .026 -2.416 .016 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.208 .060 -3.488 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.452 .088 -5.112 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.065 .027 -2.408 .016 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.175 .059 -2.946 .003 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.384 .087 -4.409 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.053 .027 -1.953 .051 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.184 .057 -3.218 .001 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.487 .086 -5.639 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.046 .026 -1.762 .078 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.265 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .067 .008 8.649 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .105 .021 5.136 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .064 .008 8.530 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .019 4.897 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .063 .007 8.715 *** 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.728 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .056 .007 8.158 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .111 .021 5.341 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .110 .021 5.316 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .113 .021 5.452 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .113 .021 5.501 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .113 .021 5.494 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.665 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.676 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.751 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .067 .008 8.813 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 .008 8.468 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .149 .015 9.956 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 .009 -.035 .972 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.002 .009 -.215 .830 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.272 .786 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .296 .767 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .455 .649 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .872 .383 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_ER_05 .096 .017 5.549 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .001 .009 .152 .879 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .002 .009 .248 .804 
205
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .003 .009 .389 .697 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .052 .006 8.378 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> TFE -.119 .029 -4.094 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> TFE .044 .008 5.181 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> TFE .090 .015 5.965 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.604 .009 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 2.975 .317 9.400 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.160 .332 9.516 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.413 .343 9.961 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 3.318 .329 10.082 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 3.551 .344 10.318 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .408 .039 10.582 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .410 .039 10.615 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .414 .039 10.626 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .420 .039 10.642 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .418 .039 10.655 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .038 .004 9.734 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .039 .004 10.138 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .039 .004 10.284 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .041 .004 10.416 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .042 .004 10.521 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .196 .019 10.457 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .202 .019 10.495 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .186 .018 10.481 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .160 .016 9.686 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .202 .019 10.599 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.245 .063 -3.869 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.229 .062 -3.725 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.210 .058 -3.602 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.119 .057 -2.097 .036 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.238 .062 -3.834 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.241 .062 -3.891 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.545 .093 -5.851 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.554 .094 -5.907 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.546 .093 -5.860 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.550 .093 -5.926 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.545 .092 -5.916 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.535 .092 -5.813 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.073 .028 -2.607 .009 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.071 .028 -2.543 .011 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.061 .028 -2.209 .027 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.057 .027 -2.065 .039 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.056 .028 -2.025 .043 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.067 .029 -2.304 .021 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.171 .051 -3.341 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.210 .058 -3.591 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.527 .088 -5.963 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.067 .026 -2.531 .011 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.200 .057 -3.517 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.494 .086 -5.765 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.065 .026 -2.527 .012 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.213 .060 -3.557 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.452 .088 -5.109 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.068 .027 -2.527 .012 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.180 .059 -3.030 .002 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.385 .087 -4.414 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.054 .027 -2.016 .044 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.187 .057 -3.268 .001 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.491 .086 -5.681 *** 
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Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.046 .026 -1.780 .075 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.267 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .065 .008 8.546 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.136 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .063 .007 8.432 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .019 4.905 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .061 .007 8.602 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.748 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .055 .007 8.018 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .110 .021 5.313 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .065 .008 8.586 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .115 .021 5.528 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .118 .021 5.597 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .116 .021 5.567 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .119 .021 5.708 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .119 .021 5.748 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .119 .021 5.740 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .065 .008 8.634 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.666 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.685 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.768 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .068 .008 8.831 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 .008 8.522 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .151 .015 10.005 *** 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.302 .763 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.002 .009 -.252 .801 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.283 .777 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .296 .767 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .457 .648 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .844 .399 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_ER_05 .096 .017 5.528 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 .009 .002 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.002 .009 -.180 .857 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .002 .009 .181 .856 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .002 .009 .277 .782 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .004 .009 .405 .686 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .052 .006 8.347 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> TFE -.131 .031 -4.230 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> TFE .042 .008 5.142 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> TFE .091 .015 5.949 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> TFE .007 .003 2.505 .012 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 3.041 .323 9.416 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.126 .334 9.347 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.377 .345 9.797 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 3.325 .333 9.989 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 3.485 .345 10.111 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 3.795 .369 10.274 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .412 .039 10.564 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .414 .039 10.598 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .418 .039 10.611 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .424 .040 10.628 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .422 .040 10.642 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .424 .040 10.654 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .037 .004 9.480 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .038 .004 9.959 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .039 .004 10.127 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .040 .004 10.237 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .041 .004 10.368 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .042 .004 10.526 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .190 .018 10.398 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .196 .019 10.423 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .183 .017 10.484 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 10.016 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .198 .019 10.584 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .197 .019 10.572 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.267 .065 -4.125 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.249 .063 -3.950 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.229 .060 -3.849 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.131 .058 -2.264 .024 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.249 .063 -3.930 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.251 .063 -3.971 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.231 .062 -3.729 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.628 .098 -6.417 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.621 .097 -6.421 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.626 .097 -6.433 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.617 .097 -6.395 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.620 .096 -6.445 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.613 .095 -6.421 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.603 .095 -6.325 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.067 .029 -2.332 .020 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.072 .028 -2.545 .011 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.076 .029 -2.646 .008 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.067 .028 -2.376 .018 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.065 .028 -2.320 .020 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.068 .028 -2.396 .017 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.078 .030 -2.619 .009 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.184 .052 -3.521 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.223 .061 -3.675 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.549 .094 -5.825 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.067 .028 -2.393 .017 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.194 .057 -3.399 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.532 .089 -5.944 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.061 .027 -2.310 .021 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.186 .056 -3.333 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.499 .087 -5.752 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.061 .026 -2.360 .018 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.199 .059 -3.396 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.457 .090 -5.101 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.065 .027 -2.378 .017 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.170 .058 -2.912 .004 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.389 .088 -4.401 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.056 .027 -2.065 .039 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.176 .056 -3.124 .002 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.499 .088 -5.698 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.042 .026 -1.615 .106 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .111 .021 5.219 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .065 .008 8.462 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .106 .021 5.089 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .063 .007 8.348 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .095 .020 4.858 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .061 .007 8.532 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .070 .019 3.688 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .055 .007 7.946 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .110 .021 5.249 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .065 .008 8.539 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .115 .021 5.470 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .065 .008 8.570 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .106 .021 5.175 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .107 .020 5.272 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .110 .020 5.343 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .108 .020 5.307 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .111 .020 5.451 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .111 .020 5.493 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .111 .020 5.498 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .065 .008 8.677 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .064 .007 8.669 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .065 .007 8.703 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .065 .007 8.713 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .065 .007 8.797 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .066 .008 8.825 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .065 .008 8.427 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .147 .015 9.953 *** 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.006 .009 -.697 .486 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.368 .713 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.003 .009 -.301 .763 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.326 .745 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .002 .009 .251 .802 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .424 .671 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .008 .009 .879 .380 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .018 5.497 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.005 .009 -.539 .590 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.002 .009 -.211 .833 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.004 .009 -.395 .693 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 .009 -.029 .977 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .001 .009 .077 .939 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .002 .009 .206 .837 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .051 .006 8.215 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> TFE -.123 .030 -4.120 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> TFE .045 .009 5.180 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> TFE .092 .015 5.937 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> TFE .005 .003 2.089 .037 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 2.887 .312 9.248 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 3.116 .329 9.459 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.361 .340 9.898 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 3.179 .322 9.866 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 3.380 .336 10.070 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 3.604 .356 10.117 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .415 .039 10.547 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .416 .039 10.581 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .421 .040 10.594 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .427 .040 10.613 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .425 .040 10.626 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .427 .040 10.641 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .433 .041 10.656 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .033 .004 9.083 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .035 .004 9.583 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .035 .004 9.752 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .036 .004 9.889 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .039 .004 10.214 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .040 .004 10.366 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 3.764 .367 10.252 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .038 .004 10.022 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .197 .019 10.377 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .203 .020 10.418 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .189 .018 10.432 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .167 .017 9.795 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .205 .019 10.567 *** 
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Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .206 .019 10.590 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .203 .019 10.613 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.272 .064 -4.277 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.251 .062 -4.060 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.237 .058 -4.047 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.135 .057 -2.391 .017 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.253 .062 -4.074 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.254 .062 -4.086 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.236 .061 -3.883 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.253 .063 -3.997 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.609 .096 -6.316 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.602 .095 -6.311 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.594 .094 -6.303 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.598 .095 -6.315 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.592 .094 -6.296 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.591 .094 -6.307 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.585 .093 -6.295 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.580 .093 -6.235 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.050 .027 -1.833 .067 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.065 .028 -2.306 .021 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.070 .028 -2.541 .011 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.071 .028 -2.529 .011 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.065 .028 -2.345 .019 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.064 .027 -2.333 .020 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.064 .028 -2.318 .020 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.069 .029 -2.379 .017 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.178 .051 -3.475 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.250 .065 -3.869 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.634 .099 -6.408 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.053 .028 -1.925 .054 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.242 .063 -3.819 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.551 .095 -5.793 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.058 .027 -2.121 .034 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.213 .060 -3.570 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.535 .090 -5.925 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.051 .026 -1.992 .046 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.205 .058 -3.521 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.503 .088 -5.738 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.058 .025 -2.294 .022 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.217 .061 -3.541 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.461 .090 -5.093 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.059 .026 -2.244 .025 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.185 .061 -3.046 .002 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.387 .089 -4.348 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.054 .026 -2.057 .040 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.190 .059 -3.235 .001 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.501 .088 -5.668 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.040 .025 -1.586 .113 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .113 .022 5.250 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .059 .007 8.062 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .107 .021 5.115 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .056 .007 7.923 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .097 .020 4.889 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .055 .007 8.089 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .071 .019 3.701 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .050 .007 7.612 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .111 .021 5.264 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .059 .007 8.144 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .117 .021 5.480 *** 
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Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .059 .007 8.144 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .108 .021 5.182 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .059 .007 8.311 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .115 .022 5.289 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .114 .021 5.306 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .115 .021 5.412 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .117 .021 5.477 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .116 .021 5.451 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .118 .021 5.574 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .118 .021 5.612 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .119 .021 5.613 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .062 .007 8.293 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .068 .008 8.655 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .067 .008 8.647 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .068 .008 8.672 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .067 .008 8.691 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .068 .008 8.777 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .069 .008 8.819 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .068 .008 8.443 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .153 .015 9.966 *** 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.013 .009 -1.495 .135 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.006 .009 -.698 .485 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.003 .009 -.346 .729 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.003 .009 -.288 .773 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.003 .009 -.308 .758 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .003 .009 .281 .779 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .004 .009 .453 .650 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .009 .010 .901 .368 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_ER_05 .097 .018 5.493 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.013 .009 -1.421 .155 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.011 .009 -1.239 .215 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.008 .009 -.904 .366 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.010 .009 -1.096 .273 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.006 .009 -.690 .490 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.005 .009 -.592 .554 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.004 .009 -.466 .641 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .046 .006 7.834 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> TFE -.116 .029 -3.979 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> TFE .046 .009 5.271 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> TFE .093 .016 5.930 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> TFE .005 .003 2.059 .039 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.275 .064 -4.273 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.617 .098 -6.310 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.042 .027 -1.545 .122 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 3.764 .362 10.400 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.269 .066 -4.108 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.642 .100 -6.402 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.045 .028 -1.588 .112 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 3.672 .362 10.139 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.266 .064 -4.125 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.558 .096 -5.788 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.049 .028 -1.792 .073 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 3.506 .351 9.988 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.237 .061 -3.913 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.542 .092 -5.922 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.043 .026 -1.660 .097 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 3.172 .326 9.736 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.225 .059 -3.819 *** 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.506 .089 -5.705 *** 
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Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.052 .025 -2.037 .042 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 3.022 .315 9.603 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.235 .062 -3.785 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.466 .092 -5.077 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.053 .027 -1.962 .050 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 3.248 .334 9.730 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.201 .062 -3.267 .001 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.387 .090 -4.292 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.048 .027 -1.800 .072 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 2.978 .323 9.222 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.212 .059 -3.562 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.506 .090 -5.645 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.033 .026 -1.305 .192 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 2.768 .307 9.030 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .205 .020 10.408 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .117 .022 5.322 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .060 .007 8.019 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.287 .064 -4.513 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .198 .019 10.361 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .111 .021 5.182 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .057 .007 7.884 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.272 .062 -4.401 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .190 .018 10.412 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .099 .020 4.946 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .055 .007 8.039 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.243 .058 -4.160 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .164 .017 9.654 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .074 .019 3.786 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .050 .007 7.520 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.141 .056 -2.508 .012 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .206 .020 10.530 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .115 .021 5.330 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .059 .007 8.093 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.261 .062 -4.220 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .207 .020 10.557 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .120 .022 5.543 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .059 .007 8.097 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.267 .062 -4.304 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .203 .019 10.557 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .111 .021 5.245 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .060 .007 8.266 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.245 .061 -4.035 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .213 .020 10.595 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .118 .022 5.344 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .062 .008 8.256 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.262 .063 -4.134 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .124 .022 5.630 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .444 .042 10.652 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.013 .009 -1.401 .161 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.573 .095 -6.024 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .123 .022 5.645 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .438 .041 10.639 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.012 .009 -1.342 .180 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.564 .094 -5.998 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .124 .022 5.740 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .431 .041 10.621 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.010 .009 -1.163 .245 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.555 .093 -5.980 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .126 .022 5.790 *** 
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Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .431 .041 10.591 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.008 .009 -.892 .372 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.561 .093 -6.013 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .125 .022 5.769 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .429 .041 10.604 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.009 .009 -1.057 .291 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.555 .093 -5.982 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .127 .022 5.862 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .425 .040 10.579 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.006 .009 -.724 .469 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.558 .092 -6.035 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .127 .021 5.902 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .421 .040 10.563 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.005 .009 -.611 .541 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.552 .092 -6.022 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .127 .022 5.897 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .419 .040 10.529 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.004 .009 -.474 .635 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.540 .092 -5.897 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .060 .007 8.111 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.013 .009 -1.435 .151 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .041 .004 10.496 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.061 .027 -2.252 .024 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .066 .008 8.459 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.006 .009 -.599 .549 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .040 .004 10.294 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.073 .028 -2.614 .009 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .065 .008 8.460 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.002 .009 -.217 .829 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .039 .004 10.139 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.080 .028 -2.871 .004 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .066 .008 8.483 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.001 .009 -.158 .874 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .038 .004 9.984 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.079 .028 -2.837 .005 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .066 .008 8.514 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.002 .009 -.173 .863 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .037 .004 9.867 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.074 .028 -2.688 .007 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .066 .008 8.607 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .004 .009 .418 .676 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .036 .004 9.761 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.074 .027 -2.701 .007 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .068 .008 8.648 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .005 .009 .592 .554 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .035 .004 9.579 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.075 .028 -2.697 .007 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 .008 8.271 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .010 .010 1.009 .313 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .034 .004 9.068 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.086 .029 -2.945 .003 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .154 .015 9.935 *** 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_ER_05 .100 .018 5.570 *** 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .047 .006 7.760 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.179 .051 -3.510 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 .127 .022 5.648 *** 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 .061 .008 8.117 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE14 -.282 .064 -4.385 *** 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.013 .009 -1.419 .156 
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Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 -.583 .096 -6.043 *** 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.053 .027 -1.935 
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Table B.2 
Estimated correlations for fixed effects models using school funds per FTE (log) 
Estimate 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> TFE -.365 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> TFE .573 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> TFE .882 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> TFE .254 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.210 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.400 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.100 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.202 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .357 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .736 
Ln_CoreFTE06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .892 
Ln_ER_05 <--> TFE .703 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .045 
Ln_FTE0506 <--> Ln_ER_05 .396 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 <--> Ln_ER_05 .705 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> TFE -.272 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> TFE .585 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> TFE .887 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> TFE .243 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .849 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .996 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .935 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .983 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.214 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.201 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.309 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.304 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.117 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.118 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.177 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.227 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.406 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.099 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .379 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .379 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .753 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .715 
Ln_CoreFTE07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .894 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .367 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .745 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .042 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .061 
Ln_FTE0607 <--> Ln_ER_05 .399 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .048 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 <--> Ln_ER_05 .728 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> TFE -.337 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> TFE .568 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> TFE .886 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> TFE .229 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .899 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .858 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .993 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .889 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .976 
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Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .974 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .979 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.245 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.233 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.229 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.366 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.366 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.358 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.138 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.128 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.134 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.226 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.193 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.312 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.119 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.195 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.408 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.105 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .379 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .740 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .367 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .722 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .349 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .352 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .352 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .740 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .748 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .709 
Ln_CoreFTE08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .885 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .031 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .040 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .063 
Ln_FTE0708 <--> Ln_ER_05 .401 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .037 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .050 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 <--> Ln_ER_05 .695 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> TFE -.362 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> TFE .481 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> TFE .885 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> TFE .204 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .873 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .867 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .922 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .991 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .996 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .874 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .954 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .846 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .831 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .883 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.250 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.229 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.225 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.089 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.418 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.420 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.419 
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   Estimate 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.415 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.147 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.134 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.124 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.125 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.211 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.112 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.364 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.150 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.079 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.310 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.119 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.079 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.407 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.103 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .372 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .719 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .361 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .702 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .344 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .723 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .255 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .263 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .267 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .268 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .655 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .664 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .669 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .631 
Ln_CoreFTE09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .783 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.012 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .024 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .033 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .059 
Ln_FTE0809 <--> Ln_ER_05 .397 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .000 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .006 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .018 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 <--> Ln_ER_05 .680 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> TFE -.379 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> TFE .597 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> TFE .211 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .843 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .831 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .896 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 .959 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .988 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .994 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .996 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .859 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .931 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .955 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .983 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> TFE .884 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .964 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .970 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .976 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .876 
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Estimate 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.244 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.229 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.230 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.112 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.246 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.436 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.431 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.436 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.436 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.430 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.164 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.142 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.122 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.114 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.122 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.210 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.238 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.414 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.163 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.238 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.361 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.162 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.200 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.307 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.131 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.219 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.405 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.118 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .702 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .363 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .688 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .344 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .710 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .256 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .645 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .379 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .377 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .388 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .392 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .392 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .714 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .722 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .681 
Ln_CoreFTE10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .881 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.002 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.014 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.018 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .020 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .058 
Ln_FTE0910 <--> Ln_ER_05 .396 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .010 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .017 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .026 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 <--> Ln_ER_05 .670 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> TFE -.376 
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Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> TFE .613 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> TFE .881 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> TFE .220 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .800 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .816 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .881 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 .900 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 .939 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .985 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .991 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .993 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .996 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .850 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .913 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .938 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .961 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .964 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .971 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .968 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .840 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .990 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.266 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.255 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.246 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.141 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.263 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.267 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.421 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.426 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.422 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.428 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.427 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.418 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.176 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.172 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.149 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.139 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.136 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.155 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.228 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.246 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.431 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.171 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.240 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.414 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.171 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.243 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.361 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.171 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.206 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.307 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.136 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.223 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.408 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.120 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .690 
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   Estimate 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .363 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .676 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .344 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .696 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .257 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .630 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .377 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .694 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .394 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .400 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .398 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .409 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .413 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .412 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .700 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .706 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .717 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .724 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .687 
Ln_CoreFTE11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .888 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.020 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.017 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.019 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .020 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .056 
Ln_FTE1011 <--> Ln_ER_05 .395 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .000 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .018 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .027 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 <--> Ln_ER_05 .667 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> TFE -.404 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> TFE .600 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> TFE .876 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> TFE .209 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .802 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .791 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .855 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 .885 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 .904 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 .931 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .982 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .988 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .990 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .994 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .996 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .812 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .884 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .911 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .930 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .952 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .980 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .954 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .958 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .969 
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   Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .890 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .987 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .985 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.285 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.272 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.264 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.152 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.270 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.273 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.255 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.470 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.471 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.472 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.468 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.473 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.471 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.462 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.157 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.172 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.179 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.160 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.156 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.161 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.177 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.241 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.252 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.419 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.161 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.232 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.429 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.155 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.227 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.413 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.159 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.232 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.360 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.160 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.198 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.306 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.139 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.213 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.410 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.108 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .369 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .680 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .359 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .666 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .341 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .688 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .253 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .622 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .372 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .689 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .390 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .692 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .366 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .374 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .379 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .376 
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   Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .388 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .392 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .392 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .704 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .708 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .710 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .720 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .724 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .676 
Ln_CoreFTE12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .880 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.046 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.025 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.020 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.022 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .017 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .028 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .059 
Ln_FTE1112 <--> Ln_ER_05 .392 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.036 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.014 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.026 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.002 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .005 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .014 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 <--> Ln_ER_05 .651 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> TFE -.389 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> TFE .608 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> TFE .873 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> TFE .168 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .778 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .806 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .870 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 .865 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 .896 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 .904 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .979 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .985 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .987 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .991 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .993 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .996 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .999 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .758 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .827 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .852 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .873 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .926 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .952 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 .925 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .894 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .950 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .957 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .959 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .856 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .984 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .988 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .992 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.296 
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   Estimate 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.280 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.279 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.161 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.281 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.282 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.267 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.275 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.461 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.460 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.460 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.461 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.459 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.460 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.459 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.454 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.123 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.155 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.171 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.170 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.158 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.157 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.156 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.160 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.237 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.266 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.469 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.129 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.262 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.416 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.143 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.244 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.427 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.134 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.241 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.412 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.154 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.242 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.359 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.151 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.207 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.302 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.138 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.221 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.407 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.106 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .372 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .634 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .361 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .619 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .343 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .637 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .254 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .586 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .373 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .643 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .390 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .643 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .366 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .662 
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Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .375 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .376 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .385 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .390 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .388 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .398 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .401 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .401 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .660 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .703 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .702 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .705 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .707 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .718 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .723 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .678 
Ln_CoreFTE13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .882 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.100 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.046 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.023 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.019 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.021 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .019 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .030 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .060 
Ln_FTE1213 <--> Ln_ER_05 .392 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.095 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.083 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.060 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.073 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.046 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.039 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.031 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 <--> Ln_ER_05 .610 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> TFE -.369 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> TFE .628 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> TFE .871 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> TFE .165 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.296 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.460 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 -.103 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_13 .950 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.283 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.469 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 -.106 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_12 .907 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.285 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.416 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 -.120 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_11 .883 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.269 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.427 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 -.111 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_10 .845 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.262 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.409 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 -.137 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_09 .826 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.260 
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   Estimate 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.358 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 -.132 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_08 .845 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.223 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.298 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 -.121 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_07 .774 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.244 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.405 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 -.087 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_SchFund_FTE_06 .749 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .955 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .378 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 .630 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE07 -.314 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .947 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .366 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 .615 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE06 -.305 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .956 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .348 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 .632 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE08 -.287 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .835 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .260 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 .577 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE09 -.169 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .977 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .378 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 .638 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE10 -.292 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .982 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .396 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 .638 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE11 -.298 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .982 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .371 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 .657 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE12 -.278 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .989 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .379 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 .656 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE13 -.285 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .403 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1213 .998 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.094 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1213 -.435 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .404 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1112 .996 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.090 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1112 -.433 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .412 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE1011 .992 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.078 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1011 -.432 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .416 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0809 .987 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.059 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0809 -.435 
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   Estimate 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .414 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0910 .989 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.070 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0910 -.432 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .422 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0708 .985 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.048 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0708 -.436 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .426 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0607 .982 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.041 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0607 -.435 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .425 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_FTE0506 .975 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.032 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE0506 -.425 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .640 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.096 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 .975 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_13 -.151 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .679 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.040 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 .939 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_12 -.176 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .679 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.014 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 .913 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_11 -.194 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .682 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.011 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 .888 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_10 -.192 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .686 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.012 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 .870 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_09 -.181 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .697 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .028 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 .854 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_08 -.182 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .702 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .039 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 .827 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_07 -.182 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .658 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .067 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 .756 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_06 -.200 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .877 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_ER_05 .398 
Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 .602 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_ER_05 -.240 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 .404 
Ln_CoreFTE14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 .640 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_CoreFTE14 -.304 
Ln_FTE1314 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.095 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_FTE1314 -.437 
Ln_SchFund_FTE_14 <--> Ln_Fac_100FTE_14 -.130 
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